

# JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

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## EDITORIAL.

With new editors and a new plan, the JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY begins its fifth volume. A glance into the volumes already issued shows that topics such as the following have been considered: Stages of religious development, history and psychology of prayer, sex-phenomena in religious thought, types of religious attitude, types of denominational belief, psychology of prophecy, faith, fear and the sublime, religion as a factor in the struggle for life, pedagogy of missions, psychology of Jesus, ethical culture movement, primitive magic and morals, conception of God, conversion, religion and sensualism, philosophy of Nietzsche, place of the feelings in religion, psychology of Christian hymns, the sign of the mother-goddess, original sin, human sacrifice, religious folk-songs of Southern Negroes, etc. The outlook upon the field of religious psychology has been broad and catholic both as to subject-matter and as to treatment of current literature and the more detailed and substantial arguments that find place in the ever-increasing number of monographs and books representing now the results of careful research as well as of naïve speculation. The JOURNAL will continue, as far as possible, to cover the field indicated by its title; there will be no narrowing here, either of service or of view-point.

More attention than has been the case hitherto will be given the anthropological and the sociological aspects of the subject, something justified by the rich material now being accumulated by competent investigators and ethnological experts, which is leading more and more to the revision of our opinions concerning the mythological, philosophical and religious ideas of so-called "lower races" of man and their relationship to the cognate phenomena now existing, or having once existed, among the "higher races." From the "new school" of American anthropologists, who have had at their very doors for years the great human laboratory of the Indians, a people among whom

are to be found still almost every variety of religious ideas known among men, from the Californian agnostic met by Powers to the Peruvian Inca, who had reached the level of monotheism, we may expect many interesting and important contributions to the science of religious psychology. Dr. Franz Boas' recent volume on *The Mind of Primitive Man* and Goldenweiser's excellent monograph embodying the ideas of the "American school" on the much-debated and much misunderstood question of *Totemism* are some of the first-fruits now garnered. These may well be set off against some of the more ponderous discussions of similar topics, which do not possess the advantage of having been continually controlled by the unequaled data extant in America alone. Here the student of religious psychology will find now, not merely the white man's own meager record, in his mother-tongue, of the religious life and activities of many more or less primitive peoples, but, in increasing bulk, the native texts, which record and explain, from the minds of the aborigines themselves, their mythic lore, religious beliefs, etc. From these sources may be expected not a little light upon the question of the linguistic aspects of religion as well as valuable data concerning the relationship of religious ideals and social institutions. New and fertile activities in the study of the mythologies and the religions of primitive peoples are to be seen in the recent investigations of Ehrenreich, Schmidt, etc. The problem of so-called "primitive monotheism," in the rather polemic discussion of which Father Schmidt, the editor of the excellent anthropological journal *Anthropos*, and Andrew Lang, the British man of letters (and ethnologist withal), have taken part, needs further study and elucidation. In his *L' Idée de Dieu* Father Schmidt has treated the whole matter from the point of view of a "Catholic man of science," with a wide range of bibliographical knowledge. An equally comprehensive statement of the question from the point of view of the thorough-going evolutionary psychologist or anthropologist has not yet appeared. Dr. Paul Ehrenreich, an anthropologist *vom Fach*, has, in his *Allgemeine Mythologie*, sought to give new life to the science of comparative mythology, which had almost received death at the hands of its friends of the school of Max Müller,—a quasi-resurrection of the "sun-myth" theory is now being attempted by Frobenius and others. Ehrenreich escapes panbabylonianism, but runs some danger of being swamped by



panlunarism or selenomania. The new life in the sociological consideration of religion is represented not only in the increasing attention that is given to the institutional religious activities of savage and barbarous peoples, but in the discussion by psychologists of the social and economical aspects of religion everywhere. The monograph on *Rest Days* by Professor Hutton Webster, reviewed in this number of the JOURNAL, deserves special mention here. It will be one of the objects of the editors to see that new investigations and significant contributions to knowledge receive prompt and adequate recognition in these pages. Special effort will be made to secure ample and authoritative book-reviews, and publishers are invited to send in volumes and monographs belonging more or less in the field of religious psychology, notices of which will appear as promptly as possible. To the department of "Periodical Literature" in each number Professor Alexander F. Chamberlain will contribute brief analyses, résumés and critiques of the periodical literature of religious psychology, particularly that which appears in other languages than English.

It is intended that the JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY shall appear quarterly, the four numbers making an annual volume of about five hundred pages. Contributors are requested to note that the editors feel more or less obliged to discourage papers of inordinate length, and believe that even the best articles should not exceed the limit of fifty pages; indeed a larger number of briefer contributions, where the content is of equal merit, must be preferred to a few long articles. This does not, however, mean that longer articles by expert authorities will not be accepted for publication in the JOURNAL, only that the average article must be of reasonable dimensions. The editors will welcome contributions from all regions of the field of religious psychology. For views expressed, theories advanced, etc., contributors are solely responsible.

A. F. C.





# THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY.

By SIMEON SPIDLE, B. D.,

*Fellow in Psychology, Clark University.*

## INTRODUCTORY.

The present writer makes no claim to having any special light to shed upon the age-long question of immortality. He is rather an inquirer than an illuminator. Having been for a number of years interested in this subject, there has grown up in his mind a desire to make somewhat of a first-hand study of it. Others have worked in this same field and have given us, from time to time, the results of their investigations. All this is necessary in order to know how the current of thought concerning the belief in an after life is tending. No one cross-section of the belief can tell us this. We need several such cross-sections in order to indicate the direction of its flow. If the study made in this paper shall in any small degree contribute to this end, the writer's purpose will be abundantly fulfilled.

The subject will be treated under four general heads. First of all we shall attempt an analysis of the concept of immortality with a view to determining the different senses in which that concept is used. Next we shall outline the different theories which have been advanced to account for the origin of the belief. Then we shall make a brief survey of the grounds upon which the belief rests. And, finally, we shall give the results of our own empirical study regarding the present status of the belief.

The numbers included in brackets refer to the corresponding numbers in the bibliography at the end. Where the letter p is prefixed to the number, the reference is to the page of the book quoted.

## I. TYPES OF IMMORTALITY CONCEPTS.

### 1. *Plasmic Immortality:*

No part of the furnishings of the human mind is endowed with greater plasticity than the concept of immortality. It is capable of being moulded into a great variety of forms. Not infrequently do we hear the word used with reference to the rejuvenating power of protoplasm. Not long since, while in

conversation with a prominent biologist, I made some inquiry regarding the work being done in his class room. The reply that I received was that he was just then engaged in carrying his class through a course on the "immortality of protoplasm." This may seem like a strange application of the term to one who is unacquainted with the facts of biology, but to one who is cognizant of those facts the application seems entirely justifiable. As every one knows, it is a truism of biology that "no protozoa have any dead ancestors." These creatures, lowest in the scale of animal life, and composed of one tiny cell of protoplasm, never die under normal conditions. The whole mass of the cell is, in a sense, reproductive in its function, the mode of reproduction being that of cell-division. Taking the case of the amoeba, which is the lowest form of all, each parent cell divides, without loss or death of any of its material, into two equal parts. We have then two creatures instead of one, each having half of the protoplasm of the original cell from which they were produced. Here no part of the original cell can be said to be the corpse of a being that has perished. No being has perished. It has simply transformed itself into two beings. The only possible way of looking at such a process as this is to say that the substance and life of the original cell are continued on under changed conditions without loss or death.

And this fact of plasmic immortality is not confined solely to the protozoan level of life. Modern embryology has revealed to us that, in a limited sense, this same principle obtains also on the higher levels of life, including man himself. Physical death, or "the birth of the corpse," took place in the animal series, as a normal experience, only when in the metazoans the cells began to divide themselves into two specialized groups, the somatic, or vegetative cells, and the reproductive cells. The vegetative cells then assumed the function of forming for the animal a body. In doing so, they lost their original power of perpetual rejuvenation and thus became subject to dissolution and death. Why they should have done so is still one of the unsolved problems of biology. Far different, however, was it with the reproductive cells. They still retained their rejuvenating power. Both in the case of viviparous and oviparous reproduction, the offspring is simply a fusion of two parent cells which have detached themselves from the reproductive cells of the parent bodies. The whole chain of animal life, therefore, from the amoeba up



to man, is simply the product of one continuous chain of deathless protoplasm which is "eternally young, eternally reproductive, eternally forming new individuals to grow up and perish, while it remains in its progeny always youthful, always increasing, and always the same. Thousands upon thousands of generations which have risen in the course of the ages were its products, but it lives on in the youngest generations with the power of giving origin to coming millions. The individual organism itself is transient, but the embryonic substance which produces this transient organism preserves itself to all ages imperishable, everlasting, and constant."

## 2. *Influential Immortality.*

But, rising to a somewhat higher level, we meet with an entirely different use of the term immortality. This time it is applied to the permanent character of human influence. If we designate the former use of the word as denoting a strictly biological conception, we may designate this latter use as denoting a strictly positivistic conception.

Perhaps no better statement of this use of the term could be formulated than that given by Büchner, the famous exponent of German materialism during the last century. In speaking of death and immortality in his *Man in the Past, Present and Future* (p.225), he says:

"Great philosophers have called death the fundamental cause of all philosophy. If this be correct, the empirical or experimental philosophy of the present day has solved the greatest philosophical enigmas, and has shown (both logically and empirically) that there is no death, and the great mystery of existence consists in perpetual, uninterrupted change. Everything is immortal and indestructible—the smallest worm as well as the most enormous of celestial bodies; the sand-grain and the water-drop, as well as the highest being in creation, man and his thoughts. Only the forms in which being manifests itself are changing. Being itself remains eternally the same and imperishable. When we die, we do not lose ourselves, but only our personal consciousness or the causal form which our being, in itself eternal and imperishable, had assumed for a short time. We live on in nature, in our race, in our children, in our descendants, in our deeds, in our thoughts, in short, in the entire material and psychical contribution which, during our short personal existence, we have furnished to the subsistence of mankind and of nature in general."

Comte taught the same doctrine. He held that the only immortality which any individual can reasonably expect to attain is the perpetuation of his memory and influence in the race.

This abiding influence he called "subjective immortality," and held it up in true Thanatopsis fashion as the great incentive to noble living, the mighty motive to admission into the Company of the Saints made perfect by Positivism. A similar view is that of George Eliot, George Meredith, and numerous other writers of note. In his poems entitled *Earth and Man*, and *A Faith on Trial*, Meredith constantly exhorts men to live in their offspring and to dismiss forever from their minds the fictitious desire for a personal existence beyond this life. There is no such existence. The only immortality to which any man shall ever attain is the immortal mark which his influence makes upon the race in which he has, for a time, lived and moved and had his being.

### 3. *Cosmic Immortality.*

Leaving now these rather arbitrary uses of the word, we come next to a somewhat more consistent and more metaphysical application of the term. This time it is applied to the permanent character of the universe itself. This is the pantheistic notion of immortality, and as such may be designated as cosmic immortality. The whole universe, it is said, is one great being which is eternal and immortal. Out of this one unconscious cosmic being has come the whole train of individual things, including man himself. Each individual plays his part in his own day and generation and then sinks back again into this great unconscious world-soul out of which he originally sprang. In doing so, he loses his distinctive personal identity but not his essential existence. Just as the drop of rain which falls into the sea loses its own particular individual form in the great indistinguishable mass of water, yet not its essential existence, so does man fall back at death, soul and body, into the one impersonal essence of the universe, which is the great eternal God from whom all came and to whom all return.

The great philosophic exponent of this view in modern times was Spinoza, although the view is as old as philosophy itself. Its first distinctive advocate was Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic School of pre-Socratic philosophy. Religiously, it may be said that the great exponent of this view is Buddha. The heaven, or Nirvana, of Buddhism has long since been a bone of contention, but for all practical purposes of thought it can be regarded as identical with the heaven of the pantheist. It is sometimes erroneously affirmed that Nirvana means annihilation.



But this is true only with reference to finite personality. Nirvana, in the true Buddhistic sense, does not mean the annihilation of existence itself. It means rather the annihilation of finite individuality through the infinite unfolding of individuality until it shall lose its finite limitations in becoming coexistent with the universe itself. It is the annihilation of personality through growth, just as the seed loses itself in the higher existence of the plant, or the ovum in the higher existence of the full grown man. Of course, the line of development toward this goal is by no means straight-forward. It is a singularly sinuous one, with numerous backward curvings of repeated reincarnations by means of which the soul is purged of its egoistic impulses and desires and thus made to take on the larger life of an impersonal, cosmic existence. A very clear and sympathetic exposition of this view is given by W. S. Bigelow (7).

For the ethical import of this conception of a future existence the reader is referred to C. L. Slattery's *Life Beyond Life* (61). While not accepting this view of the future as his own, Mr. Slattery is nevertheless forced to recognize in it a very lofty ethical principle, the principle of moral solidarity. According to this view the highest ethical effort of man consists in the elimination of all his purely personal and egoistic impulses and desires by merging them into the wider altruistic interests of the race. To quote his own words, Mr. Slattery says:

"The selfishness of some forms of the Christian doctrine of immortality is little short of ghastly. The smug satisfaction of the mediaeval saint, leaving the world to its misery and sin that he might fit his own miserable and puny soul for heaven, is not edifying, is not Christian. We have grown to think the saint a truer saint if, with some little flecks from the naughty world, he has stayed in the world and helped to raise others with himself toward the heavenly vision. It is the great and growing sense of brotherhood, of mutual responsibility, that is making us feel that we must reach that other country with the rest of mankind, or it will after all be a sad and mournful abode for our loving, unselfish hearts. That is the ideal toward which we strive. It is the kernel of vital truth hid within the Buddhist's doctrine of Nirvana."

In passing, it may be said that we are here dealing with a view of immortality which is widely held today by minds of great refinement and culture. The reason for this we are told is not far to seek. Besides the ethical charm of an ever-expanding altruism, already referred to, there is inherent in this view the philosophic charm of a monistic conception of the universe

which tends to satisfy the irresistible propensity of the human mind to mentally construct its material into a universe rather than a multiverse. There is, furthermore, inherent in this view, it is said, the religious charm of a monotheistic conception of the soul's relation to its God, and also the psychological charm of a unifying conception of life which tends mightily to the solidifying of personality, to the knitting together of psychic experiences against the inroads of abnormal dissociations. With all these features to commend it, we are not at all surprised to find this the cherished view of many highly cultivated minds.

#### *4. Personal Immortality.*

There still remains another use of the term immortality to be considered. This time it is applied to the survival of personality itself. It is the theistic conception of the after life, and, as such, is known as "personal immortality." According to theism, God is not the impersonal soul of the universe, as pantheism affirms, but is a transcendent personal Being, existing independently of the universe and yet imminent in it as its upholder and providential Ruler. Neither is the human soul a part of the essence of deity, as pantheism affirms. It is rather a secondary essence, a thing derived from the creative activity of deity, which will ever retain its own essential, personal existence apart from, yet in ethical relations with, deity. As to the exact nature of this personal identity there is a wide divergence of opinion among theists. Some hold that the after life will be a continuation of the present but under more favorable conditions. Others hold to a sort of cataclysmic conception of death by means of which the soul is to undergo at the moment of its departure from the body a sudden and radical transformation such as will purge out of it all traces of moral imperfection and thus enlarge and intensify its capacities and powers beyond the limit of anything which the most vivid imagination can now envisage.

In general, it may be said that there are now held by theists two radically different conceptions of personal immortality. According to the one, the human soul is essentially immortal, immortality being an inherent quality of soul-essence. According to the other, the human soul is not inherently immortal but immortable, that is, capable of being made immortal. Those who



hold to the former view are driven by the logic of the situation to postulate the personal survival of all human beings, good and bad alike, while those who hold to the latter view escape the perplexing problem of caring for moral degenerates in the after life by affirming that through lack of moral and spiritual cultivation these souls never arrived at the state of actual immortality, the result being that at death they simply go out of existence. Inherent immortality, it may be said, is the orthodox view of present-day Christian theology. It is held universally in the Greek and Roman Catholic Churches and also by the great majority of Protestant denominations. Whether or not the New Testament teaches inherent immortality is a mooted question. Naturally enough, the advocates of this view say that it does, and adduce not a few passages in its support. On the other hand, the advocates of immortality, or "conditional immortality" as it is commonly called, say that it does not, and in like manner adduce a respectable array of passages in support of their view. They tell us that the New Testament holds out the hope of immortality only to those who receive eternal life through faith in Christ and devotion to that ideal of life by which he lived and for which he died. The idea of inherent immortality, it is said, crept into Christian theology during the Middle Ages at the time when the teachings of Plato played so large a rôle in the formation of Christian doctrine. The first outstanding voice in modern times to be raised against this so-called relic of mediaeval theology was Rev. Edward White of England. In 1846 he published a book entitled *Life in Christ*, in which the conception of attainable, as over against inherent, immortality was strongly advocated. The logic of White's arguments is not generally accepted today. But his book served to call attention to the subject and to crystallize certain vague stirrings which were then at work in the minds of men and which have since then, especially within the last few years, taken shape in the well-formed eschatological doctrine of conditional immortality.

Scientifically considered, this view has much in its favor. It is the exact counterpart in the theological world of the doctrine of the "survival of the fittest" in the scientific world. As applied to the question of immortality, the doctrine of the "survival of the fittest" affirms that only those survive death who are morally fit. The rest drop out of the race and become ex-

tinct. Seizing upon this scientific postulate in support of his view, the advocate of conditional immortality has only to tell us who the morally fit are, who shall survive. They are the spiritually renewed, he tells us, the recipients of the immortal life through filial relations with God. It will be observed, of course, that throughout this discussion the standpoint is religious and philosophical. The existence of a spiritual entity called the soul is taken for granted. The only question at stake is this, is this spiritual entity inherently immortal or is it not. One camp of theists says it is, while the other camp says it is not but that it may become immortal. To this latter view one serious objection is raised. It is assumed by the advocates of immortality that the soul is essentially mortal or subject to dissolution and death, but that, by an ethical and spiritual readjustment of its relations to God, it may be made essentially immortal. How, it is asked, can any ethical and spiritual readjustment of relationship between God and man effect a change in the essential constitution of the human soul? Can love and obedience to God reorganize, so to speak, the constituent elements of the soul so as to ensure it against dissolution and death? What is this essential change which takes place in the soul when it passes from a state of mortality over into a state of immortality? Is it not a pure fiction of the imagination born of a superficial cast of metaphysical thinking? Such is the objection offered by the advocates of inherent immortality to the doctrine of immortality. And so the battle rages, each side holding its ground with dogmatic tenacity, yet both agreed that whatever of future survival there is, it must be of a personal character.

Such then are the four chief uses of the word immortality, the *biological*, the *positivistic*, the *pantheistic*, and the *theistic*. The first two can hardly be classed under the head of beliefs. A belief is a conviction based upon considerations of greater or less probability but falling short of actual knowledge based upon experience. Plasmic and influential immortality are matters of every-day knowledge. We know from experience that these things are so. Cosmic and personal immortality, on the other hand, are matters of belief. They rest not upon experience, but upon presumptive evidence only. It is in these latter two senses, therefore, and especially in the sense of personal immortality, that we shall use the term in the remaining part of this paper.



## II. THEORIES CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF.

It is needless to say that in dealing with the matter of origin we lose ourselves in an exceedingly dense maze of prehistoric uncertainty. The precise point at which, in the unfolding of the human mind, the idea of an after life first dawned upon the threshold of human consciousness cannot be definitely determined. There may be little evidence of its presence during the Palaeolithic age, but there is clear evidence of its presence during the Neolithic period. The ornaments, weapons, tools and food placed by the side of the dead, as well as the sacred drawings upon tombs, etc., all seem to indicate some conception of survival. Especially true is this of the position of the body in the tomb. One of the peculiar features of Neolithic burial was the bent-up posture of the body to represent, apparently, the position of the foetus in the womb. This fact is now regarded by some ethnologists as a rather strong evidence of a Neolithic belief in human survival. The grave may have been looked upon as the womb of mother-earth from which the soul of the dead was to be born anew into an after life. Some such motive, it is thought, must have induced these early peoples to have placed their dead in such an unnatural position.

The question now arises, whence came this belief? How did man ever come to have awakened within him this conviction of an after life? As already stated, we are here dealing with a question that lies entirely outside the sphere of demonstrable certainty. Our best knowledge is wholly a matter of conjecture, based, of course, upon considerations of greater or less probability. Three such conjectures have been advanced.

### 1. *Nativistic Hypothesis.*

The first theory purporting to explain the origin of the belief in immortality is that known as the "nativistic" hypothesis. According to this view, man came upon the stage of his earthly existence with the idea of immortality ingrained into the very structure of his mental constitution. Plato, of course, is the classical exponent of this view. His theory is rather unique. He held to the pre-existence of the human soul. Man's earthly life is a brief span, during which an eternal and immortal soul links itself up for a time with a temporal and perishable body. This spiritual voyager from the other world, in coming over into this tenement of clay, brought with it a full stock of knowledge

acquired during its earlier existence. This epistemological outfit then furnished the basis of all earthly advancement. The acquisition of knowledge for Plato was simply and wholly a process of reminiscence, a lifting up into the focus of clear consciousness that which was previously known but which the process of reincarnation had for a time obscured. How has man come to the idea of an after life? Plato answers, by calling to mind the fact of his former life. The fact that he has lived carries with it the necessary implication that he will live. And so, out of the depths of his own soul, man fishes up his belief in immortality. This, to be sure, is innateness with a vengeance, and, in the crass form in which Plato held it, is not popular today except among those who still believe in the doctrine of reincarnation, notably the theosophists.

But there is a less drastic form of this hypothesis which has been and is held very widely by those who do not believe in reincarnation. Emerson may be cited as a good exponent of this type. In speaking of the origin of the belief in immortality he says:

"I know not where we draw the assurance of prolonged life, of a life which shoots the gulf we call death and takes hold of what is real and abiding. Here is the wonderful thought. But whence came it? Who put it into the mind. It was not I, it was not you. It is elemental. It belongs to thought and virtue, and whenever we have either we see the bearers of this light. Whenever the Master of the universe has points to carry in his government, he impresses his will in the structure of minds."

That expresses very clearly the essence of the nativistic hypothesis. Man believes in his own future existence because the idea of such an existence is imprinted upon each human soul by the hand of its Creator.

The advocates of this hypothesis are very fond of quoting the experience of Huxley in support of their view. As is well known, Huxley was an avowed agnostic on the subject of immortality. He neither affirmed nor denied it. He simply lived a good life and wrought a good work in utter disregard of the future. But strange to say, while he disregarded the future, the future did not disregard him. In spite of all his agnosticism, the thought of an after-life forced itself in upon him with singular persistency. In a letter written to Morley near the close of his life Huxley makes this frank confession. He says:

"It is a curious thing that I find my dislike to the thought of extinction increasing as I get older and nearer the goal. It flashes across me at all

sorts of times and with a sort of horror that in 1900 I shall probably know no more of what is going on than I did in 1800. I had sooner be in hell a good deal—at any rate in one of the upper circles where the climate and company are not too trying. I wonder if you are plagued in this way.”—(*Life and Letters*, Vol. II, p. 67.)

Here, it is said triumphantly by the advocates of nativism, is a striking confirmation of our position. Why was Huxley unable to shake off this haunting idea of an after life? Simply because it was a part and parcel of the native stock of his soul-furniture. So far, all is plain sailing. Nothing could be more simple and self-evident. We believe we are immortal because the Creator has implanted the idea of immortality into the very texture of our natures. Such is the theory, and so it might stand were it not for the destructive weapons of the restless critic. As all must see, the whole theory rests upon the philosophic assumption of the validity of innate ideas, a philosophic bark that has had a stormy sea on which to sail ever since the days of Locke. As it is not within the scope of our present purpose to discuss this basal principle on which the theory rests, it must suffice to say that at best it is only an assumption, and, as such, any theory resting upon it can carry weight only in so far as the assumption itself is well grounded.

## 2. *Revelatory theory.*

A second conjecture which attempts to explain the origin of the belief in an after life is that known as the “revelatory hypothesis.” According to this theory, the human race did not come into existence with the idea of a future life imbedded within the texture of its psychical operations, but received this idea at a later date through the mediation of a divine revelation. This revelation, it is said, was not an isolated experience of the race, but was a part and parcel of a larger revelation which marks the origin of religion itself. Referring to this view, Dr. Brinton says, in his *Religions of Primitive Peoples* (p. 43):

“A strong school of Christian writers, led early in this century by Joseph de Maistre and Chateaubriand, and represented in our own tongue by Archbishop Trench, have asserted that all faiths, even the most savage, are fragments and reminiscences, distorted and broken indeed, of a primitive revelation vouchsafed by the Almighty to the human race everywhere at the beginning. These have occupied themselves in pointing out the analogies of savage and pagan creeds and rites with those of Christianity in proof of their theory.”



Here, then, we have a view which postulates the origin of the belief in immortality as an integral part of a larger revelation "vouchsafed by the Almighty to the human race everywhere at the beginning." But what about this original revelation, asks the critic, both as to its historic validity as well as its psychological possibility? Here again, it is said, we are standing on the slippery ground of a great philosophic assumption, the assumption of the possibility and validity of a supernatural revelation, and with the credibility of this basal assumption, stands or falls the credibility of any theory that is built upon it.

### 3. *Genetic hypothesis.*

A third conjecture purporting to explain the origin of the belief in a future life is that known as the "genetic hypothesis." According to this view, the belief originated not as the result of an innate idea nor yet as the result of a divine revelation, but rather as the product of man's whole mental reaction to his environment during the early, plastic stages of his psychic development.

The factors involved in this early experience of the race which conspired to produce this belief are variously estimated by the different supporters of this hypothesis. It is generally conceded, however, that the tap root of the belief is to be found in the fact of death itself. The human race has never taken kindly to the idea of death. There seems to be a deep-seated desire in every normal human being to live. In fact, so irrepressible and universal is this desire in the whole gamut of life, that Darwin was led to postulate the "struggle for existence" as one of the bed-rocks on which to build his whole theory of evolution by natural selection. "The-will-to-live," as it has been called, and its counterpart, the dread of death, is regarded, according to the genetic hypothesis, as the basal motivation out of which the belief in immortality originated.

In this process of belief-making, dreams are thought to have played an important rôle. The supposition is that at first primitive man looked upon death merely as a deep, prolonged sleep from which the slumberer would sooner or later awaken. Not finding this expectation fulfilled, naturally enough a psychic tension was produced, which issued in dreams concerning the dead. Visions of them were seen. These visions naturally led to the impression that these slumberers left their dwellings at

night and roamed abroad. Hence arose the idea of a double or second self, which lingered around and was in some way dependent for its existence upon the same kind of nourishment which had supported the body previous to death. Consequently, food was taken at regular intervals to the tombs of the dead in order to nourish the soul of the departed.

Haeckel emphasizes a somewhat different factor. In his *Riddle of the Universe*, he seeks to account for the idea of immortality in what he calls a "necessity of emotion." Taking his cue from Kant, that the conviction of immortality is not a postulate of the pure or theoretical reason but of the practical or ethical reason, he demolishes, to his own dogmatic satisfaction, all the arguments hitherto advanced in support of a rational belief in an after-life, and then, having done so, raises the question, how did this transcendent delusion ever gain its grip upon the human mind. His answer is that it sprang up out of two fundamental emotional cravings of the human soul, the desire for a better condition of life than is here enjoyed, and the desire for a happy reunion with loved ones in this better land by and by. Being pressed on every hand by innumerable adversities, and being denied a thousand delights which the heart most eagerly desires, the crucified emotions are said to have taken refuge in consoling dreams of a blissful existence beyond the grave.

Others emphasize the element of aspiration as the fundamental motive in giving rise to the belief in an after life. Primitive man, it is said, launched out upon some great undertaking, but before completing his task he is brought face to face with the benumbing fact that he is about to die. Not being allowed to carry out his cherished plan, he commits the execution of it to the hands of another. This, however, fails to satisfy the lofty aspirations of his heart. Proxy attainment will not do. Without himself his undertaking will be spoiled. No other mind can adequately conceive his ideal, and no other hand can adequately execute its attainment. He must complete the task himself. And so, the wish being father to the thought, as is always the case, there arises in his mind the settled conviction that he will complete his task, that the present life with all its golden possibilities is but an earnest of a future life in which all the broken efforts of to-day shall be brought to a successful issue in the larger attainments of to-morrow.



But, someone asks, how can such a theory of the origin of the belief in immortality explain the universality of this belief as it exists among primitive peoples? Granted that such an idea did by some happy accident strike its roots into the soil of some imaginative soul which was especially favored by native endowment and local environment for the reception of it, how did it come to disseminate itself so universally and at so early a date as the Neolithic Age? The answer given by the genetic hypothesis is that the universality of this belief rests upon a broad psychological principle, the unity of action in human intelligence. Upon this fact the whole science of psychology rests. Unless all normal minds functioned in a somewhat similar fashion, there could be no such a thing as a science of psychology. There could be psychologies of individuals, but no psychology of man as such. Speaking of this law of unitary mental activity, Dr. Brinton says, in his *Religions of Primitive Peoples* (p. 6):

“And here I must mention a startling discovery, the most startling, it seems to me, of recent times. It is that these laws of human thought are frightfully rigid, are indeed automatic and inflexible. The human mind seems to be a machine. Give it the same materials and it will unfailingly grind out the same product. So deeply impressed by this is an eminent modern writer that he lays it down as a fundamental maxim of ethnology that ‘we do not think, thinking merely goes on within us.’ ”

The bearing of this broad psychological principle upon the universality of the belief in immortality among primitive peoples is clear. The same fundamental laws of psychic activity operated everywhere, giving to all men a like reaction to the data of experience out of which the belief originated.

In an article in *Harper's Magazine* (13), on “The Survival of Human Personality,” Dr. Alexander F. Chamberlain has given, from the genetic point of view, a very clear presentation of the supposed transmutations through which the idea of survival passed in its early development in the race. At first, primitive man had no conception of a personal immortality. The surviving spirit had little or nothing in common with the personality previous to death. Oftentimes it was looked upon, even, as an evil spirit full of malevolent restlessness. But as the idea and appreciation of personality became clearer in the minds of men, the tendency arose to postulate personal identity in the after life:

“Onè great step was taken when man began to look upon himself as something more than a mere reproductive being. As von Negelein has pointed out, so long as man was regarded as a reproducer of offspring simply, personality and its high implications were impossible and unthought of. The perpetuation of the race having been assumed, the individual might drop out of sight without concern or damage. The birth of his son made the father a mere cipher in the community. The extent to which such a belief could be carried is seen in the ancient Hindu practice, in accordance with which the father who has repeated himself in his son, after imparting to the latter the sacred veda-knowledge, which constitutes him the very image of his parent, retreats soulless, as a beggar, into the forest. His personality has become extinct on earth, and its survival in another world would be a superfluity. At this stage of human thought self-repetition, not the evolution of personality, was the care of mankind. And woman fared much worse than man, whose appendage she was. She is conceived of at this period as soulless often and devoid of all personality, as also is her child until the soul and the personality of his father are transmitted to him.”

The writer then proceeds to show how this impersonal idea was transmuted by slow degrees so as to take on the idea of a personal survival. The first motivation to such a change he finds in hero-worship, and, according to some, the first class of heroes to be immortalized with personal survival was the warrior class. In an age when the dominant interest of man was physical prowess, naturally enough the warrior came to be regarded with special veneration. His worthship to the community was supreme. Indeed, of such transcendent value was his personality to the life of the community, that when he died upon the battlefield fighting for his people it was an easy transition in thought to follow him on in imagination into the other world where he was supposed to survive in full possession of his personal powers to complete the struggle which he had here begun. Having thus risen by slow degrees from the plain of a belief in a mere impersonal survival to the exalted plain of a belief in the personal immortality of the warrior, it was an easy movement in human thought to extend this honor to other great benefactors of the community. And so priests, doctors, poets, and artists all came at an early date to be candidates for this glorious distinction of personal immortality. Once having started in this direction, there was no obstacle to impede progress until all men were included within its embrace, and thus by slow but sure degrees the race came to its noon-day conviction of a universal, personal survival.



Such, in brief, are the three leading hypotheses set forth to account for the origin of the belief in an after life. Which of these views best accords with the facts of the case must be left for each individual to decide for himself. And this, we are happy to say, is an entirely safe proposition, for no man's welfare either here or hereafter is in any way conditioned by the validity of the theory which he may hold with regard to the birth of humanity's idea of an after life. If the idea itself can bear the pragmatic test, the manner of its origin has, after all, only a theoretic interest.

### III. GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE BELIEF RESTS.

In the interest of clearness we shall divide the arguments advanced in support of immortality into three groups, the *philosophical*, the *scientific*, and the *religious*.

#### 1. *Philosophical grounds.*

At what particular time in the psychic development of the race man began to philosophize concerning his belief in an after life, seeking to buttress his sentiments and convictions with more or less well-reasoned arguments, we do not know. So far as we do know, it remained for Plato to be the first to formulate arguments which carried with them the authority of a rational demonstration of an after life. The crucial thing in Plato's position was his belief in inherent immortality. Primitive man, as we have seen, was long in coming to this conception. To him, personality was immortable rather than immortal. But with Plato the idea of inherent immortality stepped out from the shadows of primitive vagueness and once for all made itself felt as a determining factor in the religious and philosophical thought of all succeeding ages. In a somewhat recent work Dr. J. A. Beet (5) traces out the influence of Plato's views upon the formulation of the Christian doctrine of a future life. In a brief résumé of the ground over which he has travelled he says:

"We have now traced the popular and traditional doctrine of the endless permanence of all human souls to the teaching of Plato and to the school of philosophers of which he is the most illustrious representative; and have endeavored to prove that it was altogether alien from the phrase and thought of Christ and his apostles so far as his teachings and theirs are embodied in the New Testament; and that it entered into, and subsequently became prevalent in, the church mainly through the influence of

Plato, apparently in the latter part of the second century. We have also considered the teaching of several modern theologians, but have not found any one who seriously endeavors to prove that the immortality of the soul is taught in the Bible" (p.88).

With this background of Plato's importance in the field of philosophical argumentation for immortality, let us ask, what were the grounds on which Plato based his belief and whence did he derive it? It is commonly understood that Plato was indebted for his views regarding an after life chiefly to Pythagoreanism, the Greek religion, and the Greek mysteries which were essentially immortality cults. The nerve of his argument is contained in his "Phaedo." In this dialogue Plato has put into the mouth of Socrates his mature thought concerning a future life. In prison, on that fatal day when Socrates drank the poison hemlock, he tells those around him why it is that he can face death so cheerfully. It is because death has no power to destroy his soul. Analyzing the arguments advanced by Plato's Socrates, they are as follows: The soul is seen to be immortal from the fact of its capacity and desire for knowledge which it cannot attain in this life; from the law of contraries which runs all through life and according to which rest prepares for labor and labor for rest, day ends in night and night disappears in day, and so life terminates in death and death in life; from the intuitive character of knowledge, all knowledge being a product of recollection; from the simple and indivisible nature of the soul, only compound substances being capable of dissolution and death; and finally, from the immutable goodness of God, God being too good to destroy so beautiful a thing as the human soul.

These arguments carry little weight with them today. The second, third, and fourth, namely, those based upon the law of contraries, the reminiscent character of knowledge, and the indivisibility of the soul, are the merest ghosts of the human imagination. They rest upon the most arbitrary sort of assumptions. Only the first and last, namely, that based upon the capacity and desire for unattainable knowledge, and that based upon God's appreciation of the aesthetic value of the human soul, carry any sort of weight for present-day thinking.

From the time of Plato on, Greek philosophy ran a zig-zag course in its attitude toward the doctrine of immortality. Aristotle was ambiguous on the subject, the Epicureans denied it.



the Stoics accepted it in the cosmic sense, and the Neo-Platonists virtually deified it. Throughout the Middle Ages, and up to our own day, numerous philosophical arguments have been advanced in support of the belief in an after life, all more or less colored with Platonism. In a general way these can be grouped under six different rubrics.

The first is the *metaphysical* argument. It assumes that mind and matter are two distinct entities, each capable of existing apart from the other.

The second is the *analogical* argument. On the basis of numerous analogies drawn from nature, such as the transformation of energy, the metamorphosis of the chrysalis, and the winter slumber of certain hibernating animals, it is argued that the soul will certainly survive the changes involved in physical death. The classical exponent of this mode of argumentation is Bishop Butler, of whom Huxley said, "Read Butler and see to what drivell even his great mind descends when he has to talk about the immortality of the soul."

The third is the *teleological* argument, which regards man as purposefully endowed with capacities and powers which fit him for attainments far in advance of anything to which he can possibly achieve in this present life.

Closely related to this is the *moral* argument. This world, it is said, is a scene of injustice. Not infrequently do the virtuous die unrewarded and the vicious unpunished. If death ended all, human life would be a tragedy. But death does not end all. It is the dropping of the curtain between the scenes of one continuous drama of soul-life. It will require the second scene to even up the moral situation to the complete satisfaction of man's deepest sense of injustice, and since justice demands such a scene, we are assured on the ground of the moral argument that such a scene is forthcoming. Kant's argument for the immortality of the soul falls under this same general rubric. To Kant, obedience to an inner sense of duty, the "Categorical Imperative," as he called it, is the supreme obligation resting upon man. Obedience to this inward moral monitor should always lead to happiness, and in a perfect state of existence always does lead to happiness. But man's present state, says Kant, is not one of perfection, and so, as a matter of fact, virtue and happiness do not always go hand in hand in this life. But they are intended to do so, and since their perfect

unity is not attained here there must be another life in which this unity is attained. Such was the argument of Kant. The weakness of it is clear. On the ground of moral progress, supposing the day should ever come when in this present life virtue and happiness should always go together, what need then would there be, on the basis of Kant's argument, for an after-life? The goal of attainment for which that life was posited would be reached here and now, and Kant's heaven would be left dangling in mid-air with all of its logical underpinning knocked out from under it.

The other argument set forth in support of the belief in immortality is the *ethnological*. Mankind the world over, holds the idea of an after life. This fact, it is thought, carries with it a very strong presumptive argument in favor of immortality. This mode of reasoning is, of course, as old as the Eleatics. It lies at the very roots of Parmenides' great philosophic assumption, an assumption which held its place in the foreground of philosophic thought all the way down to the time of Hegel, namely, that "the thinkable is the real." But if this were true, says the critic of the ethnological argument, then my latch-key should always be in my pocket whenever I reach for it, for whenever I do reach for it I think it is there. But as a matter of fact it is quite often not there. In such a case the thinkable is certainly not the real. My latch-key is not in my pocket because I think it is there. Neither is my soul immortal, says the same critic, because I think it is or because all men may think it is. On the same ground, it is said, we should be able to prove the reality of ghosts and witches.

So far, then, philosophical speculation has helped us but little in the laying of a solid foundation on which to build our hopes for an after life. If such a foundation can be found, it must evidently be sought for elsewhere.

## 2. *Scientific grounds.*

Turning now from philosophy to science in search for light concerning the possible grounds on which to rest a rational belief in immortality, we are confronted with a great variety of personal attitudes. In a general way, scientists can be grouped into three classes on the basis of their attitude toward the subject of immortality. One is the *unbelieving* class. Reflecting upon the particular group of scientific data with which

they are especially familiar, those who constitute this class have come to the settled conviction that there is no such thing as personal immortality. Science, for them, furnishes not only no suggestion of such a thing, but, what is more, it furnishes suggestions which are somewhat opposed to such a view. In the interests of intellectual honesty, therefore, they are obliged to affirm that they do not and can not accept the traditional teachings of religion which posit the personal survival of man beyond this life.

Opposed to this group stands the *believing* class. For them the data of science are but a fragment of the sum-total of all the data upon which human beliefs are to rest. What and if science does not warrant a belief in personal immortality, it is said. Science is but a late comer upon the field of human history. Its best findings in any department of knowledge are as yet very limited. To make all beliefs square to its present disclosures would be a hasty step indeed. It has yet much to learn which may greatly modify its present findings. Besides, there are other interests than those of science which demand our serious attention. To cast them aside is to play the foolish part. We need to be progressive, but our progress should always be conservative, holding fast to all that is valuable in our inheritance from the past while we push ever onward into new fields of investigation. Religion, while it may not have had a stainless career, is not altogether an unmixed evil. It has its claims, and these should be recognized. For the most part, the belief in immortality has been a great moral blessing to the race. It has comforted the sorrowing and guided the aspiring. And since there is as yet no positive disproof of the belief, either scientific or otherwise, we do well, it is said, to hold fast to it, conserving it as one of the efficient agencies making for the highest moral development of the race.

Midway between these two extremes stands the *agnostic* class. They neither affirm nor deny the fact of an after life. They simply say, we know nothing about it, it is an open question, it may be true and it may not. If there is such a thing, it is barely possible that some day we shall be fortunate enough to have clear evidence of it. That being so, let us possess our souls in patience, waiting the day of larger disclosures toward which our present age is rapidly advancing. And so we have, as already stated, these three attitudes among scientists, the nega-



tive believer who says there is no future life, the positive believer who says there is a future life, and the neutral believer who says there may and there may not be a future life, I know nothing about it, I stand on absolutely neutral ground and shall continue to stand there until more positive evidence is forthcoming. Clearly enough, to the first and last of these three classes, the negative and neutral believer, science in its present state has no suggestion whatever to offer in support of a rational belief in an after life. But to the second class the matter stands somewhat differently. While not accepting any of the data of science as furnishing a positive proof of immortality, yet they regard some of its findings as furnishing more or less presumptive evidence in that direction.

*(a) The conservation of energy.*

Chief among the postulates of science which are looked upon as pointing toward the possibility of a future life is the doctrine of the conservation of energy. As all know, it is one of the basal assumptions of science that the sum total of all energy in the universe is a constant factor. Amid the multitudinous changes of nature, energy, we are told, is constantly being changed from one form into another but without any increase or diminution of its quantity. Energy in the form of mechanical work may successively pass over into electricity, light, and heat, and in turn be reconverted again into mechanical work, and when the process is completed, we have exactly the same amount of energy with which we started, provided no loss has been sustained on the way. Working inductively on the basis of such experiments as these, the far-reaching inference has been drawn that no change in the whole great universal flux of things ever creates or destroys any energy. It simply converts energy from one form into another. And the same, we are told, is true of mass. As yet we know nothing that can effect the quantity of a given mass. We may subject it to all manner of changes, mechanical or chemical, and yet its quantitative value remains constant. It must be admitted, of course, that such a doctrine as this is nothing short of a far-reaching scientific assumption. As yet, no one has subjected all energy and all matter to the test. But so far as experimentation has been carried the assumption holds, and for all practical purposes it may be regarded as possessing universal validity.

And now for the bearing of this fact upon the belief in immortality. Granting that mind is a form of energy, why, it is asked, should the human mind present an exception to this universal law of the conservation of energy which holds throughout the entire domain of the physical universe? If it is reasonable to believe that all the energy entering into the physiological processes of the body during the course of a life-time is conserved without loss, even after death has disintegrated the elements of the body, is it not equally reasonable to believe that all the energy entering into the psychical processes of the mind, which ran their course parallel with the physiological processes of the body, is also conserved even after the dissolution of the body by death? Present day physiology, of course, forbids us assuming any such thing as an interchange of energy between body and mind. Carefully conducted experiments seem to have shown conclusively that the law of the conservation of energy holds within the realm of the human body. No process of thought nor act of will ever creates any energy in the nervous system. The only source of energy for that system is physical nourishment, and it has been clearly shown that the amount of energy expended by the different physiological processes is exactly proportionate to the amount of energy obtained through nourishment. This being so, we are at present obliged to conceive of a human being as constituted of two parallel streams of energy, which run side by side throughout the whole course of life, each keeping pace with the other yet neither overflowing its banks at any time to empty its waters into the other. If, now, we are justified in saying that one of these streams is conserved after death, and we know that it is, are we not justified in supposing that the other is conserved also? This, we are told, is a much more scientific view of the case than the opposite, which affirms the conservation of the stream of physical energy and the annihilation of the stream of psychical energy. If one persists, and we know that it does, then why not the other?

So far, the advocates of the belief in immortality on the ground of the doctrine of the conservation of energy seem to have the logic of the situation on their side. But, says the opponent of this view, even though the logic of the situation be granted, at best it can argue only for an impersonal immortality. While it is true that the energy of the body does persist after death, yet it does so not as the formative principle of a distinct indi-

vidual, but in a disorganized condition. So for the psychical side, it is said. Even though the energy of the mind may persist after death, yet, on the basis of the analogy assumed, we are allowed to postulate at most its persistence only in a disorganized, impersonal condition, for if these two streams of energy run their course in a perfectly parallel fashion all though the life of the individual what warrant have we for assuming that at death they enter upon divergent courses? Such a supposition, we are told, begs the whole question and is at heart utterly unscientific. And so, there we are. On the basis of the doctrine of the conservation of energy cosmic immortality, therefore, seems highly probable, while personal immortality seems highly improbable.

(b) *The conservation of value.*

But there is another principle operative in the field of science which is sometimes quoted as favoring a belief in human survival. It is the principle of the conservation of value. Science tells us that this earth on which we live came to its present condition through the operation of certain definite forces which worked by slow degrees through millenniums of ages. Beginning with a sort of undifferentiated ball of gaseous nebulae, it is assumed that accretions and condensations gradually took place giving rise to our solar system with its great network of revolving planets. In the course of time the temperature lowered, a rocky core was formed, the surface of this core crumbled into soil, the waters collected into deep basins to form the seas which in turn become the cradle of life. This life, at first a mere unicellular speck of protoplasm, slowly evolved into multicellular forms of life, giving rise at last to the highly organized vertebrate, the fish. One day this daring Columbus of the sea in one of its bold innovations ventured out upon the land, took to breathing, developed lungs out of gills, legs and wings out of fins, and thus arose reptiles and birds. Some of these land creatures then improved their condition by becoming viviparous, and thus was ushered in the reign of mammals. Finally, out of mammalian development came the flower of the animal series, man himself. At first he was hardly distinguishable from his twin brothers, the apes, but very soon he began to show his distinctively human qualities by his unique intellectual and moral advancement, until behold him in this twentieth century the



lord and master of creation. All through this process of development, we are told, there was present one very distinctive factor, namely the conservation of values. Wherever nature was fortunate enough to hit upon some quality that had in it special worth for the higher ends toward which the whole process was blindly moving, there attention, as it were, was focused until that quality became a fixed factor in the great evolving system. Labors in this direction were, of course, not always successful. Numerous species on which untold ages of patient toil had been expended, eventually retrograded and became extinct. Devolution as well as evolution marked the whole course of the movement. As one has aptly put it, "The privilege of going to hell has ever existed throughout the whole process of organic evolution." And yet, in spite of all these blind alleys of partial retrogression, the general trend of the whole movement was ever onward and upward, so that the forces of the universe have not labored in vain but have attained sublime success in the conservation and reinforcement of their best productions.

Such has been the course of events so far. Each new age has been a distinct advance upon the preceding one, reaching, as we have, the present age with highly refined moral personality as the ripest product of the whole process. And now comes the question as to the ultimate goal of all this. Is the process to stop here? Is moral personality, with all of its marvellous possibilities, and for the production of which all the creative energy of the universe has worked with infinite patience through millenniums upon millenniums, a mere transient bubble to be burst by the hand of physical death? Is this supreme value of the universe, for the creation of which all other values have been merely auxiliary, a mere will-o-the-wisp which the forces of nature have been vainly chasing through all the ages? Was Heraclitus right? Is the universe nothing more than a grinding mill with an empty hopper? Is no grist ever ground out? Does nothing of permanent value ever emerge out of this gigantic process of "becoming" with all of its sacrifice and suffering? Where in all the universe have we ever yet seen this developing process turn back upon itself, and what grounds have we for assuming that it ever will do so? Is it not far more reasonable to suppose that death, instead of being the annihilation of personality, is but an incident in a great cosmic process of evolution, and that this

highest value so far attained, instead of becoming extinct, is conserved and made the nexus of union with another order of existence which is as much in advance of the present as the human is in advance of the animal? Unless this be so, then the universe is indeed a "riddle" as Haeckel has denominated it. And so, the belief in personal immortality, we are told, is the necessary correlate of the scientific doctrine of the conservation of value which lies at the very basis of the whole evolutionary hypotheses. As T. H. Green has expressed it, "it is impossible to believe without intellectual confusion that a system whose visible goal is the evolution of personality ends in the extinction of personality."

To be sure, strenuous opposition has been offered to this idea of personal immortality, as supported by the conception of the conservation of values. The principal point of attack has been the fact of the correlation between mind and brain. Physiological psychology has shown us that all mental processes, so far as we know anything about them, are intimately correlated with corresponding brain processes. What the exact nature of this correlation is no one as yet knows. But whatever its exact nature may be, it is there. Destroy those centers in the brain that function for speech or sight or hearing and you render at once the subject mute or blind or deaf, as the case may be. The evident conclusion seems to be that if you destroy all the centers of the brain, as is the case in death, you thereby destroy all the psychical operations which have been correlated with those centers. In his little book on *Human Immortality* (38), the late Professor William James has sought to clear the ground of this objection. He recognizes two kinds of functional dependence, a productive and a transmissive function, and in his judgment the functional dependence of the mind upon the brain is not a productive but a transmissive function. Thought is not a product of brain activity in the sense that bile is a secretion of the liver. If it were, then, of course the destruction of the brain would involve the annihilation of the mind. But thought, he holds, is rather transmissively dependent upon brain activity. It may exist quite independent of all neural processes and yet without those processes be utterly unable to make itself known. In such a case the destruction of the brain would in no wise involve the annihilation of the mind. In the thought of Professor James, the nervous system stands related to the physical

world on the one hand, and to the mental world on the other hand somewhat as the Atlantic cable stands related to Europe and America. You may destroy the cable, but in so doing you do not destroy either Europe or America. You simply cut off their means of inter-communication. So for the nervous system. Destroy it and the line of communication between mind and the external world is gone, but mind itself is in no sense destroyed thereby.

A less scientific, but somewhat ingenious, attempt has been made by various other writers to solve this problem attempted by Professor James. The view assumes that there is encased within the visible body a semi-material body of like shape and size, which serves as the connecting link between the physical and the mental. At death this transparent duplicate takes its departure from the body with the soul, and serves thereafter as the material basis of the soul's activity. If the reader is interested in this solution of the problem, he will find a good discussion of it in D'Albe (17), Björklund (8), and Frank (22).

(c) *Spiritism.*

In recent years science has interested itself in seeking to establish objective demonstration of the validity or invalidity of the belief in immortality. Assuming that there are surviving spirits, the aim has been to get into speaking communication with them. To this end, certain individuals are chosen as "mediums" through whom these spirits communicate their thoughts to certain inhabitants of earth. The supposition is that in some way, quite unknown to us of course, the soul of the medium vacates the body for a time during which period some spirit from the other world takes its place as the "control" of the medium, making use of the physiological mechanism of the body as a means of communicating its thought either by vocal utterance or by written language. Claims to performances of this sort have been in existence for a long time, but no scientific attention was given to them until within recent years. The first systematic effort to study them was made by the British Society for Psychical Research. When this Society was organized in 1882, one of its aims was the investigation of the claims of spiritism. This aim it has pursued with much diligence. Its findings, not only in this field but also in the fields of tele-



pathy, crystal-gazing, hypnotism, clairvoyance etc. are simply enormous.

Out of all that has been done by this Society, both in England and America, have evolved three distinct attitudes with reference to the subject of spiritism. One is the attitude of *implicit faith* in an objective demonstration of the existence of spirits. It is believed by not a few that clear evidence has been established of actual communication with departed spirits through the agency of mediums. A second attitude is that of *suspended judgment*. To the members of this class, much of the evidence collected by the Society seems to warrant a belief in the validity of spirit-communication, and yet the possibilities of error are sufficiently great to act as a counter-balance, leaving the mind in a state of suspended judgment. A third attitude is that of *radical scepticism*. It is held by the members of this class that all the data of the Society bearing upon the subject of spiritism can be adequately explained on the basis of multiple personality. The exit of a medium's soul out of the body and the entrance of a departed spirit in its place is said to be nothing other than the splitting off for the time being of a fragment of the medium's normal personality and causing it to function in an abnormal way. This rôle it very soon learns to play with singular skill. Clues of knowledge suitable for its purposes which are carried over from the normal state, suggestions received from those present at the time of the seance, and venture-some guesses some of which fit while many do not, these form the stock in trade of the split-off personality or assumed "Control." Of all the mediums studied by the Society, none has been more baffling than Mrs. Piper of Boston. Professor James called her his "white crow," with reference to the whole subject of spiritism. While fraud has been repeatedly discovered in other mediums, no fraud has as yet been made out in connection with the seances of Mrs. Piper. A careful study of her case has been made of late by Dr. G. Stanley Hall and Dr. Amy E. Tanner. The results of their investigations have appeared in a recent book by Dr. Tanner (64). The book is a wholesale slaughter of the spiritistic hypothesis. It seeks to explain not only Mrs. Piper's case but also the whole body of spiritistic data gathered by the Society for Psychical Research on the basis of multiple personality. Naturally enough, the book has called

down upon its authors a volley of criticism from certain members of the Society. What effect the book will ultimately have upon this whole movement yet remains to be seen. It is hoped, however, by many who agree with its interpretation of the facts, that it will serve, at least, to counter-balance certain extravagances which have manifested themselves in connection with this study of spiritistic phenomena.

Taken as a whole, what has the study of spiritism done by way of confirming the belief in immortality? Its chief service has been to call attention to the subject, and in an age of materialistic tendencies this has had its value, no doubt. But so far as furnishing positive evidence of immortality is concerned, its results are of a doubtful character to say the least. And what else could be expected? The world of disincarnate spirits is rather an awkward sphere for science to investigate. It is a sufficiently difficult task to gather valid scientific data on this mundane world of ours, but to collect valid scientific data from a super-mundane world, and have it transmitted to earth through the channel of a pathological personality, seems like a hopeless task indeed. And further, supposing that a considerable body of trustworthy scientists should succeed in gaining what to them would be incontrovertible evidence of communication with spirits, and supposing they should couch their findings in a permanent literary form, how much weight would their testimony have for the generations following them, by way of settling once for all the fact of immortality? Would it have any more weight than the evidence for the resurrection of Christ, contained in the New Testament, has for the average scientist to-day? He snaps his finger at such evidence. To him it is a case of establishing miracle on the basis of human testimony, a task which Hume convinced most of the scientific world years ago can not be accomplished. Strange conceit this is of the scientist that he should regard his own word as of so much more value than that of a company of honest fishermen two thousand years ago. Free communication with disembodied spirits can never be a commonplace of human experience. If such a thing is possible, and possible only through certain select mediums, then it must ever remain a sweet luxury for the few, and, as such, an extraordinary and rather miraculous occurrence. That being so, it can never carry with it the weight of a universally convincing proof of human survival, according to the verdict of science itself. We

would not under any consideration put a handicap upon scientific investigation in any field, but it does seem as though there must be a better way for a noble soul to build up its assurance of immortality than by raking among the pathological abnormalities of multiple personalities.

So far, then, the scientific grounds for a belief in immortality are on about the same footing with those of philosophy. Neither one is conclusive. While there are certain phenomena which seem to point in the direction of personal survival, there are others which seem to point just as definitely in the opposite direction, leaving us, from a scientific point of view, in a state of suspended judgment.

### 3. *Religious grounds.*

But philosophy and science are not the only points of view from which the belief in an after life may be considered. In fact, they are not the primary standpoints from which to view this subject. In the last analysis the question of immortality is a religious question. As John Fiske has said, "it must ever remain an affair of religion rather than of science." Scientifically we may never be able to demonstrate the fact of an after life, assuming that there is such a life. And yet, the rank and file of humanity ever has believed, still does believe, and for aught we now know will continue to believe in a future life, notwithstanding the negative testimony of science. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that the belief is fundamentally motivated by considerations which are essentially religious. And this is legitimate. As has already been stated, religion has its rightful place in the general scheme of human affairs. And when religion is pressed to its ultimate psychological analysis it is found to concern itself chiefly with the emotional aspect of man's mental life. We may not wholly agree with Schleiermacher's definition of religion as a "feeling of dependence," and yet Schleiermacher put his finger on the right place when he found in feeling the essence of religion. Other elements enter into it of necessity, but here we are at the center. As one has said, "Religion is the meeting of spirit with spirit, the flush of happiness, the thrill of satisfaction, the sense of peace, the glad realization that now at last a hunger, keener than physical hunger, has been appeased by the heavenly bread. God and the soul have met, and in the shock of that meeting there



has come to the soul an emotion of loving fellowship which is the very heart of religion." Of course, it must be understood that religion has to do with cognition as well as with emotion. The preacher struck a wrong note, when, in the course of his sermon, he said: "Few things have done more harm in this world than thought. Don't put me down, my dear friends, as a thinker, put me down as a believer." The audience is said to have remarked afterward that the preacher had placed before them a very unnecessary precaution. Such an attitude is, of course, a travesty on religion. And yet, it serves to show by way of exaggeration where the primary interests in religion lie. They lie not in the rational processes of cognition, but in the affective processes of the emotions. And this being so, we shall find on close investigation that the belief in immortality, which is primarily a religious belief, finds its strongest support, not in the intellect where philosophy and science move and have their being, but in the affections where religion moves and has its being.

Taking the Christian religion, which is pre-eminently the religion of personal immortality, there are two fundamental motivations to the belief in a future life. One is the attitude of Jesus himself toward the future, and the other is the doctrine of his resurrection. Which of these two has had the greater influence in the past it would be difficult to say. Possibly the balance has held a fairly horizontal position. But to-day there is a slight inclination on the side of the former. The deeper men's lives become rooted in the conviction of a personal God, to whom they are related in a vital and filial way, the less do they look for objective proofs of immortality, and the more do they come to rest the whole burden of their faith upon that inner sense of assurance which results from a loving and trustful attitude toward God. And this, we are told, is the true Christian ground on which the belief in immortality should ever rest. It was the one ground on which Jesus' belief in immortality rested. While it is true that he did at one time argue for immortality with the unbelieving Sadducees on the ground of the teachings of the old Testament, yet he did so for their sakes and not for his own. His own belief had its roots not in any book but in a great experience, the sense of Sonship. The fact of an eternal and immortal God to whom he was related by an indissoluble tie of filial affection was one of the most real

factors in the consciousness of Jesus. His whole life may be looked upon as the unfolding of this conviction, and his whole attitude toward the future was the blossom of this conviction. When he spoke of the future, it was his "Father's house" to which he was going and to which he would ultimately lead his people. He had no long drawn out arguments, based upon logical deductions, to offer in support of his belief. The future life was to him as real as the present life, and all because he was the Son of an immortal Father, whose immortal life he shared. And ultimately, it is said, here is where the Christian's faith in immortality should ever rest, not so much in the objective evidence of the resurrection of Christ, valuable as that may be, but in the subjective evidence of God's life in the soul. We are to take our stand where Jesus took his stand, not upon logic, but upon the experience of the heart in its relation to God. Am I God's child, have I the divine life in me? If so, I am the immortal child of an immortal Father, and in the sweet consciousness of this fact my heart should rest.

#### IV. PRESENT STATUS OF THE BELIEF.

Having thus outlined the different forms which the belief in immortality has assumed, the different theories which have been advanced to account for its origin, and the different grounds on which it has rested, we are now ready to consider the present status of the belief as determined by our own empirical study. No sweeping deductions can be made from our limited survey. The results obtained are suggestive rather than exhaustive. In order to ascertain approximately how this subject of an after life is lying to-day in the minds of intelligent, thinking people, the following list of questions was drawn up and distributed over a wide area both in America and Canada.

1. Do you believe in man's immortality? If not possessed of a *belief* in immortality, do you hold it as a *hope*?
2. What kind of immortality do you believe in, personal or cosmic or merely influential?
3. Are all men immortal? If not, who are?
4. What are your reasons for believing in, or not believing in, man's immortality?
5. What is your conception of the *state* of the after life? Is it a mere continuation of the present state or is it different?
6. Did the question of immortality in any way lead to your "conversion" or acceptance of the Christian faith, in case you have accepted it?

7. Have your views on immortality undergone any radical change with the lapse of years? If so, when, and in what respects?

8. If given your preference, which would you choose, immortality or annihilation? Why?

9. What influence has your belief in immortality upon your own conduct, character, and life?

10. In your judgment, how did the belief in immortality originate in the race?

11. In your judgment, has the race been profited or not by its belief in immortality? If profited, how? If not, why?

12. In your judgment, is the belief in immortality increasing or decreasing in the race? If either, why and among what particular class or classes?

13. In your judgment, has the belief in immortality acted in any way as a cause of or as a preventive against suicide?

14. In your judgment, what effect would a complete annihilation of the belief in immortality have upon the race, directly and ultimately?

15. Has the modern pulpit changed its message regarding immortality? If so, how, and with what effect?

16. What weight do you attach to the general belief in immortality as an *evidence* for immortality?

17. What was the attitude of Jesus toward immortality, and what weight do you give to his attitude?

18. What value do you attach to the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ as an *evidence* for immortality?

19. Is science to-day in conflict with a rational belief in *personal* immortality? If so, how?

20. In your judgment, can the fact of immortality, if it is a fact, ever be established on scientific grounds? If not, why not?

21. Is a belief in immortality necessitated by the doctrine of evolution? If so, why? If not, why?

22. Is a belief in immortality necessitated by the doctrine of the conservation of energy? Why?

23. In your judgment, has "THE SOCIETY FOR PSYCHICAL RESEARCH" in England and America made any contribution toward a solution of the problem of immortality? If so, what?

24. Should children be taught adult views of the after life or be left to frame their own views of it?

25. Does the desire to be reunited again with loved ones act in any way as a spur to your belief or hope in immortality?

26. Has the thought of "hell" in any way influenced your life?

27. What is your age?

28. Is your sex male or female?

29. What is your occupation?

30. Any remarks or suggestions.

The parties to whom copies of these questions were sent were in most cases the writer's own personal acquaintances from whom he had every reason to expect serious and honest answers. One hundred and seventy such answers were secured. Of these,



forty-six belonged to the High School level, twenty to the college level, and one hundred and four to the professional level which included lawyers, physicians, teachers, preachers, etc.

We shall deal with the professional class first. Of this group seventy-five believed in personal and seven in cosmic immortality. Thirteen rejected the idea of a future life altogether. The only immortality for man, they held, is that of influence. Nine were uncertain as to the kind of future life they believed in, but vaguely hoped for a continued existence of some sort.

Fifty believed that *all* human beings are immortal. Fifteen affirmed that only a *part* of humanity will survive death, that part being "the good" and "believers in Christ." Twenty-six were in doubt in regard to the matter, and thirteen affirmed that none are immortal.

As to the reasons given for the belief in a future life, the teaching of the Bible was named fifty-three times, the general belief in immortality thirty-four times, the incompleteness of this life eleven times, the doctrine of the conservation of energy as applied to personality five times, the doctrine of evolution or of the conservation of values three times, the influence of early training seven times, the influence of the dead twice, the law of the fitness of things twice, boundless aspiration, dread of extinction, and simple faith were each named once.

Fifty reported themselves as having experienced no important change of view, while fifty-four reported radical changes of view. The character of the changes indicated were a turning away from a belief in inherent to a belief in conditional immortality; a turning away from a gross material conception of an after life to a more refined spiritual conception of unfettered psychical activity; a turning away from a belief in only human survival to a belief in the survival of all animal life; a turning away from the conception of a heaven of mere song to a heaven of service; a turning away from a definite belief to a rather vague hope; and a turning away from all belief and hope to a state of utter disbelief. The particular time in life at which these changes occurred were:

"After reading the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man;" "after my second year in College as the result of my philosophical and psychological studies;" "after my graduate work in science;" "after my theological and psychological studies;" "during early adolescence;" "at the age of twenty-five;" and "after a careful study of the Scriptures."

One said the doctrine of immortality had been an important factor in helping to upset his faith in Christianity as a whole. His case is so extraordinary that I feel constrained to note it somewhat in detail. He is an eminent physician, fifty-one years of age. I quote his own words:

"I believed in immortality up to the age of fifteen. By twenty-three I had become somewhat doubtful, as my belief in the Bible as the 'Word of God' was fading out, but, as I had never looked closely into the matter, I kept my judgment in suspense. At a later age, I developed consumption of the lungs and became fully persuaded that I had only a few months to live. I then resolved to attempt to settle the matter, and, as I felt that the belief in immortality was bound up with that of the inspiration of the Bible, I began my investigation at the first chapter of Genesis in connection with Adam Clarke's Commentaries. With every chapter my belief in inspiration faded. I did, for a short time, try to persuade myself that Jesus was really divine and was sent by a beneficent Deity to teach the human race, but further study forced me to give up the New Testament also. With the belief in Christianity as a divine system went the doctrine of immortality. Nearly thirty years more of reading science, old theology and new theology, together with such casual thought as I have been able to employ, have only confirmed the conclusions framed then. I would, however, if given my choice prefer immortality to annihilation, provided I could be assured against excessive pain and monotony. My reason is that there is so much more that I want to know. I would like to spend—not eternity perhaps—but a very, very long time examining into the mysteries of the universe."

There were other returns in which the changes in belief indicated were just as radical as this, but the case of this man seemed especially significant in view of the fact that the readjustment of his belief took place as a result of a careful investigation of the Scriptures and that at a time when death seemed near at hand.

Ninety-five preferred immortality. The reasons given were:

"For the joy of loving and serving;" "for the sake of the improved conditions expected;" "for the sake of a life of harmony with God;" "because of my repugnance of the idea of annihilation;" "because life is sweet;" "from a desire to solve life's enigmas;" "in order to complete this incomplete life;" "for the opportunity of progress;" and "for the joy of living and working without tiring." Two preferred annihilation, one giving as his reason the fact that "annihilation is nature's order to which I cordially submit."

Twelve had no preference, except to prefer such as should be, whether annihilation or immortality.

As to the influence which this belief has upon character and life, eighty-two said that it has a beneficial influence. The expressions used were:

"It inspires me to altruistic service;" "it makes life worth living;" "it makes me desire to grow like God in character;" "it restrains me from evil;" "it inspires progress in personal holiness;" "it holds me to the right;" "it gives dignity and range to my life and character;" "it stimulates fidelity to duty;" and "it gives my life hope and purpose."

Seventeen said the belief had no influence upon their life. Five were unable to tell whether it had or had not an influence upon them. As to its racial influence ninety-three affirmed that the race has been profited by the belief. Nine were in doubt in this respect. One expressed the opinion that the belief has been a positive hindrance to the race in that it has diverted man's attention from the proper business of life, which is the material and moral improvement of this present world, and has focused his attention upon another world which he knows nothing about and will never reach. One said the belief was both a help and a hindrance to humanity. In the case of some it inspired hope and progress, while in the case of others it fostered depression and even insanity by holding up before the mind the gruesome picture of loved ones roasting in a hell of endless torment.

Twenty-seven held that the belief is decreasing. There was pretty general agreement that this decrease is found principally among the educated classes. One, however, was of the opinion that the decrease is confined chiefly to the religiously liberal classes of Northern Europe who are temperamentally shallow and cynical in their mental characteristics. As to the causes of this decline, it was thought to be brought about:

"As the result of scientific study, which demands the evidence of the senses as over against that of mere faith;" "as the result of the doctrine of evolution;" "as the result of the psychological fact of the correlation between mind and brain;" "as a result of the teachings of pagan religions;" and "as a result of the present-day greed for gold." Thirty, on the other hand, said that the belief is increasing. Some distributed this increase among all classes, others confined it to the educated, others said it is increasing wherever Christianity is being taught, and one made bold to affirm that "it is increasing among all classes, except a few college men and a few fool preachers."

Eleven were of the opinion that the belief is relatively stationary.



With regard to suicide, fifty-seven held that the belief in immortality has acted as a preventive. As evidence of this, it was cited that there are few suicides among Roman Catholics, who as a body hold firmly to the doctrine of immortality; that the greatest number of suicides are found in non-religious communities where the belief in an after life is not held, as is shown by a study of French and German suicides; and that religious workers among persons of suicidal tendencies are at one in their testimony to the great restraining power which this belief has over persons contemplating the act of suicide. One teacher was very emphatic on this point. He said: "It is indeed a powerful preventive, as I know from personal experience in dealing with persons of suicidal tendencies." One called attention to the fact that among primitive peoples this belief has acted as a cause of suicide. Firmly believing in the reality of a future life, these people rushed on by self-inflicted death to enter into that life. Twelve said that the belief acted both as a cause and a preventive, citing examples like those given above. Twelve expressed the opinion that the belief has had no influence either for or against suicide, suicide being the result of a pathological condition of mind with which the belief in a future life has no connection whatever.

Eighty-five were of the opinion that an annihilation of the belief would work untold harm to the race, both immediately and ultimately. The particular lines of harm indicated were:

"It would lower the value now set upon human life and thus cause a reversion to the animal state;" "it would dull aspiration;" "it would take away hope and destroy man's peace of mind;" "it would check spiritual development;" "it would usher in the reign of unrestrained immorality;" "it would increase suicide amazingly;" "it would destroy the moral and religious sanctions that now sustain the race;" and "it would obliterate all altruism and spiritual aspiration."

One replied with the following quotation from the late Senator Hoar:

"No race or nation will ever be great or will long maintain greatness unless it holds fast to the faith in a living God, in a beneficent Providence, and in a personal immortality. To man as to nation, every gift of noblest origin is breathed upon by this hope's perpetual breath. Where this faith lives are found courage, manhood, power. Where this faith dies, courage, manhood, and power die with it."

Two expressed the opinion that an annihilation of the belief in a future life would prove a blessing to humanity in that it

would give greater emphasis to the worth of this present life and thus elevate the general moral tone of society. Both, however, were of the opinion that the belief should be destroyed gradually rather than suddenly. Three said that an annihilation of this belief would have no important effect, either immediately or ultimately.

The relation of the modern pulpit to the belief in an after life was variously estimated. Sixty-two were agreed that the pulpit has changed its message concerning the future. The lines of change indicated were varied. Some held that the present-day pulpit has turned very generally from a belief in personal to a belief in cosmic immortality. Others, that it has turned from personal to influential immortality. And still others held that it is rapidly moving toward an acceptance of the doctrine of reincarnation. There was pretty general agreement, however, that the pulpit of today is saying less about an after life than the pulpit of earlier days had to say about it, and that, when it is spoken of, the idea of hell is almost, if not quite, ignored. Most of this class of respondents were of the impression that this change is for the better in that it leads to the acceptance and formation of a good life from higher motives than that of fear. A few, however, said that this change is for the worse in that the pulpit is failing to use the motive of fear which, they said, has been the great moral educator of the race. One of this class expressed the belief that the reason why the pulpit of to-day is either silent altogether or else exceedingly cautious in its utterances about the future is because both preacher and people alike are at the present time utterly at sea on the whole subject. Twelve were of the opinion that the modern pulpit has not changed.

Seventy-seven said that Jesus assumed the fact of immortality, and that his attitude carries with it the greatest weight possible as an evidence for the reality of an after life in view of the fact that he was the most spiritually minded teacher that the world has ever known. Fifteen, however, took the opposite view and said that the attitude of Jesus carried no more weight than that of any other good man. Two, in fact, said that his attitude carried less weight than that of an intelligent scholar of to-day. To quote their own words:

“The testimony of Jesus to an after life is of no more value than that of any other man of his day, and is not to be compared with that of a

modern scientist of good standing;" "Jesus imbibed the belief in immortality from his environment and was not in as good a position as we are today to judge of its truth."

Twelve said they had no idea whatever what Jesus' attitude was toward the belief in an after life.

In regard to the doctrine of Christ's resurrection, seventy-six held it to be the crowning evidence of a future life. A few others were inclined to attach less evidential value to the story of the resurrection, regarding it merely as a co-ordinate factor in the general group of evidences for an after life. All of these seventy-six respondents, however, were at one in their belief that the resurrection of Christ is a well authenticated fact of history. Fifteen, on the other hand, said that the story of the resurrection is not an established fact of history, and, therefore, carries no weight as an evidence for immortality. Two physicians replied in substantially the same terms, the exact words of one being, "The teaching concerning the resurrection of Christ is by no means an established fact. It is utterly lacking in historical confirmation." One man said, "Even if a physical resurrection did take place, it would by no means prove immortality." One scientist of wide repute said, "While I believe in personal immortality yet I do not base my belief upon the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ. I regard Hume's argument as never having been answered." Hume's argument, as we all know, was that "Nothing that is of less frequent occurrence than the falsity of human testimony can be proved by testimony." Thirteen said that they had never given the story of the resurrection any thought, and were not in a position, therefore, to say what bearing it had upon the belief in an after life.

Fifty-five were of the opinion that science is not in conflict with a rational belief in personal immortality. Fifteen took the opposite view. One psychologist, of international reputation, said, "It is, I believe, impossible to disprove personal immortality by scientific reasoning, because of the lack of data one way or the other. I think, however, that science makes it extremely improbable." An eminent physician says:

"Science, so far as I am aware, finds no evidence upon which to found a rational belief in personal immortality. Since the scientific spirit teaches us to believe only those things which are proved, to disbelieve those which



are disproved, and to hold our judgment in suspense in regard to other matters, we must be content to leave, at least, the doctrine of personal immortality in doubt."

Thirty-four had no idea how science stands related to the belief in personal immortality.

As to the possibility of science proving the reality of an after life, granted that there is such a life, fifteen believed such a thing possible. One scientist of note said, "No man can foretell what science will be able to do." Another scientist said, "Science has already so far outstripped in its discoveries the expectations of a generation ago that it would not be at all surprising if in this matter of an after life it should also outstrip our present expectations and lay bare to us facts which now seem utterly beyond the limit of its apparent sphere." Sixty, on the other hand, were of the opinion that science can never establish the fact of an after life, granting the reality of such a life. The grounds upon which their convictions were based can all be summed up in one sentence, namely, science can never prove the existence of a future life because it has no data upon which to work and can obtain no data, for the reason that science deals only with the experiential facts of man's present life while immortality lies entirely outside the sphere of such experience.

Forty-one regarded the doctrine of evolution as lending no support whatever to the belief in an after life. To quote the words of one, "The doctrine of evolution argues more for mortality than it does for immortality, for if the lower species are mortal, as we know they are, why not the higher species, including man himself." A prominent physician says:

"The doctrine of evolution appears to me to oppose a belief in personal immortality. Individual plants and animals, species, races, nations, planets, stars, systems, and now it seems perhaps even the chemical elements, arise, grow old, and die. The elements of which they are composed live on and are reincarnated in other forms, but that which distinguished them—their individuality—disappears. Why should we expect an exception to be made in favor of one, even the highest, species of animals?"

With minor variations, this was the line of reasoning followed by all of those indicated above. Opposed to them stood twenty-eight who regarded the doctrine of evolution as furnishing rather strong presumptive evidence in favor of personal immortality. The gist of their position has already been given under

the head of "the conservatism of values" in discussing the scientific grounds of the belief.

In like manner did opinions differ as to the evidential value of the doctrine of the conservation of energy. Thirty affirmed that it has no value as an evidence for *personal* immortality but that it does favor the idea of *cosmic* survival. Says one, "Is my mind 'energy' or some manifestation of it? If so, I would expect it to live on after death but not in the form of my personality. As a matter of fact I believe that mind is as indestructible as energy or matter." Another says, "Only the imagination of a protagonist could detect any analogy here." Another says, "If the doctrine of the conservation of energy furnished any support to the idea of personal immortality then every living creature from time immemorial to time immemorial must be immortal." Another says, "Life and energy are not in the same category, so that the conservation of the one by no means argues for the conservation of the other." Twenty-nine took the opposite view and said that the doctrine of the conservation of energy does support a belief in personal immortality. In fact, one prominent scientist gave this as the only ground of her belief in personal immortality, "the doctrine of the conservation of energy as applied to personality."

Forty-eight were of the opinion that "The Society for Psychological Research" has made no contribution whatever toward a solution of the problem of immortality. Two believed that it has done something for the belief by calling general attention to the subject. Eight took the opposite ground and said that this Society has made a most invaluable contribution in that it has established beyond all reasonable doubt the validity of spirit-communication.

Sixty-one favored the idea of children being taught adult views of immortality. Thirty-one objected to this. The reasons given were that:

"Children are shrewd enough to frame their own views, which they do;" "it is wrong to inculcate views into a child's mind which may later have to be repudiated. Teach only those things to a child which are known to be true and which the child will never have occasion to repudiate, and let all debatable matters like that of a future life take care of themselves;" "children should not have adult views of religious matters thrust upon them but should be given the Bible and allowed to frame their own views therefrom;" "it is better for the child not to force into its mind adult views upon any subject but rather to guide its processes in the framing of

its own views;" and "it is of much greater importance to teach the child how to obtain immortality than to attempt to teach it about immortality."

Twelve were in doubt as to whether children should or should not be taught adult views of an after life.

It was acknowledged by fifty-nine that the desire to be reunited to loved ones acted as a spur to their belief in a future life. Two couched their sentiments in the following phrases:

"I long for the touch of a vanished hand;" "I would like to see my mother, God grant that I may go to her." Here I should add the case of a young lawyer from whom I obtained the following statement. I had given him a copy of our *questionnaire* some months before this, with a promise on his part to fill it out and return it to me. Months passed by and the syllabus was not returned. One day he came to me with this statement:

"I am sorry to say I have never been able to fill out your syllabus. I took it home, laid it on the shelf in the dining room, and every day took it down and looked over the questions and talked them over with my wife while engaged in the noon meal. Honestly, I have worn out that sheet of paper handling it over and looking at the questions, but I have not answered one of them and I cannot answer them. When I try to reason this matter out on the basis of logic I say to myself, of course there is no future life. But, on the other hand, my father died a few years ago and I cannot but believe that I shall see him again. That is how I think and feel, and, if you can reconcile that contradiction you know what my belief in immortality is."

With regard to the belief in "Hell," fifty-five said that it never had any influence over their life. Forty affirmed that it had. A few specified as to the exact nature of this influence. One said, "the thought of hell has had an influence for good over my life ever since I can remember." Another said, "the thought of hell hindered me from joining the church for a year or two." A third said, "for a time the thought of hell upset my faith in everything and caused me much misery." And another said, "only as a child did the thought of hell have any influence over my life, and then it introduced into my experience an element of tragedy which was entirely needless and which interfered for a time with both my mental and moral development."

Some of the "Remarks" appended to our returns were of considerable significance. One psychologist of wide repute says:



"If I should try to sum up my views in general, I should say that the whole question is one that has become a side issue in my life,—one on which I do not hold any very vital opinions, such as I do have being rather in the negative. I hold them lightly and in a way to be somewhat easily changed, I suppose, by scientific evidence if any were forthcoming, or by those fundamental emotional determinants (which I think are at the root of the belief in those that hold it strongly) if any should rise in my own life."

Another says:

"My impression is that all these questions refer to reason, omitting the great field of feeling, which may be just as meaningful as that which our poor intellects can comprehend. The only incontestable argument for immortality, incontestable because unanswerable, is the argument of the heart. When I see injustice, suffering, sorrows of parting, and incompleteness in this life, my heart longs to give those who desire it another life where all may be righted. This is best expressed in Browning's Saul. But, as I said above, my reason works otherwise, and to it the immortality of influence, as set forth in George Eliot's *Choir Invisible*, seems most desirable."

Another says:

"I regret to say that in my present state of mind I cannot give a very satisfactory response to the questions set. If I were to reply now, it would be from the standpoint of a pretty rank agnostic, and you know very well what the character of such a reply would be. It may be that this is only a temporary state with me. I hope it is, for I am getting very little comfort out of it."

The Mayor of a large city writes:

"Your circular was duly received and I have read it over several times. I did not realize before how limited my knowledge was along the lines you suggest. There are so few items in the list of questions that I could answer with satisfaction to myself that I do not feel justified in answering even the more simple questions. Candidly, if I could satisfactorily answer those questions, I ought to be able to write after my name all the letters that Clark University gives for degrees."

Turning now to our College and High School returns, we find only one in each of these two groups expressing doubt in the reality of an after life. All the rest believed in immortality, and all, except one, in *personal* immortality. With the exception of one other thing which will be noted below, this was the only feature of special importance to be observed in these two groups.

From all the above returns, it will be seen that the belief in *personal* immortality far outstrips that of any other form of survival. Seventy-two per cent. of all our respondents hold to a belief in the preservation of personality in a future life. The idea of an impersonal survival does not seem to fascinate

the imagination of most people. If they are to survive, they want to know it and to consciously participate in whatever the future may have for them.

Another disclosure of importance is that relating to the time and cause of changes in belief. Fifty-two per cent. of our respondents reported themselves as having passed through a period of radical change regarding their belief in a future life. The time at which these changes took place were almost invariably that of later adolescence. This, as we know, is the college period, and the causes assigned for these changes indicated were said to be, in almost every case, the effect of the study of science and philosophy during the college course. An interesting side-light upon this aspect of the subject is furnished by our college and High School returns. Out of the forty-six copies of our syllabus which were distributed among High School pupils, forty-six copies were returned, all answered. Out of the one hundred copies which were distributed among college students, only twenty were returned. The distribution of these latter copies was placed in the hands of four college professors, one in each of four different colleges. One of these colleges returned fourteen copies, another six, and the other two none. Of the forty-six respondents from the High School level, only four reported changes of view regarding the future. Of the twenty respondents from the college level, on the other hand, fourteen reported changes of belief. It would seem from all this, then, that the time of radical readjustment of belief in immortality is during the college period or the time of later adolescence. And the intensity of this process of readjustment seems to be pretty accurately measured by the small number of those who are willing to commit their views to paper, and also by the large percentage of changes in belief found among those who are willing thus to commit themselves. All this, of course, comports with what we have long since known, namely, that the age of adolescence is the age of psychical upheaval and of radical readjustment of beliefs, a fact which carries with it a tremendous pedagogical significance, as all must admit.

One other important fact should not be overlooked. While it is true that, for various reasons, many are now questioning the validity of the belief in a future life, yet the almost unanimous verdict of our returns is that an annihilation of this belief would work untold harm, both immediately and ultimately.

Only seven venture a contrary judgment. And the reason for this solicitude is placed wholly on the ground of its practical moral value. It is held that this belief has been one of the most potent incentives to a good life that has motivated human conduct. In Pragmatic phraseology it has "worked," and, hence, according to Pragmatic logic, it is "true." But does it "work?" Does the belief in a future life put man in more helpful and healthful relations with his environment? I am inclined to think that it does. No doubt life would still have worth even though the belief in immortality were destroyed. But with the destruction of this belief, life would certainly lose a large percentage of its worth for most people. It is by no means a cheap belief. Its power to enrich life is great. It is at once both humanizing and expanding. Nothing can more effectively kill out the brute in man and spur him on to the attainment of high moral manhood than the thought of immortality. What else can strip a human soul so utterly bare naked of everything but itself as this thought of the future? And, surely, if anything should induce a man to be good, it is the contemplation of one day having nothing to fall back upon but himself. What a hell such an experience is for some people. They dread to be alone. They are such poor company to themselves that unless they have a book or a friend or some exciting pleasure to divert their attention from themselves they are utterly wretched. There is a Book that asks this question: "Wherewithal shall a young man cleanse his way?" and the same Book answers, "By taking heed thereto according to thy Word." For a man to take heed to his way in the light of his immortal destiny is a most powerful cleanser from all brutal defilement.

And not only that. The belief in a future life is not only humanizing but it is also expanding in its effects upon character. It gives to human endeavor its most enhancing orientation. It says to every laborer, do your best, you are not carving a statue of ice to be melted down by the hot rays of annihilation, you are carving a figure out of materials that are indestructible, do your best therefore. Such has ever been the appeal of the belief in immortality to the human heart. And wherever this appeal has been responded to, there do we find our noblest character and our highest service. A belief, therefore, that has blessed the race with such results as these we can ill-afford to abandon. And we are pleased to say that as



rational beings we are not obliged to abandon it. So far as the writer is aware, no field of human research has as yet demonstrated the denial of immortality. The burden of proof is not with the man who affirms, but with the man who denies, a future life. He has the instincts of the whole race against him. Are these instincts false? They may be, but it remains to be shown. In my inner heart of hearts I have the conviction, however I may have received it, that my life is destined to unfold into a higher order than the present. This conviction rules and motivates all the activities of my life. Who will say that it is a delusion? It may be, but I await a positive demonstration of it. Till otherwise proved, I shall cling to my belief in a personal immortality as one of the most precious boons, not only of my own life, but of the life of the race.

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# SATAN AND HIS ANCESTORS, FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT.

## PART I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

BY C. F. SPARKMAN, A. M.,

*Fellow in Clark University.*

### INTRODUCTION.

The original purpose of this paper was to cover the entire field of devilology in an extensive rather than an intensive way; but, as time and space were limited, it became necessary to confine it to Satan and some of his immediate ancestors.

The distinction between "demons" and "devils" has not always been strictly adhered to, because they have not at all times been so clearly separated in the minds of their advocates. In general, however, "demon" simply means a natural agent of physical (and sometimes mental) pain or suffering. These did evil because it was a part of them, and no one expected anything else of them. From such a standpoint, theoretically, they could not be blamed, but, because of inconsistent man, this has not always been the case. A "devil" proper is one who does evil for its own sake. He could do either, but chooses evil in preference to good.

The first half of the paper was meant to deal simply with the historical development of Satan and his forbears. It has been impossible and needless to draw the line very distinctly. Many attempted explanations would creep in from a more philosophical standpoint.

The second half has its special introduction. In brief it is an attempted explanation of the rise, growth, and death of Satan.

My view-point has changed somewhat as I progressed, which accounts for some seeming inconsistencies. I am especially indebted to President Hall for his timely suggestions and general oversight. Dr. Theodate L. Smith gave me some valuable points on application of Freudian analyses. My pastor, Rev. Allyn K. Foster, helped me with the outline; and Dr. Paul Carus made some helpful suggestions on the last half.

I have drawn freely from Conway's *Demonology*, and am greatly indebted to Carus' *History of the Devil*," and Réville's little book, *The History of the Devil*.

#### SUMERO-ACCADIA.

The earliest forms of religion cannot be known because savages keep no satisfactory records, but the earliest known civilizations had their devil. This is found among the Sumero-Accadians, who occupied Mesopotamia about 4000 B. C. The Accadians were invaders of this already civilized land of the Sumerians, a nomadic, Semitic race, possessing very little civilization but wonderful adaptability; the Sumerians were already highly cultured, being especially rich in religious ideas. The Accadians adopted the religion of the Sumerians, out of which they developed and perfected our first demonology. The Sumerians designated their god by a star, which leads one to believe they thought of him as a real star, or at least as inhabiting the heavens; the Accadians later developed this into Bel-Marduk, a Sungod. Likewise they changed the three classes of evil spirits of their predecessors into seven. R. C. Thompson (43) has recently translated these cuneiform texts of the early Sumero-Accadians into English. He gives the invocation against the Seven Evil Spirits thus:

"Seven are they! Seven are they!  
 In the ocean deep seven are they!  
 Battling in Heaven seven are they,  
 Bred in the depths of the ocean.  
 Nor male nor female are they,  
 But are as the roaming wind blast;  
 No wife have they, no son can they beget;  
 Knowing neither mercy nor pity,  
 They hearken not to prayer nor supplication.  
 They are as horses reared among the hills.  
 Of these seven (the first) is the South wind,  
 That none can (withstand).  
 The second is a dragon with mouth agape.  
 The third is a grim leopard,  
 That carrieth off children—  
 The fourth is a furious beast (?)  
 The fifth is a terrible serpent.  
 The sixth is a rampart,  
 Which against God and king—  
 The seventh is an evil windstorm.  
 These seven are the messengers of Amu the king.

Bearing gloom from city to city,  
Tempests that furiously scour the heavens,  
Dense clouds that over the sky bring gloom.  
Rushing windgusts casting darkness over the brightest day,  
Forcing their own way with baneful windstorms.  
Mighty destroyers, the deluge of the storm-god.  
Stalking at the right hand of the storm-god."

One sees in this that these spirits were not strictly devils; they did evil because they could not do otherwise, and so come in the class of evil demons. A real devil, such as they later developed, must be a malignant being who, having choice of right and wrong, chooses the wrong, and does evil for its own sake, in opposition to the god who always does good.

Magical rites, spells, and enchantments were used, in addition to this invocation, to free the possessed from the *tabu* under which these spirits held him. Sometimes auxiliaries were resorted to, such as meteoric stones, and pure water, which they imagined came from the realm of their gods. The priest or magician must know some words of power as, "By Heaven be ye exorcised," or "By Earth be ye exorcised." They reasoned that, as their gods had power over all things, evil included, they must be invoked in this hour of need. In fact, all magical rites are based on this assumption; if not, why ask aid of their gods? The priest also had to know something of the nature of the ailment. He must, at least, know the name and some of the characteristics of the demon before he could combat him. This assumption through the ages has been a great impetus to the study of the science of medicine. In looking for causes of the *tabu*, diagnosis could easily develop into a system of cure; because the aid of the unseen god would grow to be of less and less use, as the real cause was found out.

Gallu, of the old Sumerians, changed to Tiamat by the Accadians, gradually grew to be more powerful than any of the other seven. He assumed all malignant forms proper to devils, and became the enemy of Bel-Marduk. Paul Carus describes him as a huge monster, half eagle, half beast, with claws and horns; and identifies him as a personification of the destroying southwest wind. Evidently this was their greatest enemy and could be easily thought of as the arch-enemy of their sungod, Bel-Marduk.



As time advanced, he gradually combined many other vices with those he already had, and, as is the case with most devils, had to bear the blame for all the short comings of men. One writer describes him now as a huge sexless monster, who prowled the streets at night, haunting human souls that had wandered away from their fellows into luckless places, holding sway until exorcised by a priest. He never seems to have gained the eminence of a tempter, but was, in some manner, believed to be the cause of evil.

Their hell seems to be ruled by a different demon, but probably the same was meant, and only a different name was used. Schrader, in *Die Höllenfahrt der Istar* (Giessen, 1874), describes it as translated from the terra-cotta tablets of the library of Assurbanipal. He called it *Mat la namari*, "the land where one sees nothing," or *Mat la tayarti*, "the land from whence no one returns." It seems to have been a huge mansion situated at the center of the earth, which was governed by Nergal, the Assyrian Mars, and his wife, Allat. It was rather a place of captivity than punishment. The souls are guarded, as they flit about in darkness, eating only dust. Istar alone was represented as being punished, and that because of her pride. Every part of her body was smitten with disease, that had previously been adorned with jewels.

#### EGYPT.

The Egyptians had a lower conception of the power of their gods than any other ancient nation. This was possibly due to their fertile soil and favorable environment which rendered life easy and gods less needed. Their gods seem to have had no divine superiority to man except in pre-existence, and greater intelligence. They could be slain, as was Osiris. They had to send messengers to communicate. They wreaked vengeance on each other. In short, they possessed all human faculties and passions in a greater degree; and their godship consisted in using these powers of greater intelligence. The effects of which they were cognizant were generally thought to be those of magic and witchcraft.

Osiris was the good god, who was slain by Set, or Typhon. Plutarch (31) gives a detailed account of their contests. Set, by some trickery, enticed Osiris into an ark which closed on him when he entered. Set and his companions now put this to float in the river Nile. His wife, Isis, bemoaning his fate,

hunted until she found him in the ark which was imbedded in a tree-trunk supporting the porch of the king's house. She secured the ark, but watchful Typhon, finding it again, tore the body into pieces. Isis, ever faithful, gathered each part up and buried them separately. Horus, his son, now came out of Hell to help the mother avenge his father's death. They succeeded in worsting Typhon, but did not fully overcome him. W. M. Flinders Petrie, in the *Religion of Ancient Egypt*, says:

"Osiris was a civilizing king of Egypt, who was murdered by his brother, Set, and seventy-two companions. Isis, his wife, found the coffin of Osiris at Byblos-Syria and brought it to Egypt. Set then tore up the body of Osiris and scattered it. Isis sought the fragments, and built a shrine over each of them. Isis and Horus then attacked Set and drove him from Egypt and finally down the Red Sea."

Professor Petrie is well able to judge on such matters, and this opinion that their later theophanic conceptions were based on earlier tribal wars should carry great weight.

Osiris, who ruled both lower and upper Egypt, became a god, after being dead a few years. Tradition always enhances the virtues of heroes, and, among simple-minded folk, gives them god-like qualities. Likewise, Set became the god of the Asiatic invaders who encroached upon the Egyptian territory. Being the god of an enemy, he was soon believed to be a devil and all their misfortunes were heaped on his head. Plutarch well illustrates this: "For it is not drought, nor sea, nor darkness, but every part of nature that is hurtful or destructive that belong to Typhon." The warfare waged against the desert in keeping back the encroaching sands from their fertile soil, the parching sun that withered their growing crops, were attributed to their agency. The life-giving Nile was thought to be the gift of Osiris. Reasoning from this, they believed anything moist came from Osiris, and their opposites, anything dusty, dry, fiery, or in any way repugnant to moisture, came from Typhon. They even speculated as to the color of these deities from such results, believing Osiris to be black, because anything is darker when wet, as earth, hair, clouds, etc.; and picturing Typhon as a reddish pale deity, from lack of color in the dreary desert. Then, too, spring time is bright and colored, while autumn is dull and death-like.

They never gave up all the human attributes of these deities, even after they were thought of as great natural forces. They

believed Typhon, who was barren, to have been greatly angered, when Osiris cohabited with Nephthys, his brother's wife, to give plant life in these regions. Typhon, seeing the melilot plant, knew his wife had been unfaithful to him, so he became more and more determined to keep back the life-giving Nile. He was aided in this by the Queen of Ethiopia, as the Southern wind, who drove back the clouds, causing rain to fall on the upper Nile. He even became master of the Nile, and caused it to draw in its head and take a contrary course.

The people of Egypt seem to have been rather passive spectators of all these battles of the gods. The essential idea of worship was to secure the favor of the god rather than to avert evil influences. They had no confession to make, and had no thought of pardon. Each related that he had not committed the forty-two sins; and, if this could be substantiated in the balances, when his heart was weighed against his evil deeds, he was permitted to enter the boat and be carried to the Elysian fields. Should the evil deeds out-weigh his heart, he was devoured by one of Typhon's monsters, or sent back to the upper world in the shape of a pig.

They never really thought of a real hell as Typhon's realm. Earth was bad enough in their conception of it. Their Sheol, or Hades, was the realm of shadows or region the sun traversed at night; and in some vague way Typhon was connected with this, being thought of as the sun; but he did not rule it, nor did he punish people there. He only made possible such a place, where demons of all kinds dwelt. There were abnormal beings resembling ibises, monkey-shaped crocodiles and ravens. The dead were naturally thought of in connection with these, but retribution or punishment was not dreamed of.

E. A. Wallis Budge says:

"The dead who attained the everlasting life became in every respect like the divine inhabitants of the earth, and they ate the same meat and drank the same drink, and wore the same apparel, and lived as they lived."

Their Elysian fields were only imaginative plains very similar to those of fertile Egypt.

#### PERSIA.

We now come to a more philosophical age. It is a relief to turn from the childish wrangles of Accadian and Egyptian deities to the more mature ideas of Persian Dualism. Zoroaster



was the founder of Persian Dualism. Some have thought him to be a mythical figure because of his many demigod-like characteristics; but the majority of the evidence shows him to have been a real prophet, who proclaimed his philosophy to the Persian people about 1200 B. C. James Freeman Clarke, in his *Ten Great Religions*, states his belief that he was a teacher under Vitisca of Bactria, concluding that he could not have lived later than 1200 B. C., because this kingdom was abolished by the Assyrians in 1200 B. C. Spiegel, in *Erân, das Land zwischen dem Indus und Tigris* (Berlin, 1863), considers him as contemporaneous with Abraham, therefore living about 2000 B. C.

It is very important to know, with a pretty good degree of certainty, just when he lived, so as to understand properly the evolution of his system of religion. We need to know just how much of his Dualism existed when he began his work, and how much he himself invented.

The earlier religion, before he appeared on the scene, was monotheistic in the main, yet the nature-gods were also worshipped, according to Pictet and other authorities. Conway thinks Zoroaster came from India, bringing with him these high ideals of religion and liberty, which no doubt he had painfully and sadly gleaned from contact with the corrupt and autocratic Brahman priests. Finding a suitable soil for the growth of his ideas, he tried to reconstruct and remold the religion of the Persians to fit his more philosophical ideas. He advocated a kind of moral religion arising from a revolt against the Pantheism of India. It was essentially based on justice and right, being dualistic in essence.

Frances Power Cobbe, in an essay on Persian Dualism, says that it was not always dualistic, that good was a positive thing, the conception of Ahura Mazda, or Ormuzd; and that evil only the opposite, which was developed by Zoroaster into a being with a power almost equal to Ormuzd.

Zoroaster could not be so optimistic as to accept the Pantheism of India. He could not say, "whatever is, is right," for some things he knew were wrong, and he could only account for evil and wrong by ascribing it to an Evil Being. God, to his mind, could not cause the wrong. Ahriman, the antagonist, the enemy, must be its source.

There seem to have been before him two religious parties; those who worshipped the *daêvas*, or nature gods, and those who worshipped Ahura Mazda. Paul Carus says:

“Zoroaster not only degraded the old nature gods into demons, but also regarded them as representative of a fiendish power which he called *Angro-Mainyush*, or *Ahriman*, which means the evil spirit.” (5, pp. 52-53.)

Conway also thinks Zoroaster saw the need of a devil to explain the existing state of affairs, as these two antagonistic religious parties were almost equal in power and number of followers. Zoroaster’s philosophy of the cause of good and evil could hardly be anything but dualistic. He was of the Ahura party, and could easily and naturally think of the god of the *daêvas* as co-existent with his god Ahura. He could conceive of this great power behind his antagonists only as a rival god almost equal to his own.

Probably Ahriman was a result of both of these developments in the mind of Zoroaster. His earnest, philosophical bent, in looking for an explanation of the evil existing, would be greatly aided when he conceived his enemy to be identical with the enemy of good in general.

However he got his system, we cannot help admiring his idea of the cause of good and evil. To him Ahriman was not created by Ormuzd, but, like him, existed from the beginning, as a rival power—not equal, to be sure, but of great might. There is a peculiar fascination about this idea of a devil as always independent of the god. In this respect, it is greatly in advance of many religions, that regard their devil as the scape-goat or servant of their god, who, all powerful himself, makes the poor devil do the horrible and wicked things that he himself would not do. Ormuzd was not catering to public opinion, in avoiding the evil by making Ahriman do it, but fought incessantly this devil whom he could never quite overcome.

Plutarch tells us of some of the romantic things, as he expresses it, told about Ahriman, viz., that they believed certain plants belonged to him; that water animals were under his sway,—hence happy the man who killed them; that darkness was his realm, and light his greatest enemy; that he tried to match every creation of Ormuzd with a wicked mimic. Clarke supplements this by saying he matched all but man whom he could not match, hence he became more determined than ever

to destroy him. By continued warfare he hoped to overcome both Ormuzd and his proto-type man.

Ahriman was indeed the most diabolical in purpose of all devils conceived of by men. He was a kind of a divine devil, a creator and inspirer of all wickedness.

Zoroastrianism, however powerful Ahriman might be, was optimistic in the extreme. Man would finally triumph over all his schemes. Justice must be meted out. The pious Parsee, who carried on this warfare faithfully, could not be condemned. Even the Sufis, who, perhaps, were a little less optimistic, thought the soul would be divided rather than good should not be rewarded. Conway tells of a vision related by a Sufi, where he saw a man, who was all in hell except one foot, which was entwined with flowers. He had been very wicked in everything, but this foot had kicked a bundle of hay within reach of a hungry ox.

Zoroaster taught that good would finally triumph, and all would be saved.

#### THE EARLY HEBREWS.

The early Hebrews worshiped the Elohim, or nature gods. They were thought of as brute forces of nature, having no moral qualities whatever. They created the heavens and earth and all therein. This was the best explanation of the existing state of things to their primitive minds. They saw the marvelous works of creation and gave it a creator—a kind of teleological conception, which made the designer act by law, thereby relieving him of moral characteristics. The splendor and awe of nature did not fill them with any adoration or praise for its originator. They were a part of the creation, and the Elohim could not have acted otherwise than as they did. *Elohim* is always used in the singular, though meaning more than one. This shows a tendency to centralization even here.

Renan says the Semite believed he was living amid a supernatural environment. The world was surrounded and governed by the Elohim, myriads of active beings very analogous to the "spirits" of the savage. They had no distinct proper names, as had the Aryan gods, hence were always used in the singular. Elohim is everywhere; his breath is universal. Jacob erected an altar to him for his work,, "and he erected there an altar and called it El-Elohe-Israel."

Jehovah was an entirely different being, and of a later conception, when these gods were thought of as doing right or wrong; that is, when the moral attribute entered into their make-up they became *Javch*,—singular, because of Hebrew centralization and deep religious convictions. Jehovah, to them, meant a god of both good and evil. *Elohim* is translated in our English Bible as “God;” *Javch*, as “Lord,” and *Javeh Elohim* as “Lord God,” according to Conway and other good Bible scholars.

Miss Cobbe says:

“When the first Hebrew conception of the Elohim had settled into strict monotheism, wherein Jehovah alone was adored as the sole God of Israel, the theology of the age attributed to him the doing of every act, and the inspiring of every thought, both good and bad.” (12, p. 156.)

The Germans call this “theocratic pragmatism.” It hardened Pharoah’s heart, caused a lying spirit, etc. The Jews had no question as to its author. Jehovah could do these things without blame. He sanctioned theft, in Exodus XI. 2: where the Israelites are advised by Jehovah to borrow jewels of their neighbors. He advised vengeance, in Numbers XXXI. 2: “Avenge the children of Israel of the Midianites; afterward shalt thou be gathered unto thy people;”—and, in the same chapter, he sanctions rape and murder,—verses 16 and 17: “Now, therefore, kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by lying with him, but all the women children that have not known a man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves.” He believes witches should be destroyed, in Exodus XXII. 18: “Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live;” again in Leviticus XX. 27: “A man also or woman that hath a familiar spirit, or that is a wizard shall surely be put to death; they shall stone them with stones; their blood shall be upon them.” He deceived the prophets, and then brought death upon them for their false prophecies (I Kings XXII. 23, and Ezekiel, XIV. 9).

When the early Hebrews became monotheistic, it was strictly so; they had no use for a devil; Jehovah was equal to the task of both. In the *Pentateuch*, *Joshua* and *Judges*, all written before the conquest of Canaan, according to Renan, the devil is not once alluded to. They speak of lying and evil spirits, and of heathen gods, but could not have believed in a devil, or some



mention would have been made of him, especially in an age when the supernatural was seen in everything.

When the journey to the Promised Land was planned, Javeh seems to have become more human. He talked to Moses face to face (Exodus XXXIII. 2). He refused to go with them because of their stubbornness: "For I will not go up in the midst of thee; for thou art a stiffnecked people: lest I consume thee on the way" (Exodus XXXIII. 3). This is a beginning of their later idea of Javeh—"God is eternal; man lives four days; God governs the world with justice and omnipotence, yet there is injustice everywhere. Man is audacious to complain; and yet he has a right to complain." Their philosophy wavered between these two conceptions. If Javeh was human, he must possess human inconsistencies, he must be partly good and partly bad. National individualism demands a special god, and Javeh as such must be the protecting deity of Israel, declaring that they were right when they were wrong, aiding them against their enemies, and expecting their thanks when the victory was won.

Javeh, when he became the national god of Israel, was necessarily very selfish. He assumed all the outlines of the ethical conscience which had adopted him. The Israelites of this period were not highly civilized, yet, they preferred righteousness and goodness. They projected themselves into Javeh, and attributed their vices as well as their virtues to him.

### THE SERPENT.

The Serpent in the Garden of Eden was evidently regarded as mythical by the Hebrews, as it is never spoken of again. It was, doubtless, borrowed from Persia and India, and could not have been a devil then, in view of other facts. It appears in Eden as a talking animal,—the like of which has been very common to early folklore of all nations,—and very likely represents the conflict between man and the wild forces of nature. The Elohim build no fences, forbid no fruit. Javeh says, "You shall not eat!" Nature won, and man, as a real man, emerges conquered by the forces of nature. The basis of this is found in Persian Dualism. Ahriman tempted the first pair through his evil son, Ash-mogh, the two-footed serpent. The Persians got their idea of it from the Brahmans in India, who believed that Ahi, the Vedic serpent monster, was conquered by Indra,

who crushed his head for temptation, and for drinking the Soma, a plant monopolized by the gods. One sees in the Soma a likeness to the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. Conway believes it to be the same as the Soma of India, the Haoma of Persia, the Kvasev of Scandinavia, to which are ascribed the intelligence and powers of the gods. If we substitute Rahu for serpent, Devas for God, Adea Suktee for Eve, Adima for Adam, Soma plant for Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, Amrita for Tree of Immortality, and re-read the story in Genesis, we have a pretty good rendering of the old Aryan myth. The curse of the serpent, who should forever be condemned to crawl on its belly, can be explained only by reference to this Aryan origin. It would be no curse for a serpent to have to crawl forever on its belly, for that is its natural way of moving, but in India nothing could be a greater curse, for there all forms were thought to be born again into higher and higher forms of life.

This Aryan legend could be admirably used to harmonize the first (Elohistic) chapter of Genesis and the second (Jahvistic). In the first, "God created man in His own image; in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them." He told them to be fruitful and multiply, to replenish the earth and have dominion over it. This was finished on the sixth day, and God rested on the seventh.

Now, in the second chapter we read, "And the Lord God formed man out of the dust of the earth and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life and man became a living soul." The Lord, seeing it was not good for man to be alone, created Eve from a rib taken from his side. He emphasized her complete dependence on man; and, in striking contrast to the first chapter, did not command them to be fruitful and multiply.

Lilith was the traditional name of this first woman created before Eve. She quarrelled with Adam for supremacy, and finally flew away from him over the Red Sea. When she saw the blissful state of Adam and Eve in the garden, woman-like, she was envious and began to plan their fall. As the Elohistic worshippers were supplanted by the worshippers of Javeh, this incident would have been almost forgotten, and, as is often the case when handed down through successive generations, left only its shell, which, filled in by later Persian ideas, showed

them a likely and easy solution of sin, and was so represented in the Fall.

Michael Angelo portrays Lilith in the Sistine Chapel as the serpent in the temptation of Adam and Eve. She was supposed to have beguiled the serpent on guard at the gate of Eden to lend her his form, so the curse on the serpent could have meant that she was to forever keep that form. She is represented in this painting with a serpent's body and a woman's head. Adam, man-like, is shown stretching out his arms to this fair temptress, wholly enamored by her charms and great beauty.

Conway, who has studied this subject more closely than anyone else, believes, however, that Eve's fall represents the passionate nature of woman before she was brought under such rigid restraint by a tribe wanting to preserve its tribal purity. The serpent, he says, might have been of the sons of Elohim (as nature), who tempted Eve and thwarted Jehovah's plan to have his own pure race. The Elohistie and Jahvistie parties were contending for supremacy, and these early myths would be colored by their own conflicts. Elohim tempted Abraham to slay Isaac, but Jehovah stayed his arm. So here Eve really thwarted Jehovah's purpose by yielding to the man, only meant to be her helpmate, by bringing forth children, who intermarried with the Elohistie creations, and the rivalry continued. Cain and Abel could not have obtained a wife, if other tribes had not coexisted. Jehovah says to her now: "I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee." (Genesis III. 16.)

This view does not seem to harmonize all portions so well as the Lilith theory, yet it has many points in its favor. Jehovah again utilized Sarah, because she was barren, to realize his aspirations, in the birth of Isaac, for a family of his own on earth. Rebecca was likewise sterile, though she gave birth to Jacob and Esau, through the intervention of Jehovah. Rachel bore Joseph and Benjamin, by Jehovah's power; Mary gave birth to Jesus, though she had known no man.

It is easy to see how a serpent was thought of as a demon. "He was the most subtle beast of the field," and at the same time the most dangerous enemy. He could strike unawares, and his bite was deadly because of the unseen poison. His soft,

noiseless, gliding movements, wingless, footless, yet swift and graceful; his forked tongue darting back and forth, suggesting the deadly lightning, would cause primitive man to imagine it aided by some diabolical power. Whatever were the causes for the serpent as tempter, it does not seem plausible that it was thought of as their devil; at least, it was not alluded to again, and could not have been the same Satan described in Job, and, farther removed, in Zechariah. It was evidently only a mythological explanation, partly gleaned from other lands, yet explaining, in accordance with the philosophy of their time, that grave problem.

#### JOB AND ZECHARIAH.

Satan, as an adversary of man, is freely used in the Old Testament, as in Job I. 6-12, where Satan came with the sons of God, and was given permission by God to afflict Job. Again, in Zechariah III. 1-2, it is so used,—Satan stood at Joshua's right hand to resist him, and God said, "The Lord rebuke thee, O Satan." In Psalm CIX. 6, the word Satan is used in this same sense in the authorized version, but it is translated "adversary" in the Revised Version.

C. C. Everett states that Satan in the Old Testament must mean adversary, or opposition, since in the Hebrew the article is used and Satan as a proper name could not be intended. But there are passages where some kind of a personal being is undoubtedly meant, as in Job I. 6-12, where God converses with Satan. One could hardly converse with anything not personal. Satan could be one of the evil spirits of the Lord spoken of in I Samuel XVI. 14: "But the spirit of the Lord departed from Saul and an evil spirit from the Lord troubled him."

Outside of the Apocrypha, I can find Satan only as a fiend, or opponent of the Deity used once, viz.: I Chronicles XXI. 1, where he is represented as being able to scheme out the destruction of Israel by provoking David to number Israel. The best Bible scholars agree that I Chronicles was written about the third century before Christ, hence, Persian Dualism could have influenced their idea of Satan as an adversary to make him a fiend.

Pfleiderer thinks that, after the Maccabean war of liberation, opposition between kingdom of God and the world caused them to transform these angelic spirits into emissaries of Satan.



In Job, Satan is not diabolical at all. He is represented as coming with the sons of God to present themselves to the Lord, and God as conversing freely with him. (Job. I. 6-12.) He seems to be a malicious servant of God, who gave him permission to afflict Job. He grew over zealous and became an accuser-general. Paul Carus calls him an adversary of man, not God. Everett says he was sceptical, not of righteousness in general, but of the righteousness of certain individuals; and concludes that this doubt itself would show a great zeal for holiness. Satan wanted, as servant of God, the complete devotion of the highest. Réville, on the same, says:

"Satan has become so suspicious through his constant practice as public prosecutor, that he believes in no human being's goodness, not even in that of Job the just; and supposes the present manifestations of piety to result from interested motives." (36, p. 15.)

Emphatic stress is laid on Satan's subordinate position here, on the absence of all but delegated power; no power of spiritual influence is attributed to him. He could control only outward circumstances.

He is not a tempter at all, and does not in any sense try to outwit God, or argue his case against the Almighty. Job's wife could bid him "curse God and die," and Satan remained only as an interested spectator. A real devil will argue his case, will make concessions or compromises, giving present desires in order to gain his point in the future, which will always be more important than his concessions.

In Job, no promise of a future reward is held out. Job gets his reward here, later in life. Satan nowhere expects to gain his soul, his punishments are earthly, and so Job's rewards for resisting them. The beauty and grandeur of this allegory are nowhere surpassed. Faithful Job could not be induced to renounce God. These awful afflictions caused him to wonder why God so punished the Just, and made him want to argue the case, but he would not renounce Him.

So in Zechariah, Satan is still this angel of accusation employed by God, who, over-stepping his bounds, delighted to convict even the innocent like a state's attorney who *must* convict. In Zechariah III. 2-3, we see Joshua, the high priest, standing before the angel of the Lord, clothed with filthy garments, and "Satan standing at his right hand to resist him;" and the Lord said unto Satan, "The Lord rebuke thee, O, Satan, even

the Lord that hath chosen Jerusalem rebuke thee; is not this a brand plucked out of the fire?" after which the filthy garments were taken off and a mitre was placed upon his head.

Cheyne says: "Zechariah thought that the colossal calamity of Israel was due to a heavenly being called Satan whose function was to remind God of human sins which otherwise He might have been glad to forget." (9. p. 18.)

Réville explicitly states that *Job*, *Zechariah* and *Chronicles* are the least ancient of the sacred collection; Conway thinks them written after the captivity, and Everett holds to the same belief. We can get a very likely solution here of their problem of evil, if this be the case.

The early Hebrews had little use for a Devil. Jehovah was equal to the task of both God and Devil in their estimation of Him. As their civilization advanced and their respect and adoration for Jehovah grew, they abstracted His evil qualities and attributed them to His servant Satan. They could not believe their God guilty of such horrible deeds. Pfeiderer says Satan was regarded as God's crown-prosecutor and accuser of sin as early as the (post-exilic) book of *Chronicles*. He concludes with Réville that this change took place between the writing of II Samuel and I *Chronicles*. In II Samuel XXIV. 1, we read: "And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them, saying, Go number Israel and Judah." In I *Chronicles* XXI. 1, it says: "Satan stood up against Israel, and provoked David to number Israel." These chapters are practically the same in other respects, telling of the destruction of Israel from this numbering. This shows how their reverence and adoration of Jehovah had grown even during the period of captivity. They felt a theological necessity for exonerating God from responsibility for wickedness, and so put it on His servant Satan. Doubtless their captivity was very conducive to this idea. It must have been very humiliating and revolutionizing. In moments of solitude, they would surely think their God had forsaken them to let them be led captive into the enemy's country. Their long years of faith in their God, their deep religious nature, their traditional belief that they were God's chosen people, came to their rescue, and showed them, as they thought, that they, not God, had an opposer; that because of their sinful ways God had permitted this to be done. He would not lead them into such humiliating

servitude, and could not have an antagonist himself. He tested their faith as a people, and this was allegorically represented in Job.

#### APOCRYPHA.

That Javeh had rivals is shown in the commandment, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" (Exodus XX. 3). Another verse says: "Thou shalt not worship any other god." "He that sacrificeth unto any god save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed" (Exodus XXII. 20). He rebuked Aaron for making the Israelites a golden calf. Naturally, these antagonistic gods would be diabolical to the Israelites; they were the recognized gods of their enemies, hence would be their enemies and even of their own God. These approach devils more than Satan did in the Old Testament. Before the captivity these were regarded as demons, as in Deuteronomy XXXII. 17: "They sacrificed unto devils, not to God, to gods whom they knew not, to new gods that came newly up whom your fathers feared not." This term, and a similar one in Psalm CVI. 37, are translated "demons" in the Revised Version.

But, after the captivity, these demons or satyrs took on the characteristics of Ahriman, the Persian devil. Asmodeus, Beelzebub, Azazel, Samael and Mammon were the principal ones created in this period. They occupied different districts, or had different duties. Some were never thought of as very powerful or antagonistic, while others were very much so. They were essentially the gods of their enemies, and their power would be measured by the amount of opposition they encountered when meeting the enemy. Especially antagonistic are those mentioned in the Apocrypha, due to its being a later production. Persian ideas had had to become well grounded. Asmodeus in *Tobit* is of this type. C. C. Everett says: "He is Ahriman with hardly a change of name."

Beelzebub, as god of the Phoenicians, originated from a pun on Baal; and Gehenna (Hell) from the place where Moloch was worshipped in the valley of Tophet, according to both Conway and Carus.

The following is a very striking passage in regard to one of these evil deities:

"Aaron shall cast lots upon two goats, one for the Lord and the other for Azazel, and Aaron shall bring the goat upon which the Lord's lot fell and offer him for a sin offering. But the goat on which the lot

fell for Azazel shall be presented alive before the Lord to make atonement with him and to let him go to Azazel in the desert.'" (Leviticus XVI. 8-11, Revised Version.)

This is probably a recognition of Azazel as the god of the desert; and the goat as an offering was given to placate him, and to gain his protection over their flocks and herds. The Israelites often forsook their god when out of his territory, and it seems that it was not always discouraged by Him. Javeh, who resided at Sinai, was not the god of agriculture, and could not be relied upon for good crops, so their worship was directed to Baal, when earthly blessings were asked for.

Samael was regarded as the devil or demon of strife. Conway believes this to be a result of the tribal conflicts of Jacob and Esau. The tribe of Jacob was weaker, though more cunning than the mountain-tribe of Esau. The plain-tribes had to live by trade and extortion. The selling of Esau's birthright was doubtless an instance of Esau's tribe being cheated by Jacob's. Of course, the stronger mountain-men would retaliate when they discovered they had been duped. Jacob's prayer to God, the wrestling with the angel, the presents, etc., to Esau,—all illustrate these conflicts and their outcome. If Jacob and Esau were real personages, whose armies thus contended with each other in their life time, the Israelites, or Jacob's tribe, would see an evil demon, Samael, who carried this on after their death.

### THE GOSPELS.

In the New Testament Satan assumes a more independent attitude. His kingdom is arrayed against the Kingdom of God. His hierarchy of evil angels contend with the good angels of God. He is opposed to Love, Truth and Purity, which are God's prime attributes. He is a tempter pure and simple, who tries to lead souls away from God by portraying God's carelessness and harshness, by appealing to man's will for false independence, and, especially, by presenting to the appetites and passions their objects in a pleasing form. In this he reaches his highest state as a tempter, and a devil. He even quotes scripture to prove his points, presenting his case with all beauty and attractiveness to make evil appear good. He possesses a superhuman personality, uses this wisdom to tempt men away from God, and then punishes them for what they could not help doing. At least, it amounts to that, for a poor, weak



human being would have very little show when such a powerful being was arrayed against him. Freedom of the will would be out of the question. Yet there is a solution,—our temptations will never be above what we can bear, with every temptation God will make a way for our escape. This shows Satan's subordination to God. This is even acknowledged by Satan in Luke IV. 6, where he tempts Jesus by offering him all the kingdoms of the world, the power of which was delegated him to give. Again in Matthew XII. 29, Satan can be bound; in Mark I. 24 and 34, and III. 11, the devils recognized Jesus' power and came out at His bidding. Surely if the minor disease-devils recognized Him, Satan, the prince of devils, would too.

The apostolic idea seemed to vacillate between Satan's great power and his subordination. Paul regards him as a thorn in the flesh meant for our moral advantage. Yet he is the ruler of the world, and its God (John XII. 31, XIV. 30, XVI. 11; 2 Cor. IV. 4). All the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them are his to bestow (Luke IV. 5). His followers exceed those of God (Matthew VII. 13-14). He deceives the whole world and almost destroys the very elect (Matthew XXIV. 24). He inflicts disease, fever (Luke IV. 39); dumbness (Matthew IX. 32); blindness (Matthew XII. 22); epilepsy (Matthew XVI. 39).

Paul's idea of his power seems to have grown. He first thought of him as an obstacle to his work, but, later, he attributed to him all thwarting and hindering influences. He conceived him as a wolf in sheep's clothing, a being entirely opposed to God, who stopped at nothing to gain his point, as "One who opposeth or exalteth himself above all that is called God or that is worshipped" (2 Thess. II. 4).

John speaks of the spirit that opposes Christ,—not God,—as the antichrist. Christ, at this date, had greatly supplanted the old Jewish idea of God, and all opposition to the spread of His gospel was attributed to the antichrist. Nero became the great antichrist. Political conditions favored compromises with these antichrists. Rome ruled the world, and, at this time, to be a Christian was to be unpopular from a political standpoint.

Bierer, in his *Evolution of Religions*, believes the early Christians even imagined Satan and his angels were overrunning the world, causing persecution of Christians, the whole heathen

world being in league with him to crush our Christ and Christianity.

Jesus evidently believed in the existence of a personal devil, according to the records that have come down to us, or sanctioned a belief he knew to be false. His contemporaries believed in evil demons and devil possessions, and he would not have used language to confirm this, if he had thought otherwise. Although many of his discourses pertaining to Satan and devils were undoubtedly symbolically used for bases of teaching higher moral truths, his teachings as a whole, fairly and honestly analyzed, teach a personal being antagonistic to God and Himself. The three temptations have been twisted and turned to make Satan only the personification of evil. From an unprejudiced perusal of all three temptations, one sees Satan to Jesus was a real living being, who could converse, argue with and tempt Him. Surely He, if believing Satan was only the personification of evil, would not have related such a realistic parable to His credulous, superstitious hearers. It makes Him dishonest to so interpret it. In Matthew VIII. 31, we see His belief, when the devils in the maniacs begged to be permitted to go into the herd of swine. This would have been a favorable opportunity to correct an erroneous impression. When the people, astonished at His power over devils, asked Him to depart out of their coasts, if He had not actually cast out devils, why did He so teach them? In Matthew X. 1, He gave His twelve disciples power against unclean spirits to cast them out, and to heal all manner of sickness and all manner of disease. In Matthew XII. 27-29, He argues that one could not cast out devils by Beelzebub, the prince of devils, that a house divided against itself could not stand. Paul believed Jesus to have conquered the evil spirits (Col. II. 15),—"and having spoiled principalities and powers he made a shew of them openly triumphing over them in it." In 1 John III. 8, we read: "He that committeth sin is of the devil for the devil sinneth from the beginning. For this purpose the son of God was manifested that He might destroy the works of the devil."

If Jesus used Satan as only representing a personification of evil, how are we to know God was not in the same sense a personification of good? The language seems to be no more symbolic in the one case than the other.

There seems to be no other alternative but that Jesus believed in a real living devil, and demon possessions, and so taught His disciples and followers. Harnack says: "The notion of people being possessed was current everywhere, nay even the science of the time looked upon the whole section of morbid phenomena in this light." He concludes that it is not strange that Jesus and His disciples should share this belief, that we too would believe the same thing, if the newspapers and scientific magazines took up the cry. In speaking of Jesus' belief in this, he says: "There can be no doubt about the fact that the idea of two kingdoms of God and the devil (long since cast out of Heaven and will also be defeated on earth), was an idea which Jesus simply shared with the rest of His contemporaries." (24, p. 58.)

Yet Jesus speaks of our evil thoughts as proceeding out of our hearts and not from an outward Satan. Surely He did not share in all the current conceptions of demons. The problem is very complex and has been the source of many apologetics. Christ's sayings are colored by the human media through which they are given to us, as He Himself wrote nothing. In the fourth gospel we find scarcely a trace of a belief in a personal Satan.

Some have argued that Christ's humanity was so complete that He must have shared in the cosmic presupposition of his time, and, as demonology was a part of the existing science, He, to be human, must have shared the belief. They argue that no moral world would have been conceivable, if intermoral relations between personalities had not been taught, especially as their whole animistic philosophy was so grounded in this. (Cf. Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*.)

It has been suggested we do not know that Jesus conceived of a personality in the strictly individualistic sense. He seems to speak of Satan as an anthropomorphic being, it is true, but, aside from using the science of His time, could He not somehow have understood the problem of evil even better than the philosophers of the present? (I do not mean to imply any superhuman or divine aid here for I am treating this on a historical basis only.) Could not Jesus have worked out this problem, which to us, in any form, is still a riddle? He lived in an age when many devout Jews lived pure and upright lives, yet his example towers so far above them as to be a monitor

for all ages. He obeyed the laws of the land, and the Jewish laws that were not inconsistent to His belief, yet set new standards, which, though not revolutionary themselves, have revolutionized the world. In a matter of fact way, while conforming to the Sabbath, He showed the orthodox Jews that the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath. May He not have conceived Satan in some such higher sense that we have not learned yet? President Hall, in a lecture on the Psychology of Jesus, said, "If we seem to be abreast of Jesus in our ideas of sin, there is a vast amount to learn yet, and here the psychology of Jesus seems beyond our own."

Jesus rejected many of the superstitions of His age, and the only reason we can see as to why He did not reject this one was, that He, in a way unknown to us, could combine it with His own ideals. If this be the case, until we know personality better, reason bids us reject any idea of a personal devil. In the light of our present knowledge, and in the common acceptance of personality, such a recognition involves us in more difficulties than it explains. The idea of a just and powerful God cannot be correlated with such a powerful antagonist.

Whatever idea we may have of God, whether He be a personality, a spirit, a shadow, a substance, a force, a law, or what not, the idea of Satan is disgusting and unfounded, if an entity is understood by the term. The opposite of God is Satan, but it is and must be a negative term, denoting the absence of good and God, rather than an independent antagonistic creation.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (19) aptly expresses it thus: "Demonology is the shadow of Theology. The whole world is an omen and a sign, why look so wistfully in a corner? Man is the image of God, why run after a shadow?"

According to the Biblical account, Satan, as a personal entity, is a paradox and really defeats his own purpose. Robert Ingersoll asks, "Why should this devil, in another world, torment sinners who are his friends to please God his enemy?" (25, p. 50). He goes on to show how the devil was duped, when he tempted Judas Iscariot to betray Jesus; for if Christ had not died, then all mankind would have been lost. So, why did the devil defeat his own purpose?

It does not help matters to say the devil was deceived, that he did not know Jesus was divine, for that puts the deception on God, who used Satan as a tool for this diabolical scheme.



It makes God a cheater and a deceiver. According to the Bible, Satan must have thought Jesus was the Son of God. The disease-demons recognized Him, even calling Him the Holy One of God (Luke IV. 34). If they knew this, surely Satan, the prince of devils, knew it too. Satan virtually acknowledges this himself in the three temptations, where he begins each temptation by saying, "If thou be the Son of God, do so and so."

Crusoe's man Friday's question, "Why God not kill Devil?" has never been adequately answered. Church philosophers and scholastics have strained their conscience to make him a necessary being, saying that, without an antagonist, we could not be good. Some have tried to make themselves believe the question was ludicrous, but withal it forces itself upon the mind, and his existence cannot be correlated with a just and omnipotent God.

The comment of Celsus on the absurdity of Satan has an unanswerable truth that we intuitively perceive, viz.: that the Son of God suffered death at the hands of Satan, yet we are commanded to defy him, that he will come again and work miracles, pretending to be God and that we poor, weak human beings are to vie with the God man in combatting him. The Son of God was overcome, yet we are charged to fight against him, at our peril. Why not punish the devil, instead of threatening poor wretches he deceives? What an absurdity to Celsus! Do we wonder at the futility of missionary efforts, when their philosophy has such a basis? Do we wonder over poor Wu Chang's surprise that Christians, pretending to believe in the horrors of hell's torments, are so oblivious to the fact that it excites no comment, but, when a few people are murdered in the Turkish massacres in Bulgaria, they are aroused to frenzy.

The apostles often used Satan and the devil in a figurative way to represent evil, as did Jesus in Mark VIII. 33, and Matthew XVI. 23, "Get thee behind me Satan!" when referring to Peter; but the New Testament, as a whole, undoubtedly teaches of Satan as a fallen angel, who is now a personal antagonist to God. The whole description of his power is spiritual in nature and influence; and the demons and devils subject to him are the physical agents (Matthew XII. 24-26; Matthew XXV. 4, Eph. VI. 12).

This conception of him as a fallen angel had its root in the old Jewish theology. We have seen the gradual development of Satan there, and this is really only a continuation of it. He was completely divorced from God here, and the best possible theory was that he had fallen from his high state of archangelship. He must have been an archangel there, they reasoned, or he could not be so powerful in his fallen state. God would not create anything essentially and originally evil, but could give freedom of choice. So arrogant Satan rebelled, and was cast out. The New Testament does not speculate as to the cause of this, but gives it as a fact, as in Luke X. 18:

“I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.” In Rev. XII. 7-9 we read: “And there was war in Heaven: Michael and his angels fought against the dragon, and the dragon fought and his angels, and prevailed not; neither was their place found any more in Heaven. And the great dragon was cast out, that old serpent called the Devil, and Satan which deceiveth the whole world; he was cast out into the earth, and his angels were cast out with him.”

In 2 Peter II. 4 and Jude 6, there is also reference to this fall. He is to forever remain in this state. The Bible teaches no reconciliation as dreamers have dreamed of. Toy says:

“There is no hint of a possible change in Satan’s moral character. The New Testament leaves him at the beginning of a new dispensation, as the embodiment of evil, to abide forever, but in chains and darkness, shorn of his power, impotent any longer to disturb the moral order of innocence. Its solution of the problem of evil is practical not logical nor philosophical.” (44, p. 164.)

Even if we cannot accept the Biblical interpretation of the problem of evil, Christianity need not be given up, nor even suffer therefrom. It has too many good things that we can believe and practice. Narrow opinion, based on a few texts in the Bible, holds that we must accept all or none. With reason as our only guide, we can accept all that we can conscientiously believe, and let the rest take care of itself.

#### THE EARLY CHRISTIANS.

The early Christian fathers believed that failure in crops, droughts, famine, pestilence, etc., were due to the influence of the devil. Origen classified them as demons, according to their vices. Cyril of Jerusalem ascribed to the devil an obdurate heart, and incorrigible will. Gregory Naxienzen (*Orat.*, XL. 10,

p. 697) believed that water of Baptism can quench the arrows of the evil one, and that Satan can have no power over Christ. He was deceived by his human appearance, and thought him to be a mere man. So the Christian who is united to Christ by faith can resist him. Tertullian (in *Apol.*, I. 23) says:

“But how from certain angels corrupted of their own will a more corrupt race of demons proceeded, is made known in the Holy Scriptures. Their work is the overthrow of man. Wherefore they inflict upon the body both sickness and many severe accidents, and on the soul perforce sudden, strong extravagances. Their own subtle and slight nature furnisheth to them means of approaching either part of man. Much is permitted to the power of spirits as when some working evil in the air blighteth the fruit or grain, and when the atmosphere, tainted in some secret way, poureth over the earth its pestilential vapours. They commend the gods to the captive understandings of men, that they may procure for themselves the food of sweet savour.”

Justin Martyr, Athenagoras (fl. 176 A. D.), and others, believed devils fed on idol sacrifices and used this means to get them.

Tertullian believed they were sorcerers because living in the air near the stars they could learn their secrets, the threatening of the skies, etc.

Hagenbach says:

“The orthodox fathers believed that everything which was opposed to the light of the gospel and its development, as well as the numerous persecutions of the Christians, to be the work of Satan and his demons. The entire system of Paganism, its mythology and worship, and, according to some, even philosophy was supposed to be subject to the influence of demons.” (22, p. 198.)

Yet, with all his power for evil, and his temptations to lead men astray, Gregory the Great calls him a stupid animal, since he entertains hopes of Heaven without being able to obtain it, and is caught in his own net.

In general, the Christian Fathers of this early period combined many of the Gnostic and Manichean notions with Christianity. Satan was a powerful antagonist, dressed in Pagan clothes. He was possessed with worldly wisdom. He could tempt and deceive men but not God. It was held by them that the atonement of Christ was “a ransom of blood,” a sort of trade whereby God bargained with the devil to give him Christ, a perfect man and, therefore, independent of the devil’s claims, as a discharge of his claim on man. St. Irenaeus

taught that mankind had been as slaves of Satan since the Fall, and God could not justly take away the right without making some concession. Yet their conception of God allowed them to believe He could thus deceive and dupe the devil by bartering this Holy man. Knowing that, the devil could not keep him in hell, Origen admits that the devil had made a great mistake; that he did not know that he could not keep Christ in Hell. This is a horrible conception of a God. They showed, by their faith, how they would have acted in similar circumstances, and so made Christ and God worse than Satan himself.

### DARK AGES.

The Devil of the Dark Ages conformed to the ideals of the time. Every form of nature was seen as a benevolent or malevolent factor. Superstition was at its height, and witchcraft reached its zenith. Conway says:

“What we call the Dark Ages were indeed, spiritually a perpetual *séance* with lights lowered. Nay, human superstition was able to turn the very moon and stars into mere bluish night tapers, giving just enough light to make the darkness visible in fantastic shapes, fluttering around the prince of darkness, or non-existence in Chief!” (15, p. 240.)

It was during the early part of the Mediaeval period that Satan, as Prince of the World, was so strongly believed in. As long as Pagan rulers occupied the throne of the Caesars, public opinion of the Christians saw the world in Satan's grasp. At last, Christianity triumphed, and Rome became the seat of the Holy Roman Empire, which lasted until 1806. Satan now had to assume a different attitude, so easily regained the power he had lost. When Christian missionaries carried the Gospel to the Northern nations the idea of Satan found a fertile soil. These Germans were grossly ignorant and superstitious. Satan to them was a real personage, who could and did seek and devour men's souls. With their polytheistic ideas, it was natural that Satan should be so thought of. Even the bishops, intoxicated with success, believed they were combating Satan and his hosts in converting the heathen. One does not wonder that the poor savage northern tribes believed so implicitly in the devil. The old Celtic and Teutonic gods gradually died out, but vestiges of their existence remained in the shape of fairies, bogies, water-sprites, dwarfs, etc. The Teutons, while professing Christianity, half believed their old gods were angry for being for-



saken, and so exercised some power of evil over them. This would lead to devil bargains and witches' powers. These demons,—diabolized gods,—were seen as frogs and wolves. Cats always accompanied the witches.

Gradually the origin of these spirits was forgotten, and Satan ruled again with all their added qualities. He was seen in nightly orgies, dancing until sunrise with his faithful followers. The sighing of the wind through the pines was heard as his voice. Signs and omens were used to drive away his influence. Every obstacle, however slight, was attributed to him. People really believed in the devil, and lived accordingly. It was not like twentieth century orthodox belief in him, in name only, even by those who think they believe in him in reality; they do not live it now.

Abbott Richalmus says (*Liber Revelat.*):

“When I sit down to holy studies the devils make me feel heavy with sleep. Then I stretch out my hands beyond my cuffs to give them a chill. Forthwith the spirits prick me under my clothes like so many fleas, which causes me to put my hands there; and so they get warm again, and my reading grows careless.”

They thought when food did not taste well the devil had taken away their appetite, and salt, which has always been regarded as the enemy of the devil, was used to bring it back.

#### WITCHCRAFT.

With such a belief, witchcraft could not be avoided. Paul Carus says:

“One of the most characteristic features of the pre-scientific age is man's yearning for the realization of that which is unattainable by natural means. The belief in magic will inevitably prevail, so long as the dualistic world conception dominates the minds of the people, and, in that period of civilization, supernatural deeds are expected as the indispensable credentials of all religious prophets. It is the age of miracles and witchcraft.” (5, p. 269.)

It is true the miraculous element was not emphasized very much in this period, but prayers for selfish interests in opposition to natural laws, laying on of hands, faith-cures, holy water, etc., demonstrate belief in it. Miracles are very closely akin to witchcraft; they are regarded as a setting aside of natural laws by God, while witchcraft is the same thing, only employed by Satan. This was recognized by the church officials, and every

known means was used to prevent its being used by Satan's agents.

Those who denied the power of witches were referred to Exodus XXII. 18: "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live," and to Saul's account of the witch of Endor. Such denials were almost as heretical then, as a study of higher criticism is now. Sir Matthew Hale, in England, and Cotton Mather, in New England, bitterly resented any such scepticism.

From such a recognition in the time of Constantine until a more scientific age, laws against magicians were enacted, and witches and sorcerers punished. This finally culminated in the horrible persecutions of the Inquisition in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This will always be a blot on the fair name of Christianity. All kinds of torture and horrible deaths were devised for the witches, sorcerers, and heretics. Gibbon calculates that the number burned alone exceeded, in one country of Europe, all the ten Roman persecutions.

As science triumphed, and came to be regarded as God's laws, rather than the works of the devil, superstition and witchcraft receded, yet breaking out at times in all its ancient fury, as in Salem, 1692. Sir Walter Scott, writing in 1824, says:

"From this I am taught to infer that tales of ghosts and demonology are out of date at forty years and upward; that it is only in the morning of life that this feeling of superstition comes over us like a summer cloud, affecting us with a fever that is solemn and awful rather than powerful." (39)

Most superstitions of the present are results of this awful nightmare. It is hard to discard old national beliefs. Science still smarts under its sting; and it is still regarded by many ignorant ministers as contrary to the Bible, and consequently of the devil. The things our fathers did and believed surely leave their trace, and in the most cultivated minds are not always discarded when known to be wrong. The sign of the cross, and the taking of an oath are as much products of this belief, as the ordeal by water which rejected the guilty.

#### DANTE'S DEVIL.

Dante's *Divine Comedy* really pictures the hell of Roman Catholic Christians, instead of any devil. In the last part of the *Inferno*, he portrays Satan enclosed and frozen in his ice palace. All the horrors of a northern winter are exaggerated

here, to make this picture appear as gloomy as possible. One wonders why a resident of sunny Italy should thus portray hell and its ruler. He was not accustomed to northern winters, and the desolation and horror accompanying them, so he must have borrowed his idea. Paul Carus gives us an interpretation, taken from Dr. Ernest Krause's work. He believes that all the myths symbolizing the death and resurrection of the sun to have originated in the northern countries, where their greatest friend, the sun, seemed to die and be resurrected again. Naturally, this period of "no sun" would be dreary and desolate, and would in time be thought of as ruled by their enemy. Heaven has most generally been the idealization of our pleasures and desires, and hell the opposite. Dr. Krause argues that Dante followed closely these Teutonic legends, which had become the possession of the Christian world through Saxo Grammaticus, Beda Venerabilis, Albericus, Caedmon, and others; and cites as a proof of this that most southern people have pictured their hell as a burning sulphur-lake instead of the wintry desolation of an ice-palace. Paul Carus says:

"Dante's portraiture of the evil demon whom he calls 'Dis' agrees exactly with the appearance of the principal northern deity of evil, as he was commonly revered among the Celts, the Teutons, and the Slavs. 'Dis' has three faces; one in front, and one on each side. The middle face is red, that on the right side whitish yellow, that on the left side black. This the trinity idea was transferred to Satan on account of the ill-shaped idols of the crude art of northern civilization.

"Dante's description of Dis reminds us not only of the three-headed hoar-giant of the Eddas, Hrim-Grimnir, who lives at the door of death, but also of the trinity of various pagan gods, especially of Triglap, the triune deity of the Slavs." (5, p. 249.)

#### MILTON'S DEVIL.

Milton's idea of the fall of Satan from Heaven was doubtless taken from Caedmon's poem of sixty-four lines, describing this as resulting from ambition to rival God. He and his followers were represented as being cast out into hell already prepared, and were thus punished by an already existing devil. He wove this idea into a powerful epic, which has influenced our belief in Satan more than the Bible itself. Isaiah XIV. 9-17 embodies this theme in part, but it evidently refers to the war on earth instead of in Heaven. The oppressed Hebrews, who believed themselves to be God's chosen people, could see nothing else but

that Satan had become prince of the world, embodied in their cruel oppressors.

Milton took up this theme, and wove it into such a great literary production, that men have taken it for a revelation, believing their opinions were taken from the Bible.

The following paragraphs are the substance of David Masson's masterly analyses of Milton's Satan, as taken from his work on *The Three Devils*.

Milton's idea was not like Luther's, to portray the devil, but for literary effect. He traces the fall of this ruined arch angel from the epoch of creation when Satan, traveling from star to star, concocted this gigantic scheme of ambition and revenge.

Milton had great difficulties in representing a supernatural condition of beings and at the same time to construct a plausible story that was not like one of Aesop's fables. It would be difficult to retain Satan with all that power as an object or person, yet he weaves it in forcibly:

“Thus Satan talking to his nearest mate,  
With head uplift above the waves and eyes  
That sparkling blazed; his other parts beside  
Prone on the floods extended long and large  
Lay floating many a rood.”

His infinitude of space in hell is made comprehensible by the description of a gate to enter. His Satan was exempt from the law of gravitation, easily floating from star to star; this seems to be a masterly stroke to describe his power over the world and worldly things.

Milton does not give his creatures any more intelligence than human beings. He brought the philosophy of the devil down to earth, showing him to have ambition, desire and revenge, and to have acted as man would act in similar surroundings.

His presentation of Heaven was not a locality, but an infinite distance, stretching out on all sides; underneath was the equally infinite, howling, angry night. This space in Heaven was peopled by innumerable hosts of angels and angelic beings, four of whom, Raphael, Gabriel, Michael and Satan, had power over all others, and were next in creation to God himself. Satan did the work of God faithfully and earnestly until becoming so absorbed in his service, like a human being, he forgot his Master, and imagined himself to be the *all*. When God called the four together to announce his only begotten Son King on the Holy hill of Zion, Satan frowned and became a rebel. He had not meditated this rebellion, nor laid schemes as to how he could outwit God, but on the impulse of the moment he was angered beyond recall. He had felt himself so great and now was to have two masters instead of one.

In his revolt, a third part of the angels went with him, being so accustomed to him as their ruler. Beelzebub, a high official, was his intimate friend, so were Moloch, Belial, Mammon, etc.



One cannot help admiring his independence, as pointed out by Milton; with his chosen band of followers, he had rather reign in hell though in torment, than serve in Heaven in peace.

Beelzebub was his faithful helper, when this scheme of revolt was laid. In the wars that followed, he was not warring against God, but against his fellow-angels, whom he knew and feared not. He was too wise to expect to conquer God, when he had only one-third of the heavenly hosts on his side, for, when the Messiah interfered, Satan and his hosts were expelled from Heaven, fleeing themselves before his thunder.

God now determined to create a new kind of being, who, though lower than the angels, could work themselves up; so he made Adam and Eve, and placed them in the beautiful Garden of Eden.

Satan now resolved to do all evil, because good would delight God, yet, as he visits the world for the first time, his thoughts were not evil, but sad and noble. He reasons with himself and maps out his course again for evil,—only because of opposition to God, and began his career as Prince of the World by tempting Eve. He is a worthy hero here.

Milton makes Satan the embodiment and type of the English Lord fighting the true church of Christ, as he termed the Puritans.

#### GOETHE'S DEVIL.

The various Faust legends of Marlowe, Klinger, Goethe, all portray Mephistopheles as the personification of desire in this world. Mankind has always sought for knowledge and pleasure. Goethe beautifully embodied these as Mephistopheles. He saw that neither cruelty, falsehood, malice, nor pride could be the great evil of the world, but that it must be ambition to know and the selfish desire for pleasure. Mephistopheles was only meant to typify the evil spirit of his time, and portrayed by Goethe only in a literary way. If Goethe believed in a devil it must have been other than Mephistopheles for he tempted mankind only in these special ways. He was not a development of evil, but a full-grown representation as it exists now, and, as such, is a devil to the very core. He fulfils his part of the bargain to the letter, and cannot be charged with unfaithfulness. He drags Faust from scene to scene, from pleasure to pleasure, giving him all that he asks, but, in the end, demands and receives his soul. He knows where all screws are loose, and loosens others. He does not repent, and seems never to have a twinge of conscience. This powerful being is an index to the earlier thinking of his age. The priests and ministers were so narrow that they could not correlate pleasure and piety. Philosophers, who had dug out some new idea in regard to the universal explanation of things, were represented as dangerous enemies

to mankind. Astronomers, who made the stars look larger, were shunned. Chemists, who worked with crucibles and test-tubes, performed their magic by the aid of the devil. Such ideas, coupled with this false sense of piety, the absence of mirth and pleasure, would lead to devil-bargains. It must have been a great concession to give up the brilliant and gay world, its pleasures and enjoyments, to the devil. He must needs have been, as Goethe represented him, powerful and strong.

#### PRESENT THEOLOGY.

Both the Catholic and Protestant ideas in regard to Satan changed greatly after the Reformation. This was due to the intense interest aroused in all lines of study by the Renaissance, and especially by Luther's activity in this field. Luther, himself, strongly believed in a personal devil, even throwing his inkstand at him one day in his study. He could not shake off the years of early training, but he gave such a stimulus to a scientific study of theological problems that some of his contemporaries and many of his successors were able to do so,—both of the Catholic and Protestant faiths. Those who held to this belief saw it modified so as to hardly be recognized as the same thing. So long as such things were unquestioned, and accepted on priestly authority, they would not change; but, when people began to think about eternal punishment, devil-possession, etc., being based solely on Church authority, or a few texts in the Bible, they would naturally wonder whether matters of such vital importance would stand on such slender bases.

Another factor, which was conducive to this change, was the different environment of the Teutonic races as compared with the old Jewish and Roman life. They lived amid the beautiful, natural scenery of the forests, and encountered no animals stronger than the wild boar, deer and wolf. They could not understand and appreciate the monsters described in *Revelations*, so resorted to distorted and caricatured forms, and bestial combinations to represent their devils. This was carried to such an extent that Satan became an object of mirth, and, even now, we smile when his name is mentioned.

When the Protestants became pretty strong rivals with the Catholics, what one did was represented as diabolical by the other. Luther's devil, as a holy monk, although real to him,

was undoubtedly conceived in this light. He was an emissary of the Catholic church to revile him to return, showing him what he had lost by withdrawing. Probably there was a great sum of money included in the temptation. On the other hand, Luther, in reviving language and educating the people, was a devil to the priests. They saw what they might lose,—“These knowers will become as one of us!” The exorcisms, practiced by the Catholics against evil spirits and witches, were denounced by Protestants as coming from the devil. To them holy water and the sign of the cross were idolatrous and ignorant. Even while inwardly believing in their efficiency, they thought it a kind of casting out devils by Beelzebub, the prince of devils. The Catholics, as a body, contend with the Protestants, the Protestants split up in a thousand and one sects, believe all the others wrong but themselves. The masses in all yet believe in a personal devil. The educated clergy have almost entirely abandoned the idea, but are afraid to preach it, because many of their best members would not stand for it. Some, independent of the salary, have dared to do so.

Many, it is true, preach the higher morality, and salvation by character as the core of Jesus’ great teachings; others ignore completely all attempts at explaining the Biblical problem of evil; while a host of them are still fundamentally interested in keeping their members out of Hell. They still base all the worthy ideals held up by Jesus on the selfish standard of gaining a happy home in Heaven, and avoiding individual punishment in Hell.

Rank egotism is the incentive to all such teaching, and, as such, has done irreparable harm. The ministers alone are not responsible for this, but it is for them to change it. The same Mediaeval songs that inspired the butchers of the Inquisition are used in our twentieth century hymn books. Only about a month ago I heard the following song in one of Worcester’s largest churches:

“O come thou rod of Jesse, free  
Thine own from Satan’s tyranny;  
From depths of Hell thy people save,  
And give us victory over the grave.”

Such philosophy surely has lost its hold on a twentieth-century cultured mind. The minister of the present has the problem of the ages on his shoulders. When a young college fellow,

filled with modern psychology and philosophy, goes back to his country-town, or even his city-home, the gap is too great, he cannot bridge it. His pastor, who still gives him Mediaeval theology, cannot inspire him any more. So he rejects it all. It would not be so bad, were the results seen only in him, but his influence is wide and many go with him in destroying our beloved Christianity. Surely there is no question more vital; and we, as teachers and psychologists, should help out this great movement in protecting Christianity, which is the only secure basis for the morality of our nation.

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## THE DEATH OF PAN: POETRY AND SCIENCE.

BY ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN, Ph. D.,

*Professor of Anthropology, Clark University.*

Plutarch records this story: In the reign of the Emperor Tiberius, one Thamus, a pilot, steering near the coast of Paxos, heard suddenly a loud voice, which bade him proclaim "Great Pan is dead." Upon his arrival at Palodes, he had the news announced from the poop of his vessel. No sooner was this done than there was heard a great noise of lamentation, Nature giving vent to her profound grief.

With the death of Pan, the gods hid themselves in the remotest corners of the universe, and the oracles ceased. The Naiads forsook the rivers, the Dryads the forests, the Oreads the hills and mountains. The disinherited gods turned to pale silent ghosts. The "glory and the loveliness" of things seemed to have passed away altogether. The heart of Nature grew cold, and her sleep-pressed lids shut out from the sight of men her beautiful eyes, while her face counterfeited death. Down to Hades, where were congregated the wandering shades of men, swept the ghostly throng of deities, and "the good old days" were by forever.

The death of Pan, which legend assigned to the reign of Tiberius, was, by other stories, made coincident with the birth or the ascension of Christ, and the early Christian world took up the fable of the passing of the great heathen deity and made it one of the signal proofs of the triumph of the new religion. So it came about that, later, two quite different groups of poets sang of the death of Pan.

The heathen bards, who still survived, naturally enough, assumed the strain of lamentation for the disappearance of the ancient glories and the beauties of the old mythology, solacing themselves with the belief, sometimes, that the divinities of sky, earth, sea, and air, were, after all, not really dead, but only sleeping, or wandering far from home, and would one day return to make the whole world glad. Some, however, were absolutely pessimistic, glimpsing the departed greatness only, with no hope of its future restoration.

Christian poets, jealous of the fame and honor of their religion, sang the downfall of the old gods as the necessary prelude to the regeneration of the world. Some of these sought even to identify Pan with Satan. Others, with Milton, in his magnificent *Ode on the Morning of Christ's Nativity*:

“The oracles are dumb;  
 No voice or hideous hum  
 Runs through the archèd roof in words deceiving.  
 Apollo from his shrine  
 Can no more divine,  
 With hollow shriek the steep of Delphos leaving:  
 No nightly trance or breathèd spell  
 Inspires the pale-eyed priest from the prophetic cell.  
  
 The lonely mountains o’er  
 And the resounding shore  
 A voice of weeping heard and loud lament;  
 From haunted spring and dale  
 Edgèd with poplar pale  
 The parting genius is with sighing sent;  
 With flower-inwoven tresses torn  
 The Nymphs in twilight shade of tangled thicket mourn.  
  
 In consecrated earth  
 And on the holy hearth  
 The Lars and Lemures moan with midnight plaint;  
 In urns and altars round  
 A drear and dying sound  
 Affrights the Flamens at their service quaint;  
 And the chill marble seems to sweat,  
 While each peculiar Power foregoes his wonted seat.”

connect the legend with the birth and not the crucifixion of Christ, perhaps a more poetic treatment of the theme.

Later poets of Christian races, too, bewailed the passing of the beauties of heathendom. This was a common feeling in the last years of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth as a reaction against the materialism and scepticism of the age. For the continent of Europe, Schiller voiced the sentiment of grief over what had been lost, and vainly wished it back. His poem, *The Gods of Greece*, is perhaps the most ambitious discussion of the topic we possess. Part of it may be quoted here:

“Then through a veil of dreams  
 Woven by Song, Truth’s youthful beauties glowed,  
 And life’s redundant and rejoicing streams  
 Gave to the soulless, soul,—where’er they flowed.

Man gifted Nature with divinity,  
 To lift and link her to the breast of Love;  
 All things betrayed to the initiate eye  
 The track of Gods above.

. . . . .

Art thou, fair world, no more?  
 Return, thou virgin-bloom on Nature's face;  
 Ah, only on the Minstrel's magic shore,  
 Can we the footstep of sweet Fable trace!  
 The meadows mourn for the old hallowing life,  
 Vainly we search the earth of good bereft:  
 Where once the warm and living shapes were rife,  
 Shadows alone are left.

Cold from the North, has gone  
 Over the Flowers the blast that killed their May;  
 And to enrich the worship of the One,  
 A universe of gods must pass away  
 Mourning I search on yonder starry steeps,  
 But thee no more, Selene, there I see!  
 And through the wood I call, and o'er the deep,  
 And,—Echo answers me.

,

Deaf to the joys she gives—  
 Blind to the pomp of which she is possessed—  
 Unconscious of the spiritual Power that lives  
 Around and rules her—by our bliss unblest—  
 Dull to the Art that colors or creates,  
 Like the dead time-piece, godless Nature creeps  
 Her plodding round, and, by the leaden weights  
 The slavish motion keeps!

To-morrow to receive  
 New life, she digs her proper grave to-day;  
 And icy moons, with weary sameness, weave  
 From their own light their fulness and decay;  
 Home to the Poet's land the Gods are flown;  
 Light use in *them* that later world discerns,  
 Which, the diviner leading-strings outgrown,  
 On its own axle turns.

Home!—and with *them* are gone  
 The hues they gazed on, and the tones they heard,  
 Life's beauty, and life's melodies,—alone  
 Broods o'er the desolate void the lifeless Word!  
 Yet, rescued from time's deluge, still they throng  
 Unseen, the Pindus they were wont to cherish,  
 Ah,—that which gains immortal life in song  
 To mortal life must perish!"



Thus sang one of Germany's greatest poets. The fact that one half his genius was meant for science prevented Goethe, the greatest of all, from treading altogether the same path. Goethe, too, lamented the glories of Greek mythology, but he was too great a seer not to glimpse something of the brilliant dawn of science soon to break over all the world. Himself both poet and scientist, he prophesied the future of true genius.

The legitimate successors of the mourners for the departed nature-spirit of old Greece are to be met with in those poets, who, a little more than a century ago, sang of the misfortunes of mankind incident upon the advent of science (then twinned with materialism of the grosser sort), which was to do for the modern age what the coming of Christianity had done for the ancient, and complete the ruin of the beauty and the glory that made the primitive world a Paradise, wherein the gods veritably walked and talked with men. The whole epoch seemed permeated with the belief that poetry and science were in absolute and eternal antagonism, a great gulf, never to be overpassed, stretching between them. Burke, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, declared: "But the age of chivalry is gone; that of sophisters, economists and calculators has succeeded." Contemporary poets, stunned by the common materialism, saw in science only the enemy of the beautiful, if not also of the good and the true.

Campbell gives expression to this feeling in his poem, *To the Rainbow*:

"Triumphal arch, that fill'st the sky  
When storms prepare to part!  
I ask not proud Philosophy  
To teach me what thou art.

Still seem, as to my childhood's sight,  
A midway station given  
For happy spirits to alight,  
Betwixt the earth and heaven."

Keats, in *Lamia*, is even more pronounced:

"Do not all charms fly  
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?  
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven;  
We know her woof, her texture; she is given  
In the dull catalogue of common things.  
Philosophy will clip an angel's wings,

Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,  
Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine—  
Unweave a rainbow.”

According to Haydon, Keats (and Lamb agreed with him) declared that “Newton destroyed all the poetry of the rainbow by reducing it to the prismatic colors;” and only two years before his death he wrote—

“O, for an age so sheltered from annoy,  
That I may never know *how* change the moons,  
Or hear the voice of busy common-sense!”

But, enamored of Greek mythology as he was, and wearied by the cares and ills of life, the verses in which he dedicated his *Early Poems* to Leigh Hunt prove that he was not altogether without some idea of the other blessings of mankind:

“Glory and loveliness have passed away;  
For, if we wander out in early morn,  
No wreathèd incense do we see upborne  
Into the east, to meet the smiling day;  
In woven baskets, bringing ears of corn,  
Roses, and pinks, and violets, to adorn  
The shrine of Flora in her early May.

But there are left delights as high as these,  
And I shall ever bless my destiny,  
That, in a time when under pleasant trees  
Pan is no longer sought, I feel a free,  
A leafy luxury, seeing I could please,  
With these poor offerings, a man like thee.”

And, in his famous sonnet *On the Grasshopper and Cricket*, he affirms the eternity of “the poetry of earth.”

Coleridge lent his voice also to the chorus. Those words of Schiller, which he so well translated, reveal his mood:

“The intelligent forms of ancient poets,  
The fair humanities of old religion,  
The Power, the Beauty, and the Majesty  
That had their haunts in dale or piny mountain,  
Or forest, by slow stream, or pebbly spring,  
Or chasms, or watery depths; all these have vanished,  
They live no longer in the faith of reason;  
But still the heart doth need a language; still  
Doth the old instinct bring back the old names;  
Spirits or gods that used to share this earth  
With man as with their friends; and at this day  
'Tis Jupiter who brings whate'er is great,  
And Venus who brings everything that's fair.”

The whole "Lake School" of poets held practically similar views. Indeed, Stedman, in his *Turnbull Lectures on the Nature and Elements of Poetry*, says: "The chief contributions of the Lake School to our definition are the recognition of the imagination and the antithesis of science to poetry."

Wordsworth, the great leader of this school, saw further than his fellows. He wrote:

"These mighty workmen of our later age,  
Who, with a broad highway, have overbridged  
The froward chaos of futurity,  
Tamed to their bidding; they who have the skill  
To manage books, and things, and make them act  
On infant minds as surely as the sun  
Deals with a flower; the keepers of our time,  
The guides and wardens of our faculties,  
Sages, who, in their prescience would control  
All accidents, and to the very road  
Which they have fashioned would confine us down,  
Like engines; when will their presumption learn,  
That in the unreasoning progress of the world  
A wiser spirit is at work for us,  
A better eye than theirs, most prodigal  
Of blessings, and most studious of our good,  
Even in what seem our most unfruitful hours!"

But he likewise composed these lines which really bespeak the unity of the poet and the man of science:

"From Nature doth emotion come, and moods  
Of calmness equally are Nature's gift:  
This is her glory; these two attributes  
Are sister horns that constitute her strength.  
Hence Genius, born to thrive by interchange  
Of peace and excitation, finds in her  
His best and purest friend; from her receives  
That energy by which he seeks the truth,  
From her that happy stillness of the mind  
Which fits him to receive it when unsought."

Others than the "Lake poets" sorrowed with Schiller. Bryan Waller Proctor, or "Barry Cornwall," as he was better known, wrote—

"O ye delicious fables! when the wave  
And woods were peopled, and the air, with things  
So lovely! why, ah! why has science grave  
Scattered afar your sweet imaginings?"

Passing to America, we find Edgar Allen Poe making the same onslaught upon science:

“Science, true daughter of Old Time thou art,  
 Who alterest all things with thy peering eyes.  
 Why preyest thou thus upon the poet’s heart,  
 Vulture, whose wings are dull realities?  
 How should he love thee? or how deem thee wise,  
 Who wouldst not leave him in his wandering  
 To seek for treasure in the jewelled skies,  
 Albeit he soared with an undaunted wing?  
 Hast thou not dragged Diana from her car?  
 And driven the Hamadryad from the wood  
 To seek a shelter in some happier star?  
 Hast thou not torn the Naiad from her flood,  
 The Elfin from the green grass, and from me  
 The summer dream beneath the Tamarind tree?”

Burke’s lament over the passing of chivalry was extended by Macaulay, himself both critic and poet, to include poetry. Not only did he declare that “the most wonderful and splendid proof of genius is a great poem produced in a civilized age,” but he gave utterance also to the famous dictum: “As civilization advances, poetry necessarily declines,” which opinion, even twenty-five years ago, was one of the stock themes of debating clubs and literary societies all over the English-speaking world. The best answer to such views found expression in the blunt words of the *Noctes Ambrosianae* of Christopher North:

“*Shepherd*. What think ye, sir, o’ the dogma that high imagination is incompatible wi’ high intellect, and that as science flourishes poetry decays.

*North*. The dogmata of dunces are beneath the reach of redemption. A man may have a high intellect with little or no imagination; but he cannot have a high imagination with little or no intellect. The intellect of Homer, Dante, Milton, or Shakespeare, was higher than that of Aristotle, Newton and Bacon. When elevated by feeling into imagination, their intellect becomes transcendent, and thus were they poets, the noblest name by far and away that belongs to any of the children of men.”

The idea that poetry is of the heart and science of the head, and that these two elements of the human individual and their expression in culture are in complete antithesis, moved Robert Burns, doubtless, to pen his biting verses:

“What’s a’ your jargon o’ your schools,  
 Your Latin names for horns and stools;  
 If honest Nature made you fools,



What sairs your grammars?  
 Ye'd better ta'en up spades and shoofs  
 Or knappin'-hammers.

A set o' dull conceited hashies  
 Confuse their brains in college classes  
 They gang in stirks and come out asses,  
 Plain truth to speak.  
 And soon they think to climb Parnassus  
 By dint o' Greek.

Gie me ae spark o' Nature's fire  
 That's all the learning I desire.  
 Then, though I trudge through dub and mire,  
 At pleugh or cart,  
 My muse, though hamely in attire,  
 May touch the heart."

This poem was evidently in the mind of Lowell when he wrote *An Incident in a Railroad Car*, in which he has treated the subject in a thoroughly optimistic vein:

"All that hath been majestical  
 In life or death since time began,  
 Is native in the simple heart of all,  
 The angel heart of man.  
 And thus among the untaught poor  
 Great deeds and feelings find a home  
 Which casts in shadow all the golden lore  
 Of classic Greece or Rome.  
 All thoughts that mould the age begin  
 Deep down within the primitive soul,  
 And from the many, slowly upward wing  
 To One, who grasps the whole."

Lowell, however, had no false idea of the eternal antagonism between poetry and science, or between poetry and civilization. One of the wisest sayings in his *Among My Books* is this: "In the earliest ages science was poetry, as in the latter poetry has become science."

The day when science was poetry saw the glories of Greek genius, and the present age, when poetry is becoming science, prophesies an expression of the human mind in true song beside which the literature of the Hellenic era will seem but a moon of magnificence, compared with the omniluculent and all-inspiring sun. When science and culture are truly wedded the real glory of poetry will begin to appear. Even now the criers in the desert bid us make straight the paths for its coming.

The prelude to that great outburst of song may be said to have been written by Mrs. Browning, reacting from Schiller's *Gods of Greece*, wherein is set forth what she terms "a doctrine still more dishonoring to poetry than to Christianity." Her poem, *The Dead Pan*, treats the theme in masterly fashion from the Christian stand-point:

"O ye vain, false gods of Hellas,  
Ye are silent evermore!  
And I dash down this old chalice  
Whence libations ran of yore.  
See, the wine crawls in the dust,  
Wormlike,—as your glories must,  
Since Pan is dead.

Get to dust, as common mortals  
By a common doom and track  
Let no Schiller from the portals  
Of that Hades call you back,  
Or instruct us to weep all  
At your antique funeral.  
Pan, Pan, is dead.

By your beauty, which confesses  
Some chief Beauty conquering you,—  
By our grand heroic guesses  
Through your falsehood at the True,—  
We will weep *not* earth shall roll  
Heir to each god's aureole—  
And Pan is dead.

Earth outgrows the mythic fancies  
Sung beside her in her youth,  
And those debonair romances  
Sound but dull beside the truth.  
Phoebus' chariot course is run:  
Look up, poets, to the sun!  
Pan, Pan, is dead.

. . . . .

Truth is fair; should we forego it?  
Can we sigh right for a wrong;  
God Himself is the best Poet,  
And the Real is His song.  
Sing His truth out fair and full,  
And secure His beautiful.  
Let Pan be dead.

Truth is large: our aspiration  
Scarce embraces half we be.

Shame, to stand in His creation  
 And doubt Truth's sufficiency—  
 To think God's song unexcelling  
 The poor tales of our own telling—  
     When Pan is dead.

What is true and just and honest,  
 What is lovely, what is pure,  
 All of praise that hath admonished,  
 All of virtue shall endure;  
 These are themes for poet's uses,  
 Stirring nobler than the Muses,  
     Ere Pan was dead.

O brave poets, keep back nothing,  
 Nor mix falsehood with the whole;  
 Look up Godward; speak the truth in  
 Worthy song from earnest soul:  
 Hold, in high poetic duty,  
 Truest Truth the fairest Beauty!  
     Pan, Pan, is dead."

The New Christianity and the New Science are in no mortal antagonism.

Matthew Arnold, not less eminent as a critic than as a poet, wrote:

"We should conceive of poetry worthily, and more highly than it has been the custom to conceive of it. We should conceive of it as capable of higher uses, and called to higher destinies, than those which in general men have assigned to it hitherto. More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry our science will appear incomplete, and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry."

Dr. D. G. Brinton tells us that "The poetry of science will be the inspiration of the religion of the future." Happy day, when the two real "makers" among the sons of men, poets both, and both men of science, unite to discover and then to picture the good, the true and the beautiful throughout the universe of man! It is more than accident that Tyndall has been called a poet among men of science and Tennyson a scientist among poets! It was Tyndall who wrote of the man of science (cited by Berdoe, p. 62):

"He lives a life of the senses, using his hands, eyes, and ears in his experiments, but is constantly being carried beyond the margin of the senses. His mind must realize the sub-sensible world, and possess a

pictorial power; if the picture so formed be correct, the phenomena he is investigating are accounted for. Imagination with him does not sever him from the world of fact; this is the storehouse from which all its pictures are drawn; and the magic of its art consists, not in creating things anew, but in so changing the magnitude, position, and other relations of sensible things as to fit them for the requirements of the intellect in the sub-sensible world."

Said Christopher North (cited by Berdoo, p. 62), combatting the idea that science and imagination must always be at daggers drawn:

"What is science? True knowledge of mind and matter, as far as it is permitted to us to know anything truly of the world without and the world within us, congenial to their co-existence. What is poetry? The true exhibition in musical and metrical speech of the thoughts of humanity, when colored by its feelings throughout the whole range of the physical, moral, intellectual and spiritual regions of its being.

"Poetry and science are identical—or rather, that, as imagination is the highest kind of intellect, so poetry is the highest kind of science. It is only in an age of science that anything worthy the name of poetry can exist."

No matter how great the triumphs of science in the future, poetry will still be the source of its noblest and truest expression. As Shelley tells us, in that eloquent plea for his art, *A Defense of Poetry*:

"Poetry is indeed something divine. It is at once the center and circumference of knowledge; it is that which comprehends all science, and that to which all science must be referred. It is at the same time the root and blossom of all other systems of thought; it is that from which all spring, and that which adorns all; and that which, if blighted, denies the fruit and the seed, and withholds from the barren world the nourishment and the succession of the scions of the tree of life. It is the perfect and consummate surface and bloom of all things; it is as the odor and the color of the rose to the texture of the elements which compose it, as the form and splendor of unfaded beauty to the secrets of anatomy and corruption."

But it is Wordsworth, curiously enough, whose poetry incarnates some of the deepest and wisest thoughts of science, and he has best described the league existing between the Poet and the Man of Science:

"Poetry is the first and last of all knowledge: it is immortal as the heart of men. If the labors of the men of science should ever create any revolution, direct or indirect, in our condition, and in the impressions which we habitually receive, the poet will then sleep no more than at present; he will be ready to follow the steps of the man of science,



not only in those general indirect effects, but he will be at his side, carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of the science itself.

"The remotest discoveries of the chemist, the botanist, or mineralogist, will be as proper objects of the poet's as any upon which it can be employed, if the time should ever come when these things shall be familiar to us, and the relations under which they are contemplated by the followers of the respective sciences shall be manifestly and palpably material to us as enjoying and suffering beings.

"If the time should ever come when what is now called science, thus familiarized to men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh and blood, the poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and will welcome the being thus produced as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man."

In our pride of race and culture we are too prone to think that towering mountains and broad oceans separate the poets of today from their fellows of the long ago when, as Emerson said: "Every word was . . . a poem." Yet, even as all primitive men were largely poets, so, in spite of the vicissitudes of the ages, all poets are largely primitive men in the highest and best sense of the term. Unbreakable links bind together the first poet of our race and the last. As Dr. D. G. Brinton well says, in a brief essay on *Primitive American Poetry*: "We may look on their poetry as the biologist does on the rudimentary forms of organic life,—low in structure, if you please, but, after all, those which reveal to us most clearly the laws which underlie the highest forms." The poets who foreshadow, the one rudely and carelessly, the other majestically and deliberately, the future of their art, are Whitman and Browning, whose victory over the "nausty rules of meter and prosody," subordination of poetic devices to thought, and defiance of the artificialities of grammar, clearly mark out some of the chief characteristics of poetry in the centuries to come. And these characteristics are nearly all, if not all, such as are found in the poetry of primitive man, having been abandoned during the development of alleged culture for reasons akin to those which account for the teaching of Latin in grade schools to the detriment of the mother-tongue, the resort to war as a method of propagating Christianity and American political principles, the use of corsets and other excrescences of the age for which no real justification exists.

Biese, in his interesting work on the *Philosophy of the Metaphoric*, seeks to show how near the mind of primitive man is to the growing thought of today: The child's instinct, the sav-

age's *naïveté*, the wisdom of the genius and the philosopher are one. The universe really is animate, ensouled, and man could not do otherwise than think so. The ensoulment of all is the first unitary thought of mankind.

Alexander Swiechowski, a Polish man of science, published, some few years ago, a book entitled *The Poet as Primitive Man*, in which, using the literature of his own language to draw upon, he seeks to show how closely, and in how many respects, the poet of today resembles the savage of the early ages of mankind. But, while so doing, the author magnifies the difference between the poet and the man of science, conceiving the latter as freed from the ties which bind the poet to the men of other days.

And the poetry of primitive man and the science of civilized man are not so divergent in their origins after all. From a certain point of view, indeed, they are, in their essentials, one. As Vignoli says in his suggestive book on *Myth and Science* (p. 131):

"This faculty, inward function, and process of mythical and symbolical facts led in course of time to the evolution and beginning of knowledge, which is first empirical and then rational. Therefore, we must repeat, the extrinsic and intrinsic perception, the specification of types, and their modification into a unity which was always becoming more comprehensive, are the conditions and method of science itself, which is only developed by means of this faculty. Hence the elements and intrinsic logical form of science are identical with those through which mythical representations and the inward life of the human intelligence are developed."

In other words:

"The act which produces the myth is therefore the same from which science proceeds, so that their original source is identical. The same process which constitutes the fetish and myth also constitutes science in its conditions and form, and here we find the unique fact which generates them both; science, like myth, would be impossible without apprehension, without the individuation of ideas, and the classification and specification of types."

The solidarity which makes science is the same solidarity which aforesaid made myth. Even in the range from savage myth to American science of the twentieth century *Natura non facit saltum*. Moreover, Dr. Franz Boas, in his illuminating study of *The Mind of Primitive Man*, taking the ground that "mythology, theology, philosophy are different terms for the same influences which shape the current of human thought, and which determine the character of the attempts of man to

explain the phenomena of nature," compares the rôle of folklore in shaping primitive science with "the enormous influence of current philosophical opinion upon the masses of the people," and "the influence of the dominant scientific theory upon the character of scientific work."

Emerson, wise as he was, overstepped the mark when he declared so dogmatically: "You may as well ask a loom which weaves huckaback why it does not make cashmere, as expect poetry from this engineer, or a chemical discovery from that jobber." Here he had forgotten the cardinal distinction between an implement and a man. Every human being is a maker, but every loom is made. The engineer does sometimes burst into song. Here is a poem by an engineer:

SPEAK KIND TO THE BAIRNS.

"Speak kind to the bairnies, the wee toddlin' treasures,  
The ingle-neuk angels that banish a' strife;  
Their innocent plays are the source o' their pleasures,  
Their lauchin' an' rompin' the soul o' their life.  
O! wha could be thrawn wi' a bairnie's sweet smilin'!  
Wha, wha to their cuddlin' an' kissin' is blind?  
The heart maun be deid to a' beauty beguillin',  
That canna thole bairnies, an' speak to them kind.

Our freen's may be caudrife, our toil may be weary,  
Our way may be sma' aff the little we earn,  
But rich in affection, we, joyous and cheery,  
Wad gie our last bannock to comfort our bairn.  
O! what has a man on this earth to be proud o'?  
Were't no' for the nurselin's by heaven designed  
To lichten the life that they show him the good o'?  
Sae thole wi' their capers an' speak to them kind.

Sair, sair, are the tears o' the bairnies neglectit,  
Their wee hearts are broken aneath a harsh word;  
They love to be loved wi' a love unresrietit,  
An' joy when their troubles are couthelie heard.  
Hoo happy to ken we hae some that aye love us,  
Come age, or come death, they will bear us in mind;  
They'll drap a love-tear on the green sod above us,  
An' sigh as they say that we ever were kind."

This seems to be good poetry and sound "child-study" doctrine besides. The author of this poem, William Allan, was an engineer. As an engineer, he served in the Royal Navy, in the Glasgow ship-yards, and on a blockade runner during the War of the Secession in America,—it is his poem, "Kit, the

Courier," that records sympathetically the story of the last moments of Stonewall Jackson. He has published several volumes of verse, including many tender poems of child-life. He has since become a master-engineer, and a successful man of business, of whom we read: "He writes poems and songs, too, with the same hearty 'fung' and energy with which he builds engines and advocates the rights of man, and all in the intervals of a busy work-a-day life." He has also been knighted by his sovereign. So at least one engineer has climbed the slopes of Parnassus' hill. And there are others.

Another Scotchman, Alexander G. Murdoch, styled "a poet of rare and approved quality," and likewise a singer of child-life, began his career as an engineer in the ship-yards of the Clyde. Emerson forgot, too, that in the days of old every worker was a poet, as Dr. Bücher has so admirably shown in his recent volume on *Work and Rhythm*. It is possible today for the engineer to become a poet, because, in primitive times, every engineer was a poet. Indeed, it is largely the divorce of labor and song, accompanying, but not necessarily a permanent characteristic of, our great civilization, that has made some of our civilized communities so barren of real poetry. Just as the association of poetry and war has kept a halo about the head of the devotees of a barbaric art, so has the separation of work and song degraded the laborer and kept him from rising equally with the most dignified classes of mankind. Not only is the laborer worthy of his hire, as civilized man says, but he is also worthy of his song, as primitive peoples have unanimously asserted.

The occasion to which Wordsworth looked forward may have already arrived, for the new doctrine of evolution is "creating a revolution, both direct and indirect in our condition, and in the impressions which we habitually receive." And the poet is now beginning to tell the world in beauty and in truth the new order of things born of the brain and genius of Darwin and the innumerable host of students of man and of nature whom his epoch-making thought has called into existence.

In his acute discussion of *The Individual*, Prof. N. S. Shaler observes: "The main difference between practical and poetical minds of like general capacity lies in the use which they have become accustomed to make of the spontaneously offered germs of thought." It is thus, more a question of method and habit



than of absolutely discrete endowments of the intellect. No people, at the present moment, are so practically-minded as the inhabitants of the United States, and yet nowhere else is there to be found such an abundance of excellent newspaper-verse and fugitive poetical literature. Nor has any other land in the world developed so extensively or so well the art of commemorative poetry, as our school and college occurrences, social reunions, public ceremonies, and occasions of family, local, state and national importance amply prove. Many an American man of genius has begun by being a class-poet, and it was an incident rather than a necessity of his after-life that when he devoted himself to science he forsook the Muses altogether. The amount of good poetry written by men of science in their youth, or again in green old age, when the individual undergoes a sort of renaissance, is another fact in point. So, too, is the appreciation many men of science have had for the poet and his art.

Huxley, in many respects the man of science *par excellence* of the nineteenth century, left on record his testimony to the services of the poet to science, when he proposed that Tennyson should be made a Fellow of the Royal Society on equal footing with some of the most illustrious men of science in the world. Of Tennyson himself, Huxley said: "He was the only modern poet, in fact I think the only poet since the time of Lucretius, who has taken the trouble to understand the work and tendency of the men of science." He praised, in particular, the "insight into scientific method shown in *In Memoriam*," and declared it to be "quite equal to that of men of science themselves." And when the greatest poet of his day died, he had the unparalleled honor of having a poem composed in his memory by the foremost man of science, for Huxley paid tribute to his friend and interpreter in an ode of considerable merit, published in the *Nineteenth Century* for November, 1892.

This poem, by a great man of science on the death of a great poet, deserves reproduction here. The words are represented as spoken by the Minster in which Tennyson lies buried:

"Bring me my dead!  
To me that have grown,  
Stone laid upon stone,  
As the stormy brood  
Of English blood  
Has waxed and spread  
And filled the world,

With sails unfurled;  
 With men that may not lie;  
 With thoughts that cannot die.

Bring me my dead!  
 Into the storied hall,  
 Where I have garnered all  
 My harvest without weed;  
 My chosen fruits of goodly seed;  
 And lay him gently down among  
 The men of state, the men of song:  
 The thought-worn chieftains of the mind:  
 Head servants of the human kind.

Bring me my dead!  
 The autumn sun shall shed  
 Its beams athwart the bier's  
 Heaped blooms: a many tears  
 Shall flow; his words, in cadence sweet and strong,  
 Shall voice the full hearts of the silent throng.  
 Bring me my dead!

And oh! sad wedded mourner, seeking still  
 For vanished hand-clasp: drinking in thy fill  
 Of holy grief; forgive, that pious theft  
 Robs thee of all, save memories, left:  
 Not thine to kneel beside the grassy mound  
 While dies the western glow; and all around  
 Is silence: and the shadows closer creep  
 And whisper softly: All must fall asleep."

Huxley was not the only man of science who mourned the death of Tennyson. Dr. Daniel G. Brinton, the American anthropologist, one of the most eminent scientific men of our age, thoroughly appreciated the poet, and said that he "often went to him for light upon scientific perplexities." Like Huxley, too, Dr. Brinton published an important poem after middle life, though on an entirely different topic,—*Maria Candelaria*, the aboriginal American Joan of Arc.

Dr. Brinton has also left on record, in his *Pursuit of Happiness*, his opinion of the benefit poetry is to a man of science. After enumerating the wise maxim that in matters of reading one ought to "read all kinds," for "variety is the guiding principle," and "reading in ruts" is to be avoided, he observes (p. 161):

"For one branch of literature I must, however, put in a special claim, as it has been such a pleasure to me, ever since I learned to read, and that is Poetry. I have heard it sometimes said that this is a taste of

youth, and dies a natural death with advancing years. My own experience is quite the contrary. The delight we derive from accurate rhythm, melodious words, fine thoughts, and the depicting of deep emotions, ought to increase as our experience of the world and wider learning make us more familiar with them."

How, then, can men of science help loving and appreciating a poet, whose felicitous summings up of the results of their investigations are at once beautiful and generally accurate? Lucretius, we all know, is an ancient poet with quite a modern flavor. In his great poem, *De Rerum Natura*, barring its onslaughts on religion, we meet with many flashes of genius, that almost anticipate evolutionary doctrine. Take, for example, his description of the civilizing of man out of his fierce and savage origins:

"The first mankind began their former rude,  
And hard-enduring natures to relax;  
Effeminate made by warmth, their shivering limbs.  
No longer could endure the open sky;  
Love mined their savage strength, and children's arts  
Subdued the untamed temper of their sires.  
Their neighbors 'gan to join in social league  
With mutual bonds 'gainst violence and wrong;  
Their tender children and the female sex  
Clung for protection to the stronger man;  
The tender mother fostering her child,  
With gentle gesture, and with soothing words,  
Then feelingly proclaimed that all the weak  
'Twas fit the strong should pity and protect.  
But not at once could concord reign supreme,  
Faithful tho' many held to plighted faith;  
Else had the human race become extinct,  
Nor could have drawn their generations out."

Here is the same doctrine that Professor Sutherland has recently elaborately demonstrated in his two large volumes on *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct* (London, 1898).

But Lucretius' thoughts are often crude and his verse still oftener cruder yet. Note the difference, when a master of form like Tennyson takes up the strain. In his dramatic monologue, *Lucretius*, the English poet states the atomic theory of the old Roman thus:

"A void was made in Nature; all her bonds  
Crack'd; and I saw the flaring atom streams  
And torrents of her myriad universe,  
Ruining along the illimitable inane,

Fly on to clash together again, and make  
 Another and another frame of things  
 Forever."

Note also how the English poet has *résumé*d the story of evolution in the 118th section of that wonderful song of life and death and death and life, *In Memoriam*:

"They say  
 The solid earth where on we tread  
 In tracks of fluent heat began,  
 And grew to seeming-random forms,  
 The seeming prey of cyclic storms,  
 Till at the last arose the man;  
 Who throve and branch'd from clime to clime,  
 The herald of a higher race,  
 And of himself in higher place,  
 If so he type this work of time  
 Within himself, from more to more;  
 Or, crowned with attributes of woe  
 Like glories, move his course, and show  
 That life is not as idle ore,  
 But iron dug from central gloom,  
 And heated hot with burning fears,  
 And dipp'd in baths of hissing tears,  
 And batter'd with the shocks of doom  
 To shape and use. Arise and fly  
 The reeling Faun, the sensual feast;  
 Move upward, working out the beast,  
 And let the ape and tiger die."

There are other happy summings up of scientific theories, such as these:

"This world was once a fluid haze of light,  
 Till towards the center set the starry tides,  
 And eddied into suns, that wheeling cast,  
 The planets: then the monster, then the man."

"The moanings of the homeless sea,  
 The sound of streams that swift or slow  
 Draw down the Aeonian hills and sow  
 The dust of continents to be."

Again, in later years, Tennyson sang of *The Making of Man*:

"Where is one that, born of woman, altogether can escape  
 From the lower world within him, moods of tiger or of ape?



Man as yet is being made, and ere the crowning Age of ages,  
Shall not æon after æon pass and touch him into shape?

All about him shadow still, but, while the races flower and fade,  
Prophet-eyes may catch a glory slowly gaining on the shade,  
Till the peoples all are one, and all their voices blend in choric  
Hallelujah to the Maker 'It is finish'd. Man is made.' "

Scientists of the evolutionist school have told us of one of the great factors working towards the end of perfecting man. The evidence thereof and the investigator's way of putting the argument can be read in Havelock Ellis' *Man and Woman*, where the rôle of the child and its mother in shaping the destinies of the race is demonstrated. Tennyson, too, has sung of it:

"The woman's cause is man's; they rise or sink  
Together, dwarf'd or godlike, bond or free:  
For she that out of Lethe scales with man  
The shining steps of Nature, shares with man  
His nights, his days, moves with him to one goal,  
Stays all the fair young planet in her hands—  
If she be small, slight-natured, miserable,  
How shall men grow? but work no more alone!  
Our placé is much: as far as in us lies  
We too will serve them both in aiding her,  
Will clear away the parasitic forms  
That seem to keep her up but drag her down—  
Will leave her space to burgeon out of all  
Within her—let her make herself her own  
To give or keep, to live and learn and be  
All that not harms distinctive womanhood.  
For woman is not undevelop't man,  
But diverse: could we make her as the man,  
Sweet Love were slain: his dearest bond is this,  
Not like to like, but like in difference.  
Yet in the long years liker must they grow;  
The man be more of woman, she of man;  
He gain in sweetness and in moral height,  
Nor lose the wrestling thews that throw the world;  
She mental breadth, nor fail in childward care,  
Nor lose the childlike in the larger mind;  
Till at the last she set herself to man,  
Like perfect music unto noble words;  
And so these twain, upon the skirts of time,  
Sit side by side, full-summ'd in all their powers,  
Dispensing harvest, sowing the to-be,  
Self-reverent each, and reverencing each,  
Distinct in individualities,  
But like each other even as those who love.

Then comes the statelier Eden back to man;  
 Then reign the world's great bridals, chaste and calm;  
 Then springs the crowning race of human-kind."

What man of science has said these things better or more truly? This passage of Tennyson's is one of the jewels of English literature and one of the truths of science in a setting whose beauty is its rightful ornament. Who shall say that there is an eternal antithesis between poetry and science? Or who shall divide, in this man of genius, the one from the other? Have we not here a happy prophecy of their union in the future, an irrefragable proof of their belonging together?

There is another poet-scientist, in some respects the greatest master of song his race has seen since unrivaled Shakespeare filled the world with the masterpieces of the Anglo-Saxon mind. More than any one else, Robert Browning is the poet of evolution. A genius, wedded to a genius, and leaving behind him a descendant not unworthy of his parent's fame, artistic, learned, traveled, de-insularized, democratic, he represents more than any other single individual of our epoch the type of man evolution at its best can furnish the world.

Of him Dr. Berdoe says, in his *Browning's Message to his Times* (London, 1893):

"The scientific method, it is true, is not in favor with the minor poets; and it is not given even to all the greater to combine with the highest poetic faculty the deeper insight into the hidden things of nature possessed by Robert Browning. In him . . . the poetic and scientific methods are not merely found together, but are truly combined; and throughout his works are scattered abundant evidence that he, with keen vision, has seen far into the workings of Nature, and ennobled his phrase and verse from the study of her phenomena."

I will not unduly lengthen this essay with the innumerable passages which illustrate the beauty, the strength, and the eloquence of the great English poet as a man of science, for he was known and loved in America long before our slower cousins over-sea waked into full knowledge of the seer who dwelt among them. All are doubtless familiar with some of these illustrations and but a single example,—that noble prophecy of the future of our race from *Paracelsus*—will be cited here:

"Progress is

The law of life. Man is not man as yet.

Nor shall I deem his object served, his end

Attained, his genuine strength put fairly forth,  
 While only here and there a star dispels  
 The darkness, here and there a towering mind  
 O'erlooks its prostrate fellows: when the host  
 Is out at once to the despair of night,  
 When all mankind alike is perfected,  
 Equal in full-blown powers—then, not till then,  
 I say begins man's general infancy.  
 For wherefore make account of feverish starts.  
 Of restless members of a dormant whole,  
 Impatient nerves which quiver while the body  
 Slumbers as in a grave? Oh, long ago  
 The brow was twitched, the tremulous lids astir,  
 The peaceful mouth disturbed; half-uttered speech  
 Ruffled the lip, and then the teeth were set,  
 The breath drawn sharp, the strong right-hand clenched stronger,  
 As it would pluck a lion by the jaw;  
 The glorious creature laughed out even in sleep!  
 But when full roused, each giant limb awake,  
 Each sinew strung, the great heart pulsing fast,  
 He shall start up and stand on his own earth,  
 Then shall his long triumphant march begin,  
 Thence shall his being date,—thus wholly roused,  
 What he achieves shall be set down to him.  
 When all the race is perfected alike  
 As man, that is; all tended to mankind,  
 And, man produced, all has its end thus far:  
 But in completed man begins anew  
 A tendency to God. Prognostics told  
 Man's near approach; so in man's self arise  
 August anticipations, symbols, types  
 Of a dim splendor ever on before  
 In that eternal circle life pursues."

Browning marks a new era in the poetic art, the epoch now gathering in strength and beauty from having accepted the fact of evolution, not as an enemy of the Muse's art, but as its peer and co-worker in the unending task of gladdening the heart and broadening the mind of man with the search after and the demonstration of the true, the good and the beautiful in man and the infinite universe around, beneath him and above.

In the words of Dr. Berdoe (p. 57):

"It is not demanded the poet that he should ignore the beauty of the rainbow till he has studied Fraunhofer's lines. What we do say, is, that neither the scientist nor the poet alone comprehend Nature till they borrow from each—the one the reverence and the worship, the other the learning and loving study, that united make up the true spirit in

which she is to be approached. In Robert Browning, there is the happiest combination of these requisites."

Let us of today thank heaven that we were inhabitants of this earth at a time when Darwin searched and Tennyson and Browning sang, and be ready to greet, perhaps, ere we meet the common fate of men, the Darwin-Tennyson-Browning, who shall be the consummate "maker" of his age.



# AN ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE TERCENTENARY OF THE KING JAMES' VERSION OF THE ENGLISH BIBLE.

BY ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN, Ph. D.  
*Professor of Anthropology, Clark University.*

The three hundredth anniversary of the King James' version of the English Bible has been already celebrated in many ways, and other observations of this important event are yet to come. One interesting aspect of the question is concerned with the translation of the Bible, in whole or in part, into the numerous languages of savage and barbarous peoples in all quarters of the globe.

The toll of these is now large, but there still exist many into which nothing, except in certain cases, the Lord's Prayer, or some portion of the liturgical literature of the Catholic church, has been translated. By Protestant hands quite often nothing at all has been done, and from that point of view these languages are virgin soil.

Such a tongue, *e. g.*, is the Kootenay, of southeastern British Columbia and northern Idaho, which forms one of the fifty or more independent linguistic stocks recognized by American ethnologists as existing north of Mexico. The author of this brief article has been engaged on the study of the Kootenay language for a number of years, having first investigated these Indians in 1891 under the auspices of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. As a small, original contribution to the literature of the tercentenary of the King James' version of the English Bible, it has occurred to him to offer a translation of a few verses into the language of the Kootenay Indians,—the first ever made of any portion of this section of the New Testament, as follows:

1. Núpqane Jésus yúnok'áine áqktsemákinék. Aqkowoktléets yoquáqe, sáusak'áine. Tlaqáqe néis netstáhatlnintékes.
2. Aqki kakétl'ne, nopqátl'ne:
3. Tsitlsúkitlkókiné tlíttlittíne, tsukwáte áqkitlméyet amákis.
4. Tsitlsúkitlkókiné netlá'ne, tshatlsúkitlwi'ne.
5. Tsitlsúkitlkókiné k-asáhane, tshátlsúkwtíne kápes amákis.

6. Tsitslúkitlkókine tsitslúkine nowásine, nókonóktlumáine, tshatlikine kápes kápsins.
7. Tsitslúkitlkókine kákipáimek, tshatlkákipamík'nám'ne.
8. Tsitslúkitlkókine katlwi'ne ókwenámo súkine kápsins, tshatlnúpqane Yákasinkfnawáske.
9. Tsitslúkitlkókine kátlanánanám'ne, tshátlaktlékine Yákasinkfnawáske aqkálqtenintékes.

The verses translated are Matthew V. 1-9, in English:

1. And seeing the multitudes, he went up into a mountain: and when he was set, his disciples came unto him:
2. And he opened his mouth, and taught them, saying,
3. Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
4. Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.
5. Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.
6. Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.
7. Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.
8. Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.
9. Blessed are the peace-makers: for they shall be called the children of God.

This translation is, of course, not perfect, but it is, doubtless, quite up to the average of Bible translations into primitive tongues, if not beyond it; and the passages rendered are by no means the easiest. To make the matter clearer the following explanatory vocabulary may serve:

1. *Amakis*. Oblique case of *amak*, "land, earth, country;" *kape amak*, "all the land," "earth;" *aqkitlmeyet amakis*, "sky land," "heaven."
2. *Aqkaqltenintekes*. "His children." Oblique case, plural, of *aqkaqlte*, "child."
3. *Aqki*. "And."
4. *Aqkitlmeyet*. "Sky." Hence *aqkitlmeyet amakis*, "heaven,"—literally "sky land—its."
5. *Aqkitlmeyet amakis*. "Heaven."
6. *Aqkowoktleets*. Oblique case of *aqkowoktleet*, "mountain."
7. *Aqktsemakinek*. "People."
8. *Kakatl'ne*. "Speaks to." From the radical *ke*, "speak, say."
9. *Kakipaimék*. "They are merciful." Literally "they forget (or forgive)."
10. *Kapes*. Oblique case of *kape*, "all," "every;" *kape amak*, "earth," "world;" *kape kapsin*, "everything."
11. *Kapes kapsins*. Oblique case of *kape kapsin*, "everything."
12. *Kapsins*. Oblique case of *kapsin*, "thing."
13. *Kasahane*. "They are meek." Literally "not evil (or not evil-minded)." From *sahan*, "bad," the negative *k-a*, "not," and verbal *-ne*.

14. *K.atlanananam'ne*. "They are peaceful (the non-fighters)." From *tlananam'ne*, "they fight," and the negative *ka*, "not."
15. *Katlwi'ne*. "They think." From the radical of *aqkitlwinam*, "heart," "mind."
16. *Neis*. Oblique case of *ne*, "he."
17. *Netla'ne*. "They mourn (they weep)." From the radical *etla*, "weep."
18. *Netstahatl'nintekes*. "His disciples." Plural, with case ending, of *netstahatl*, "youth, young man."
19. *Nokonoktilumaine*. "They are thirsty."
20. *Nopqatl'ne*. "He teaches." A transitive form with suffix *-tl*, from *nopqane* or *nupqane*, "he sees," or "he knows." To "teach" is literally "to make see (or know)."
21. *Nowasine*. "They are hungry." From the radical *owas*, "to be hungry," the verbal prefix *n-* and the verbal *-ne*.
22. *Nupqane*. "He sees." From the radical *upqa* or *opqa*, "to see."
23. *Okwenamo*. "Always." Composed probably of *okwe*, "one," and the temporal suffix *-amo*, "time," "season."
24. *Sausak'aine*. "He sits down (rests)."
25. *Sukine*. "They are good." From the radical *suk* or *sok*, "good."
26. *Tlaqage*. "They arrive." Contains the particle *tla*, "again," and *wage*, "they come."
27. *Tlittlittitine*. "They are poor (possess nothing)." From *tlititine*, "to have things," with the privative *tlit*, "without," "deprived of."
28. *Tshatlaktlekine*. "They shall be called." From the verb *kaktlek*, "to be called (or named)," the particle *tshatl*—indicative of the future tense, and the verbal *-ne*.
29. *Tshatl'ikine*. "They shall eat." Future tense of *ikine*, "they eat."
30. *Tshatl'kakipaimek'nam'ne*. "There shall be forgiveness (or mercy)." A sort of verbal noun, from *kakipaimek*, "forgive" with the suffix (of verbal and other nouns of like meaning) *-nam*, the future-particle *tshatl*, and the verbal *-ne*.
31. *Tshatl'nupqane*. "They shall see." Future tense of *nupqane*, "they see."
32. *Tshatlsukitlwi'ne*. "They shall be comforted." Literally "they shall feel good in their hearts (or minds)." From *suk*, "good," *aqkitlwinam*, "heart," "mind," etc.
33. *Tshatl'tsukwatine*. "They shall have." Future of *tsukwate*, "they have," "they possess."
34. *Tsitsukine*. "They are righteous." Literally "they are very good." From *sukine*, "they are good," and the particle *tsitl*, "very."
35. *Tsitsukitkokine*. "They are blessed." Literally they are "very glad (or very happy)." The word seems to contain the prefix *tsitl*, "very," the radical *suk*, "good," and the stem *itlqo*, "body." So "blessed" would primitively signify "(feeling) very good all over one's self,"—this easily takes on the spiritual meaning.
36. *Tsukwate*. "They hold (or possess)," "they have."

37. *Yakasinkinawaske*. "God." A word introduced (made up from Indian components) by the whites. It seems to mean "He who made us with His hands."
38. *Yoquaqe*. "He climbs." From *yo* or *yu*, "up," and *aqe*, "to go."
39. *Yunokaine*. "There are many." The radical is *yu*, "up," "upon."

The Indian words are spelt phonetically according to the continental vowel usage, and the chief accents are indicated in the text. It will be noticed that in narration the Kootenay language employs throughout the historic present (e. g., *kakétl'ne*, *nopqátl'ne*, etc.), which adds to the realism of the story.



## LITERATURE: BOOKS, ETC.

*The social basis of religion*, by SIMON N. PATTEN. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1911. 247 p. (American Social Progress Series.)

The writer seeks here to weld together the ideas acquired in his two earlier works. He wishes to create an economic interpretation of history and science and also to trace social progress, and religion seems to be the point of union between these views. He seeks to use the economic interpretation of history to explain degenerate tendencies in civilization, and in social psychology he sets forth the opposing forces of regeneration. The latter is psychic and personal; the former objective and economic. This gives religion a scientific basis and his doctrines are transferred from the traditional field to that of science.

*The use of the Bible in the education of the young*, by T. RAYMONT. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1911. 254 p.

The writer attempts to act as an intermediary between the Bible expert and the busy teacher. Some of his chapters, therefore, are literary, others pedagogic. He has written especially in view of the needs of ordinary day school teachers, elementary and secondary, for among them he believes there are those who are interested and can be helped. So, in the Old Testament, he deals with the literary side and the teacher's survey, and the same in the New Testament. In the last part, he speaks of the course of instruction, the preparation of the lesson, modes of presentation, and appends a bibliography and chronological tables, with a comparative view of schemes of biblical instruction.

*Miracles in the New Testament*, by Rev. J. M. THOMPSON. London: Edward Arnold, 1911. 236 p.

The chief part of this book consists of a critical examination of the miracle stories of the New Testament leading to the hypothesis that the original events underlying these traditions need not be regarded as miracles. Considerably more evidence is required for miracles than for other events. The general view here is that they happen pretty much in the form in which they are related, although there is a growing body of evidence that they were not originally miracles. Detailed proof is wanting that these diseases were of a kind amenable to faith healing and the tendency to exaggerate Jesus' successes and ignore his failures is strong. The writer takes up the evidence of Paul, of Q, of Matthew, Luke, the fourth Gospel, birth, resurrection, etc.

*Jesus von Nazareth, Mythos oder Geschichte?* Von JOHANNES WEISS. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1910. 171 p.

This work is developed from Berlin lectures and treats of the religious and historical problem of sociologic methods and personality, discusses the hypothesis of Kalthoff, of Drews, Smith on the pre-Christian Jesus, describes the methods of historical religion, the myth of the dying God

and the dying Messiah in Judaism, the life of the Son of Man, the influence of myth on Christendom, the resurrection, the incarnation, Frazer's hypothesis of Haman and Mordechai, the Gilgamesh epic, Jensen's theory and method, temptations, the extra-Christian sources, Paul, tradition, the origin and transference of Mark, the source of the Sermon on the Mount, the originality, genuineness and transmission of Jesus' words.

*Hat Jesus gelebt?* Von ARTHUR DREWS. Berlin: Kultur politischer Vorlage, 1910. 93 p.

*Jesus, Vier Vorträge* von VORNEMANN, VEIT, SCHUSTER & FOERSTER. Frankfurt: Moritz Diesterweg, 1910. 119 p.

*Ist das "liberale" Jesusbild widerlegt?* Von HENRICH WEINEL. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1910. 11 p.

*Die Geschichte Jesu und die Astrologie*, von HEINRICH G. VOIGT. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1911. 225 p.

*Hat Jesus gelebt?* Von D. HERMANN. Berlin: Schöneberg, 1910. 54 p.

*Hat Jesus gelebt?* Von CURT DELBRUCK. Berlin: Possische Buchhandlung, 1910. 34 p.

*Hat Jesus gelebt?* Von ADOLF JULICHER. Marburg: N. C. Elwert, 1910. 37 p.

We simply give here the titles of the chief reactions which Professor Arthur Drews' work has evoked in Germany from scholars of various standpoints. Drews' bold hypothesis is that no such person as Jesus ever lived, but that his image developed slowly as an accretion of many mythic and historical tendencies which shot together in folk-lore, rites and myths, without any conscious purpose to deceive. He claims that thus Christology is lifted above the murky air of historical criticism and that the sublime image of Jesus stands out as the supreme human ideal. Learned as he is, and extensive as his studies for years have been, the fact that Drews was not a specialist in this subject, as well as its extreme position, has added to the hostility with which his views have been received. After a considerable conspiracy of silence, the work may be said to be in the focus of discussion now.

*Rest Days: A Sociological Study.* By HUTTON WEBSTER, Ph. D. (Reprinted from the University Studies, Lincoln, Nebraska, Vol II, Nos. 1-2, January-April, 1911.) Lincoln, 1911. 158 p.

Dr. Webster, who is Professor of Social Anthropology in the University of Nebraska, is already known through his work on *Primitive Secret Societies*, published in 1908. The present monograph, which the author intends to issue later in amplified form, treats of the following topics: Periods of abstinence at critical epochs (e. g., *tabu* days among the Hawaiians, *lali* days among the Bornean Land Dayaks, and *genna* days in Assam); periods of abstinence after a death and on related occasions (here are discussed the primitive attitude towards death, tabooed days following a death, and taboos observed during feasts of the dead and at expulsion of ghosts); periods of abstinence at sacred times and seasons (the conception of holiness, holy days in the lower and the higher culture, quasi-holy days,—the days of abstinence of the Todas, tabooed days in West Africa, quasi-holy days in archaic civilization); periods of

" abstinence connected with lunar phenomena (superstitions relating to the moon, taboos observed at changes of the moon); lunar calendars (lunar months and weeks, the hebdomadal cycle); the Babylonian "evil days" and *Sabattu* (the "evil days," the cult of seven and the planetary week, Babylonian lunar weeks; taboos observed on the "evil days," the *sabattu*); the Hebrew Sabbath (the Sabbath in the Old Testament, the Sabbath as a lunar festival, taboos observed on the Sabbath); periods of abstinence at unlucky times and seasons (the conception of unluckiness, unlucky days in the lower and the higher culture). This covers a wide field and such a well-documented study is a welcome addition to the literature of this important religious and sociological topic. Among the points more or less emphasized by Dr. Webster are these: The wide prevalence of *tabu*-conceptions and related ideas "in the lower culture and even amongst peoples of archaic civilization" (p. 4). Very frequently "the connection of a holy day with a particular divinity is not primary and direct, but comes rather as an after-thought," and "the period dedicated to a god and observed with abstinence may have been once tabooed for other and quite different reasons" (p. 35). With many primitive peoples, "the moon, rather than the sun, the planets, or any of the constellations, first excited the imagination and aroused feelings of superstitious awe or religious veneration" (p. 62),—the doctrine of "lunar sympathy" is widespread, and many primitive peoples "watch carefully the changes of the moon and describe them by appropriate names" (p. 99). The seven-day week seems to belong with Semitic antiquity (p. 101), but it is rather difficult to sustain the theory of borrowing in the case of the Tshi and Ga peoples of West Africa. The Sabbath originated as a lunar "festival." The general conclusion reached is that: "It is fairly obvious . . . that the belief in days lucky and unlucky has operated, like other superstitions, to retard the development of mankind. They hinder individual initiative and tend to prevent the undertaking of lengthy enterprises, which may be interrupted by the recurrence of an unfavorable period. Their elaborate development compels fitful, intermittent labor rather than a steady and continuous occupation" (p. 156). Both in ancient Rome and in modern Ashanti the belief in unfavorable seasons can be said to "directly affect political and social progress," for then "assemblies could not be held, nor courts of justice stand open, nor armies engage the enemy, when the unlucky day came round." The hands of the astrologer and the magician too were strengthened by such conceptions. On lucky days, there was often "a tendency to work beyond one's strength because assured of success." There is, however, a bright side to the picture. As the author observes (p. 157):

"To the student of primitive religion and sociology nothing is more interesting than the contemplation of that unconscious though beneficent process which has converted institutions based partly or wholly on a belief in the imaginary and the supernatural into institutions resting on the rock of reason and subserving human welfare. Though the origin of tabooed and unlucky days must be sought in gross superstition, sooner or later they acquire a social significance and may then be perpetuated as the primitive holidays long after their earlier meaning has faded

away." Again, "the passage of the holy day into the holiday, beginning in the lower culture, promises to reach its culmination in the thorough secularization of all the great festivals of the Christian year" (p. 158). This transition, going on under our very eyes, exemplifies the saying that "human nature is always ready for the shift from fast to feast." There are of course some moots points in this monograph. To the literature on the primitive attitude towards death (pp. 21-23) should be added a reference to Dr. Farabee's paper on the Macheyengas of eastern Peru, published in the *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society* for 1909. It is doubtful if the suggestion made on page 4 will be adopted: "It would conduce to clearness if 'taboo' as an English word were used solely as a substantive with the corresponding verbal forms 'to taboo' and 'tabooed.' The word should not be employed as an adjective; for this purpose the native *tabu* may be conveniently retained, since the Polynesian term has a double meaning not adequately rendered by any one English expression." It is hard to modify our mother-tongue which has a *Sprachgefühl* quite its own.

A. F. C.

*Die Entwicklung des menschlichen Geistes. Ein Vortrag* von MAX VERWORN. Jena: G. Fischer, 1910. 52 p.

This essay, originally an address delivered in August, 1910, before the meeting of the German Anthropological Society at Cologne, is of interest here on account of the peculiar views of the author concerning the religion of primitive man,—his views on "physio-plastic" and "ideo-plastic" art are bound up with this conception. According to Verworn, the "eolithic culture" of the Tertiary epoch was "the age of the sense-impressionist mind" in the race; then, in the later Tertiary and the Diluvium, the archeolithic and paleolithic culture appeared,—"the age of the naïve-practical mind" (in the archeolithic culture we have "the beginnings of the practical-intentional combination of chance observations;"; paleolithic culture represents "the flourishing of naïve-practical observations and inventions and the activity of a naïve-esthetic sense"); from the close of the paleolithic culture down to the present time we have had "the age of theorizing." The "age of theorizing" can be divided into two sections, the first of which, "the stage of dogmatic-speculative thought," lasts from the close of paleolithic culture to the time of the Occidental Renaissance in the 15-16th century A. D., and the second, "the stage of critical-experimental thought," from the Renaissance down to to-day. The first section may also be subdivided into "the period of imaginative-religion speculation" (neolithic, paleolithic, bronze and iron ages), and "the period of scholastic-rationalistic speculation," including the culture of Greece, Rome and the Middle Ages. It was in the "period of imaginative-religious speculation" of the stone age, when "the happy realism of the paleolithic hunter had gone by forever, yielding place to the gloomy, solemn ideas of a mystical belief in souls and spirits," that *naïveté* was supplanted by *speculation*. The most important conception of this period, says Verworn (p. 40) "is the idea of the soul, the mother of the dualism of soul and body." Thus arose, according to Verworn, from observation



of the process of death and dream-life the doctrines of spiritism, ancestor-worship, fear of demons, cult of gods, etc., and a whole system of religious conceptions began to crystallize, which very soon had all man's thinking and feeling and his willing and acting in their power. Art was not the only thing that suffered, in passing from the "physioplasmic" to the "ideoplasmic" stage. These ideas the author has also expressed, with more detail in regard to art, in another essay, *Zur Psychologie der primitiven Kunst* (Jena, 1908), where he attributes the repression of the earlier "physioplasmic" art and the birth of the "ideoplasmic" to the appearance of "the conception of the soul-idea and the consequent dualistic division of the human being into body and soul." The religious notions developing from this idea afforded the conditions necessary for the development of "ideoplasmic" art, which to-day characterizes children of civilized races and nearly all primitive people. It is fair to say that the author has not proved out satisfactorily his contentions either as to the art of primitive man in its relation to that of children or of the modern human race, or as to the development of religion and its effects upon prehistoric esthetics. Such theories, when submitted to the anthropological-psychological test, seldom survive. Both religion and art are broader and more human than Verworn would have us believe, at all ages of human history.

A. F. C.

*Truth and Reality. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge.* By JOHN ELOF BOODIN. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1911. 334 p. \$1.75 net.

The author, who is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Kansas, discusses truth and the mental constitution, the nature of truth, the criterion of truth, truth and its object, etc., from the point of view of one who regards mind as instinct, holding that "all of our fundamental adjustments or categories, viewed from the point of view of individual development, are instinctive or organic adjustments; that the stimuli, which constitute the environment, are simply the occasion for calling into play the structural tendencies of the organic growth series, and that such categories as recapitulation, imitation, and accommodation are pseudo-categories, stating certain results from the point of view of consciousness, but not explanatory of the real process of consciousness" (p. 15). This, too, "applies to the whole history of individual consciousness, and not simply to its initial stages." The author feels bound to maintain that "progress must take place through spontaneous variations and natural selection, though tendencies must be made definite and effective through external stimuli and the process of experience," and that "the possibility of education is determined by our evolutionary heritage." Professor Boodin intends the book, which is dedicated to the late William James, to serve, in a way, as an orientation of pragmatism, whose main issues he desires to emphasize "in the bewildering amount of discussion and misunderstanding to which the pragmatic movement has led." The larger part of Chapter XVII. (pp. 307-326), which treats of "The Reality of Religious Ideals," was, we are informed, "given as a lecture at Harvard in 1899, practically before the move-

ment had started." The pragmatic view of religion is taken, viz., "the progressive usefulness must prove the greater objectivity of the content," and "the truest and most objective religious ideal, then, is that which can furnish the completest and fullest satisfaction of the demands and longings of evolving humanity" (p. 325). Christianity is highest, "because it, as no other, furnishes, in the simplest and completest way, that environment of the soul which satisfies and makes objective its yearning for the highest good." It has, too, the supreme and satisfying personality of Jesus. While Christianity "neither can nor must claim any exemption from this test of the completest ministry to human nature," its ideals and the personality of its founder, are the assurance that it will "extend itself, in the centuries to come, to the ends of the earth." The past of religion is expressed in Professor Boodin's statements that "our religious tendencies determine our religion, not the opposite," and "if we lack the feeling toward the supernatural and the sense of dependence, religion is not for us." Its future is outlined thus (p. 41): "As the difference in creeds and the dread of hell disappear, religious denominations will separate in their worship on the ground of the real psychic preferences of individuals as regards the emphasis of the ethical, the mystical, the esthetic or the philosophic tendencies—always with the possibility, of course, that the more primary tendencies of custom and loyalty may keep a man where he does not psychologically belong." In the library of pragmatism this book deserves a good place.

A. F. C.

*The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature. Vol. 4: The Idea of God in Early Religions.* By F. B. JEVONS. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1910. X, 170 p.

*Ibid. Vol 8: Early Religious Poetry of the Hebrews.* By E. C. KING, D. D. Cambridge, 1911. XVI, 156 p.

*Ibid. Vol. 9: The History of the English Bible.* By JOHN BROWN, D. D. Cambridge, 1911. VIII, 136 p.

*Ibid. Vol. 3: The English Puritans.* By JOHN BROWN, D. D. Cambridge, 1910. 160 p.

*Ibid. Vol. 11: The Rise and Development of Presbyterianism in Scotland.* By THE RIGHT HON. LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH, K. T., G. C. M. G. Cambridge, 1911. 172 p.

The handy and useful series of "manuals of science and literature" now issuing from the Cambridge (England) University Press includes a number of volumes upon topics connected with the origins and development of religion and religions. Professor Jevons, in his discussion of *The Idea of God in Early Religions* treats of the idea of God in mythology, in worship, in prayer, and of the idea and being of God. He finds mythology "of little use in our search after the idea of God," holding that "myth-making is a reflective process, a process in which the mind reflects upon the idea, and therefore a process which cannot be set up unless the idea is already present, or, rather we should say had already been presented" (p. 60). Mythology is thus, "of itself sufficient proof that gods are, or have been, believed in; it is the outcome of reflection and inquiry about the gods, whom the community approaches, with

mingled feelings of hope and fear, and worships with sacrifice and prayer" (p. 56). The folk-lore of most Christian peoples contains traces of "gods dethroned." In like manner, according to the author, "ritual of this kind, not associated with the names of any gods, is found amongst the Australian tribes, and may be the wreckage of a system gone to pieces,"—here there is always danger, as Professor Jevons notes, of running into the error of times gone by, when students of mythology "found, or thought they found, in mythology, profound truths, known or revealed to sages of old." As to worship, the author is of opinion that "religion has never anywhere developed without rites, for they "are indispensable, in the same way and for the same reason, that language is indispensable to thought." The development of religion without rites is as impossible as the development of language without thought. The many different forms of religion "are all attempts—successful in as many very various degrees as language itself—to give expression to the idea of God" (p. 107). Personal religion becomes possible only as personal self-consciousness develops, and when religion becomes personal it involves man's fellowmen as much as himself, and grows to be thereby "more than ever before, the relation of the community to its God" (p. 105). On some of the moot questions of the science of religion Professor Jevons expresses himself thus (p. 120): "The theory that spell preceded prayer and became prayer, or that magic developed into religion, finds as little support in the facts afforded by the science of religion, as the converse theory of a primitive revelation and a paradisaical state in which religion alone was known. For what is found in one stage of evolution the capacity must have existed in earlier stages; and if both prayer and spell, both magic and religion, are found, the capacity for both must have pre-existed." Just as man spoke ages before he had any idea of the laws of speech or the rules of grammar, and reasoned millenniums anterior to his acquaintance with formal logic, so his religiousness long antedated any knowledge on his part of principles of religion, etc. It is the prayers of savages, who are nearest to the condition of primitive man, that "furnish the material from which we can best infer what was the idea of God, which was present in their consciousness at those moments when it was most vividly present to them" (p. 140). According to the author, "the idea of God as a being whose will is to be done, and not man's, is a distinctly Christian idea," in non-Christian religions it being really a question of man's will, and not God's. The highest development of religion "is the substitution of the love of God for the desires of man, which makes the new heaven and the new earth" (p. 150). Evolution is radiative and dispersive and not continuous on one and the same direct line. Thus "fetishism, polytheism and monotheism are not different and successive stages of one line of evolution, following the same direction," for "new forms of religion are all re-births, renaissances, and spring, not from one another, but from the soul of man, in which is found the idea of God" (p. 158). It would be well, if writers upon religious topics such as this made larger draughts upon the material now accessible concerning the religious ideas of the American Indians, and

placed not so much dependence upon the Australian data, excellent as a good deal of it is and must be.

Dr. King's volume on *Early Religious Poetry of the Hebrews* "is intended to embrace the poetry of Old Testament times as distinguished from the poetry of the Synagogue," and in *religious* poetry is included "the whole outcome of that probation whereby the suffering Nation was fitted to prepare the world for God." In the translations the form and rhythm of the Hebrew originals are imitated as far as possible. This volume will serve as a most desirable aid to the reading of the Old Testament, which contains so much of the early poetry of the Hebrews.

In his *History of the English Bible*, Dr. Brown treats of Anglo-Saxon versions, Wycliffe's Ms. Bible, Tyndale's printed translation, Coverdale's and the Great Bible, three rival versions (Genevan, the Bishops' Bible, the Douay version), the authorized version of 1611, and the revised version of 1881. In small compass a large number of interesting facts are given, with the addition of facsimiles, reproductions of title-pages, etc. This little volume tells the story of a great monument of English speech from its beginnings in 670 A. D. to its latest transformation in 1881. In *The English Puritans*, Dr. Brown discusses the chief topics involved in the story of this aspect of English religious life: The origins of the Puritans, vestments and ceremonies, the Puritans and the hierarchy, presbytery in episcopacy, absolutism and liberty, Puritanism in its triumph and downfall. As there were reformers before the Reformation, there had been Puritans before that century (1558-1658 A. D.), from the accession of Elizabeth to the death of Cromwell, which has come to be termed "the Puritan period." Moreover, "puritanism was not so much an organized system as a religious temper and a moral force, and, being such, it could enter into combinations and alliances of varied kind" (p. 1). Besides the Pilgrim Fathers, who sailed in the *Mayflower* in 1620, there were other Puritans, who were not Separatists in the sense of these, Puritans who *separated* themselves from the corruptions in the Church of England, but not from the Church itself. The rule of the Puritan fell with Cromwell. The difference between the Presbyterians and the Independents and the objection of "the English conscience" to the Solemn League and Covenant, imposed by force were also a factor in the result. The counter-revolution of 1660 was no direct revulsion of feeling against Puritanism. As the author says (p. 154): "Puritan institutions in the seventeenth century fell with Cromwell, but Puritan ideas did not fall with the institutions in which they had been embodied. They had done a great and permanent work in the sacred cause of liberty. The Puritans arrested the growth of absolute government in England." When it was "the turning-point of national destiny," then, "it was Puritanism that came to the rescue." The battle for constitutional liberty had been fought and won, and, "if Puritanism fell, it fell in the hour of victory." Lord Balfour of Burleigh's sketch of *The Rise and Development of Presbyterianism in Scotland* lays stress upon "the constitutional development of Presbyterianism in Scotland, both internally, and in its relation to the State," and emphasizes the fact that, "throughout the whole history of the Reformed Church in Scotland one of the



most outstanding features will be found to be the overwhelming desire to maintain the independence of the Church from all secular control, and the most characteristic feature of the disputes which went on during the reigns of the Stewart Kings (especially James VI and I, and Charles I) was the failure of those monarchs to appreciate the Scottish sentiments of Patriotism, Protestantism and Freedom." The Reformation in Scotland was consolidated by the massacre of St. Bartholomew in 1572 and when Knox died, he had seen "the triumph of the cause to which he had devoted his life" (p. 59),—for "the spirit of Scotland was now at one with the spirit of Knox in the great matters of faith and freedom." The overthrow of episcopacy and the episode of the Covenanters are matters of great significance. Presbyterianism survived persecution and entered into its own when, as a result of the accession to the throne of William of Orange, the British king took oath to maintain "the government, worship, discipline, rights and privileges of the Church of Scotland." As the author notes (p. 117), "the signing of this oath is the first official act of the sovereign, and on it depends his claim to the allegiance of Scotsmen." Of modern religion in Scotland the author observes (p. 162) that, "however widely the Scotland of the twentieth century may differ from the Scotland of Knox and Melville, it cannot be denied that their principles, shorn of some vigor and brought into proportion by experience, rule the ecclesiastical life of Scotland to-day," and "Presbyterianism has justified itself in Scotland by its adaptation to the religious needs of three centuries and a half." Not the least source of its strength has been "the happy combination of the clergy and the laity in the same courts," something that has "kept the Church in constant sympathy with the mind and needs of the country." Some happy method of "combining the principles of national religion and spiritual independencies," may yet be found to draw together the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church in one great "Scottish Church, national, free and Presbyterian," foreshadowing the reunion of all Christendom.

A. F. G.

*Neujüdische Stimmen über Jesus Christum.* Gesammelt von Lic. JOH. DE LE ROI. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1910. 54 p.

In this pamphlet, which forms No. 39 of the Publications of the Institutum Judaicum in Berlin, edited by Dr. Hermann L. Strack, the author, a retired minister in Schweidnitz, has gathered together from all parts of the globe (Europe in particular), opinions of eminent Jews of to-day concerning the personality of Jesus and the future position of Jewish thought with regard to him; also extracts from the writings of Jewish historians, etc. Some of these opinions are noteworthy, considering the approval which the views of Drews, in denial of the historicity of Jesus, have met with in certain Jewish circles. In Germany, Professor M. Lazarus (d. 1899); in France, Joseph and Theodore Reinach; in Italy, Cesare Lombroso (d. 1911); in England, F. Adler, C. G. Montefiore, O. J. Simon, I. Zangwill, I. Harris, etc.; in Sweden, Professor G. Klein; in Russia, S. M. Dubnow; in America, H. Weinstock, Dr. Kohler, I. Singer, Morris and Marcus Jastrow, J. H. Hoffmann, J. Krauskopf, etc.,—all these are among those who have expressed the opinion that the Jews

should claim Jesus as one of themselves and claim for their race all that through him has come to the world. The entrance of the Jews into the general current of life all over the globe makes the ultimate result of the whole matter a mere question of time. It is, indeed, inconceivable that a highly-endowed race, like the Jews, will continue to refuse to admit that "the greatest born of woman," the one personality destined to receive the admiration and the approval of all mankind, was a Jew, a good Jew, and the genius *par excellence* of all Jewry. Some day the name of the Galilean will be honored, by the side of, and beyond, Moses, Isaiah and the rest of his glorious predecessors in the history of human thought in Palestine.

A. F. C.

*Die allgemeine Mythologie und ihre ethnologischen Grundlagen.* VON PAUL EHRENREICH. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1910. VIII, 288 p.

The author of this book, which forms Part I of Vol. IV of the *Mythologische Bibliothek*, published by the Gesellschaft für Vergleichende Mythenforschung, is an anthropologist *vom Fach* and a specialist in the ethnology of aboriginal South America, etc. The topics treated are: Comparative and general mythology, problems of general mythology, the ethnological method, mythological stages of development, the materials of mythology, mythological personification, mythic forms, interpretation of myths, mythological personages and their interpretation, the migration of myths. Like articulate language, myths or *märchen* are lacking to no people on earth, so far as is known, and Dr. Ehrenreich observes (p. 3): "The myth *per se* can be comprehended only as a general human phenomenon. The most primitive human intellectual activity reveals itself in mythic thought, the objective product is myth-material. The whole conceptual world of primitive man is mythical, but the mythical view of the world is not limited to the youthful stage of mental development, but continues to exist throughout all stages of civilization. It forms the mother-soil of the religious life as well as of the beginnings of science, until, at last, with the perfection of abstract thinking, the scientific conception of the world takes its place. But the process is not excluded altogether, for, as we know, the ancient, mythic conceptions, come forth again and again from the depths of the folk-mind. In so doing, however, they find expression less in the creation of new mythical stories than in the mythical formulation of natural science or of religious ideas."

One cannot expect every people to be in possession of, or to have possessed, every myth. Moreover, the development of myth-material may be quite different with one people as compared with another. As the author rightly says (p. 3): "It depends upon *Anlage*, mental activity, local conditions, as well as upon the linguistic character of the people concerned. It has no direct relation to height of civilization. Highly developed peoples, as, e. g., the Romans, often remain at a very low stage of mythology, while the opposite frequently occurs. Lithuanians, Slavs and Finns, North American Indians and Polynesians show a surprising wealth of mythopoeic fancy, which, however, is not at all conditioned by any higher evolution of religious ideas." From the point of view of ethnology, according to Dr. Ehrenreich, "myth is rather a phenomenon

of race-psychology than of the history of religion" (p. 6). The real kernel of mythology is the "nature-myth,"—this is the lowest stratum, the matrix of all mythology, the universal, common possession of early man. The "Urmythologie" of mankind can be deduced or reconstituted from conceptions common to all peoples, from views of nature serving all peoples and all human beings as the basis of their imagination-products, irrespective of time and place (p. 45). This common property, according to Dr. Ehrenreich can be nothing less than ideas about the cosmic bodies, sun, moon and stars, together with ideas about the terrestrial environment of man and certain *motifs* derived from dream-life, etc.

This common mythical material of the primitive stage of mankind, includes the following (p. 61):

1. Beast-fables of the simplest form.
2. Like tales of the origin of remarkable geological forms, rocks, lakes, etc.
3. Tales of sun, moon and the striking constellations, etc.
4. Tales of the origin of striking biological phenomena,—birth, death, sex-functions and distinctions, etc.
5. Hero-tales, chiefly in close relation to cosmogony.

The simplest forms of mythology are to be found among the Australians, Papuans, etc., the South Africans and the Indians of East and South America, while some of the North American Indians, the North-Asiatics, the Polynesians and the West-Africans suggest in their myth-stuff the Teutons, Slavs, Letts and Finns, and "correspond in a way to the picture which we might reconstruct of a primitive Indogermanic mythology" (p. 63). Here too belong Japanese, Mexican and Peruvian mythology, but when we reach the Babylonians, the Egyptians, the Hindus, etc., we find that sacerdotal mythology and folk-mythology have been altogether separated, and, hence, comparison with primitive forms is not immediately possible. The development and extension of mythology are conditioned by such internal forces as the evolving intellectual, social and economic life of the people, and by such external factors as the mutual influences of peoples and contact with higher civilization. Religion, agriculture, secret societies, etc., are powerful here. The story of the gods and the cult-legend, e. g., give the myth the character of a conviction of faith (p. 82),—they create for religion firm form of belief. Plastic art "gives mythic forms plastic precision." All the higher mythologies "are at the same time calendar-mythologies, for all cult-acts need to be fixed in time, like the agricultural rites from which they have proceeded," and the gods "become symbolic representatives of those periods of time, for whose astral basis they stand" (p. 86). How far one can go in the direction of recognizing the influence of higher upon lower culture may be seen from the "pan-Babylonian theory," so recently current with many Orientalists. This theory "would interpret all the myths of the world as precipitates of the ancient Babylonian (or, generally, the ancient Oriental) astral religion, i. e., as the popularized form of a primitive astral-lore, which comprehended in itself both science and religion" (p. 91). The myths of the American Indians offer many problems with respect to the question of independent origins and borrowings from outside.

Of nature-myths, "moon-myths are the most universal among men and resemble one another the most" (p. 114), and "in moon-myths we find the greater agreement between the higher and the lower mythology," but one would go too far to maintain that the primitive mythology was completely lunar. Among the animal-tales it is the "explanatory myths" that exhibit the greatest resemblances in form (p. 142). To the discussion on "mythological personification" (p. 159) it may be added that the personification of abstract ideas among the American Indians is not so rare as might be thought,—e. g., the personification of "fatigue" among the Nez Percé, the Kootenay, etc. Concerning the "forms of myths" much must be left unsaid until we have the myths "as related by the uncivilized man in his own tongue;" argument from imperfect and abbreviated texts in another language, not understood by the narrator is unscientific and unsatisfying. Dr. Sapir has recently emphasized this need of the native text for the understanding of the form of American Indian myths.

As to myth-interpretation, Dr. Ehrenreich holds (p. 194) that while not every myth is a nature-myth, "it is only after failing to find an explanation from the nature point of view, that we should look about for something sociological or animistic." For most of the great epic-hero-poems of the ancient civilized people a sky-mythological basis can be assumed, and their astral or calendaric basis demonstrated (p. 222). In regard to the long-debated question whether the hero is a degenerated god or an elevated man, the author notes that gods can become heroes and that men can reach the height of heroes as well, and both of these things can happen in a variety of ways and for divers reasons (p. 234). Dr. Ehrenreich's volume is the most comprehensive attempt of recent years, by a competent authority, to resuscitate the "science of comparative mythology," which had fallen upon evil days through the mistaken labors of Max Müller and his school. While it is not possible to accept all of his "lunar hypotheses," his general discussions and arguments have much to commend them, at present at least.

A. F. C.



## PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

By ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN.

1. *Amazons.* A. F. Chamberlain's article, "Recent Literature on the South American 'Amazons,'" in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* (vol. 24, pp. 16-20), discusses the views of Ehrenreich, Lasch, Friederici and Rothery. Dr. Ehrenreich classes the Amazon myth among tales seeking "to legitimize the union of the males over against the aspiration of the women,"—divers legends, so it seems, have been intentionally modified in this direction. Lasch holds it to be "neither a historical nor a new culture-myth, but a mythic narration specially invented to explain social arrangements." It has been made serviceable for the purposes of the men's organization. Friederici demonstrates that the Amazon problem is quite complicated and that "there are several Amazon legends, and also other Amazon tales, which in content and in origin are very different from one another." Dr. Friederici rejects the view of Ehrenreich and Lasch that the South American Amazon legend originated among the northern Caribs. Rothery's book, *The Amazons in Antiquity and Modern Times* (London, 1910) covers a wide field, but lacks the bibliographical orientation and scientific accuracy of the brief studies of Lasch and Friederici, the essay of the last being, up to date, the best treatment of the subject in print.
2. *Apollo, the Greek calendar, etc.* In his article on "Die älteste griechische Zeitrechnung, Apollo und der Orient," published in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 423-448), M. P. Nilsson concludes that the opinion of von Wilamowitz that Apollo was no native Greek god, but derived from Asia Minor, is gaining ground, and seeks to strengthen this theory by arguments derived from the Greek calendar, festival-times, etc. Apollo, as the patron of month-reckoning, and because of his connection (as no other god) with a particular day of the month, viz., the seventh, is doubtless Oriental, since the seven-cult belongs there. The great religious movements generally reached Greece from without, and Apolloism was no exception. With it came the demand for reconciliation, the observation of certain rules and days, etc. In Greece coalescence with native cognate elements took place. Asia Minor looks Babylonward, and an early debt of Greece to Babylon, etc., is suggested here. The later clarifying and elevation of Apolloism (as found e. g., in Aeschylus) is a master-stroke of the Greek mind,—the dross went to Orphicism, etc.
3. *Begging monks of India.* In the *Archivio per l'Antropologia* (vol. 40, pp. 374-380), Prof. Domenico del Campana has an article "Intorno ai Sadhus dell' India inglese, monaci mendicanti." The Sadhus

(the Sanskrit word signifies "pure"), are a sect of religious mendicants, deistic in belief, monogamic as to marriage, abstainers from luxuries, tobacco, opium, betel, etc., and practicing resistance and the use of force only for personal defence. They are found chiefly in Delhi, Agra, Jeypore, Jairakhalad, etc., but a few also live scattered elsewhere in British India. De Gubernatis, when traveling in India (see his *Peregrinazioni indiane*, 1886, 1887), saw them near the sacred city of Lahore and visited one of their convents. The founder of the sect was a miracle-worker named Dadû, the son of a woman of Ahmenadab, and the story of his life, the *Dadupanthi*, is their sacred book. The clothing of the *Sadhus* is scant and their ornaments and religious paraphernalia rare. Professor Del Campana was able to obtain a set for his ethnological collection. The *Sadhus* are still reckoned heretics by the Brahmins. In cult they are rather eclectic, and Krishna is one of the deities worshiped by them. They are not idolators, but cater somewhat to popular superstitions for eleemosynary reasons.—In the *Baessler Archiv* (vol. 1, pp. 143-154), the new journal of the Baessler Institute in Berlin, W. Planert writes of *Religiöse Bettler in Südindien*, treating in detail of religious affinities, dress, paraphernalia, performances, etc. Among worshippers of Shiva the Pandaram beggars are most noteworthy; among those of Vishnu, the Sattadaver.

4. *Burials prehistoric and modern African*. The article of H. A. Junod, on "Deux enterrements à 20,000 ans d'intervalle," in *Anthropos* (vol. 5, 1910, pp. 957-968), makes comparison between the conditions of burial of the famous *Homo mousteriensis* discovered by Hauer in 1908,—this prehistoric "Frenchman" must have been interred some 20,000 years ago,—and the burial customs, etc., of the modern Baronga of South Africa. Belief in continuation of the soul after death seems indicated. The position of the body, the arrangement of the limbs, etc., are discussed (the bending of the legs and of one arm, while the other arm is stretched out,—this characterizes the skeleton of Moustier, and M. Junod suggests *rapprochement* with certain rites of the Baronga). Details of a Baronga burial are given.
5. *Chinese state-religion*. Hr. Otto Messing publishes in the *Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 348-375) an interesting article "Ueber die chinesische Staatsreligion und ihren Kultus." The history of the Chinese state-religion, from the earliest times (as represented in the Shu-king, the Shi-king, the Li-ki, and other sacred books) is given, with an account of the Temple of Heaven, at Peking, and other more modern developments. The author points out that it is to Buddhism, "the only foreign culture-element that has hitherto gained a lasting foothold in China," that the emphasis upon priesthood, temples and picture-cults is due,—these directions of religious expression and activity being anciently unknown. He also emphasizes the lofty moral tone of the old Chinese cult, which in respect to its pure content, its expression and method of representation rose far above those of the other civilized peoples of antiquity. When its deities were at the level of national polytheism, they were nevertheless

pure and chaste; there was no Bacchus or Venus and religious acts were devoid of obscenity, etc. The conceptions of Yin and Yang for the Chinese "were never popular deities, but rather philosophic theories or physical facts." The anti-foreign "instinct" of China has prevented the country from being "the arena of foreign god-ideas" to the extent that this has occurred in other ancient civilized lands, such, e. g., as Persia, Greece, Rome; and "in spite of the later intrusion of Buddhism, China has been able to preserve its religious individualism over against a religious cosmopolitanism." According to Messing the religious ideas of the Chinese, as represented by the traditional data concerned with the oldest, prehistoric, perhaps half mythical period (*ca.* 2500-1200 B. C.), were "monotheistic; then after the Chu period (the Chu dynasty began in the 12th century B. C.), where real history begins, a change to the dualistic conception (heaven and earth) occurs; in a third period (since the 6th century B. C., and lasting down to the present time) another change to a materialistic, or rather agnostic, view with a slight echo of monotheistic conception is to be noted.

6. *Civilization.* To *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 1-25) G. Simmel contributes an article on "Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur," the core of whose argument consists in the statement that, unlike the old Franciscans who declared of themselves that *nihil habentes, omnia possidentes*, the men and women of rich and overburdened civilizations, must say of themselves *omnia habentes, nihil possidentes*. The typical problematic situation of the modern man is "the sense of being surrounded by an endless number of culture-elements, which for him are not without significance, but at the greatest depth, not really momentous, and which *en masse* are somewhat oppressive, since he cannot inwardly assimilate each individual thing, nor yet simply reject it, because, so to speak, it belongs potentially in the sphere of his cultural development."
7. *Day of atonement.* In the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 130-142), H. Grimme discusses "Das Alter des israelitischen Versöhnungstages," reaching the conclusion that the Jewish day of atonement has claims to be regarded as an old constituent of the law. He is also of opinion that the "three-festival" list of *Deuteronomy* is not older than the "five-festival" list of *Leviticus* and *Numbers*.
8. *Deluge-legend.* In the *Korrespondenz-Blatt d. D. Ges. f. Anthropologie* (Jahrg. 41, pp. 82-83) is an abstract of a paper on "Die Flutsage der Cora-Indianer und verwandter Stämme," read by Dr. K. T. Preuss at the meeting of the German Anthropological Association at Cologne in August, 1910, and based on material collected by the author during his investigations of the Mexican Indians in 1905-1907. The basis of the Cora deluge-legend is the conception of the underworld and the night-sky as water and the identifying of both. The night-sky is also thought to be a water-snake, and with this the deluge is directly connected,—the flood is pictured as darkness spreading all over the earth and continuing until the rising morning star kills the snake

with an arrow and light then reigns again. Lake Santa Teresa, the only body of water in the Cora country, is looked upon as the remains of the deluge. The people who sprang into the lake, in order to escape the serpent, became stars in the sky. In another deluge-legend of the Cora Indians, found also among the Huichol, the moon-goddess, Takútsi Nakavé, informs a man of the coming of the flood and tell him to hollow out a tree-trunk. Into this he puts fire and certain seeds and after he has got in the goddess herself sits upon the boat and steers it safely through the waters (the night-sky). In a myth of the Mexicano Indians the morning-star is continually watching over the water-snake, lest the earth should be completely submerged. With the Cora Indians the watery deep is called *tikantse*, i. e. "place of night," and *tikantse* is at once a region of moisture, rain and fertility in the night-sky. Out of the night-sky come (from mythic places of birth, life, vegetation, moisture, rain, etc.), children and plants. In the underworld are to be found things that appear upon earth. Tétewan, the goddess of the underworld, has faces in every direction (according to Dr. Preuss she is thus the star-filled night-sky). She reaches up to the earth's surface and is also the deity of the waters springing up from the underworld. These legends of the Cora and related Indians of the Mexican Sierra Madre, collected by so careful and competent an investigator, as is Dr. Preuss, have great value for the interpretation of primitive religion and mythology.

9. *Fish-symbol.* In the *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 1-53, 327-392), I. Scheftelowitz has a monograph on "Das Fisch-Symbol in Judentum und Christentum," in which are discussed all aspects of the fish as a Jewish and a Christian symbol. Among the Jews the fish in water was the symbol of a believing Israelite, and this figure was transferred to the Christian by the early Church Fathers (p. 5). According to Scheftelowitz, who treats at some length the question of the "Messianic fish," among the Jews and its relation to the Messiah and previous attempts to explain the Christian *Ichthys*-symbol (pp. 6-53), the Jewish messianic fish, Leviathan, was known to the early Christians and *Ichthys*, as a designation for Christ, was likewise derived from the Jews. The Jewish idea of a fish (the Leviathan) that appears at the same time as the Messiah is, Scheftelowitz thinks (p. 327), a further development, due to later astrological influences, of the Old Testament idea (in Ezekiel) that the favorite food of the dead in the Messianic realm would be fish. Both at Jewish festivals and in the paintings on the Catacombs fish appear as the symbol of the food of the dead, and hence, the idea is again of Israelitish origin. Its ultimate provenance is from the older nature-religion conceptions. The fish also occurs as a symbol of protection against demons and as a lucky sign,—here we can go back to Babylon as well. Fish-amulets, used by the early Christians against demons are ancient in the Mediterranean region; and the Messianic fish has been specially developed from very primitive ancestors. Concerning the fish as the symbols of ancestors or ancestral spirits, we learn of



the presence of fish-figures in graves of the pre-Christian period and of a view rather widely prevalent among primitive peoples and others that human beings, after death, turn into fish. Sometimes, no doubt, this idea is due to the thought that the soul of the dead, in order to reach the land of the blest, must cross a great ocean. As a symbol of fertility, the fish has a wide distribution, being connected with increase of children, cattle, etc., and with sex. Taken altogether, in the fish-symbol, the early Christians borrowed most, if not all of its direct significance from preceding Jewish religious and mythological ideas. In connection with Scheftolowitz's monograph should be read the article of Dr. Paul Carus, in the *Open Court* (vol. 25, 1911, pp. 385-411) on "The Fish as a Mystic Symbol in China and Japan," where several points of *rapprochement* with the Judæo-Christian lore of the fish are to be noted. According to Dr. Carus certain Chinese data "bear a close resemblance to European legends in which the fish symbolizes the sun." The goddess Kwan-yin is represented very often with a fish,—she "is a female form of Buddha which originated in China." In the same journal Dr. Carus also discusses "The Fish in Brahmanism and Buddhism."

10. *Folk-religion, etc., in Spanish America.* The article of A. M. Espinosa on "New-Mexican Spanish Folk-Lore," in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* (vol. 23, 1910, pp. 395-418), contains some items of interest to the student of the origin and development of religious ideas. Among the Spanish people of New Mexico "no one is born a witch; witchcraft is a science, a kind of learning which may be learned from other witches." The New Mexican idea of dwarfs is embodied in the statement that "dwarfs (*los duendes*) are individuals of small stature, who frighten the lazy, the wicked, and, in particular, the filthy." Some of the figures of folk-belief in Spanish New Mexico are: The evil one, the weeping woman, the bugaboo (*el coco*), the devil (*el mashishi*, *el diablo*, *el malo*, etc.), the monster viper, the basilisk, etc. Ghosts also figure prominently. There are also many beliefs and superstitions about spirits, sleep and dreams, the "evil eye," various diseases and their cures, the heavenly bodies and meteoric phenomena, luck and ill-luck, etc. The New Mexicans "do not worry much about the Devil," as a simple sign of the cross will scare him away; so he seems not to be an important factor in their folk-lore. Among other epithets attached to the Devil may be mentioned *aquel gallo*—"that (old) rooster," and *pata galán*—"pretty legs" (so termed in a riddle). The "monster viper" is mixed Indian and Spanish. A specimen ghost-story is given on page 407. The moon is believed to exert influence on children even before birth. If a pregnant woman goes out to see an eclipse of the moon, "the moon will eat up the nose or lips of her offspring;" and of a child born with such deformities, the saying goes, *se lo comió la luna*, "the moon has eaten him." The recently formed Chilian Folk-Lore Society has set about collecting and preserving the folk-lore of the country, both Indian and Spanish. One of the most important contributions published up to the present is the monograph of R. A.

Laval on "Oraciones, eusalmos i conjuros del Pueblo Chileno," in the *Revista de la Sociedad de Folk-Lore Chileno* (vol. 1, 1910, pp. 75-133), treating of folk-prayers, charms, incantations, etc., in comparison with those now or formerly current in Spain. The Spanish texts of 126 prayers of all sorts, 24 charms, etc., and formulae used for children, and 21 incantations are recorded,—all from oral tradition. In the course of transmission from generation to generation some curious changes in words and in phraseology have taken place, a curious example of which is cited on page 77. The up-to-date character, which sometimes marks folk-thought is seen from the fact that we find in No. 36 the words

"Te adoro, Jesus divino,  
Que vives entre la nieve,"

a distinct reference to the now famous statue of the "Christ of the Andes" erected in 1904, on the high mountains where Chili and Argentina meet, as a symbol of peace. In connection with the folklore of Spanish America reference may be made here to J. V. Cifuentes's *Mitos y supersticiones recogidos de la tradición oral* (1910), in which will be found information concerning the chief figures of Chilian folk-mythology, a considerable number of which have been drawn partly or wholly from Indian sources. In Chili, as in New Mexico, the Devil is only of secondary importance, being eclipsed by local mythical personages. The *duendes* are "elves, fairies, dwarfs, little infant-faced angels, who cannot reach either heaven or hell, but must abide in the air."

11. *Latin in folk-lore.* The article of Ramon A. Laval, "Del Latin en el Folk-Lore Chileno," in the *Revista de la Sociedad de Folk-Lore Chileno* (vol. 1, 1910, pp. 1-25) treats of the occurrence of Latin words and phrases in the Spanish folk-lore of Chile. In sayings, refrains, popular verses, anecdotes, etc., are to be met with fragments and vestiges of Latin, some of them due, doubtless, to the colonial period when, outside of the University of San Felipe, the only educational institutions in the country were the convents, where Latin was the basis of all instruction. Some few years ago the compulsory teaching of Latin in Chile ceased, and to-day it is taught only in the seminaries and convents, and in the Instituto Pedagógico for those who intend to devote themselves to the study of languages. Most of these macaronic verses in imitation of liturgical texts, Latin words scattered through joco-serious poems, etc., have been transferred from the folk-literature, etc., of Spain. The one saying that is clearly Chilian, *Beati indiani quia manducant charquicanem* is attributed to Pope Pius X, who, earlier in life, as a simple priest, was in Chile as secretary to Monseñor Muzzi in 1824.

12. "*Manumissio in ecclesia.*" In the *Rendiconti d. R. Ist. Lombardo di Scienze et Lettere* (Sec. 2, vol. 44, pp. 619-642), Dr. P. de Francisci publishes an article "Intorno alle origini della 'Manumissio in Ecclesia,'" in which he argues that the *manumissio in ecclesia* is not, as Golopedo and many after him have maintained, derived from the

hierodulism of Hellenic law, a form of manumission in use among various Hellenic peoples under the form of fictitious sale of the slave to a divinity (e. g. slaves wishing manumission were brought to Delphi and sold to the priest of Apollo in front of the entrance to the oracle), which later on took shape as a simple declaration of the manumitter before a local magistrate (e. g. in Boeotia),—the last traces of this form of manumission are to be found in the second century A. D. According to Dr. Francisci the very form and constitution of the *manumissio in ecclesia* suggest that there is no connection between it and hierodulism or manumission by fictitious sale. The *manumissio in ecclesia* is not an innovation of Constantine, but a form already used in the primitive Christian communities, who had already a Greek formulary,—all that Constantine did was to give solemn juridical value to an act already quite common in practice. The evidence requires us to abandon the theory of the origin of the *manumissio in ecclesia* from fictitious sale to a deity. Its relation to the ancient Greek manumission by consecration to a divinity may still be maintained, but the special form was probably developed first in Christian communities of the Orient speaking the Greek language, from which it passed to the Occident with Christianity and was finally consecrated by the official recognition of Constantine.

13. *Marking, branding, etc.* Under the title of "La miraculeuse histoire de Pandare et d'Echédore," P. Perdrizet gives in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 54-129) the results of his investigations concerning the question of "marking" in antiquity, in connection with the tale of Pandarus, the Thessalian, and the transference of the stigmata on his forehead to Echedorus. The author discusses in detail the meaning, etc., of all manners of "marking," "branding," "stigmatizing," including *stigmata*, *grammata*, marks and signs, tattooing, the *signaculum* of confirmation, the mark of the *miles Christi*, "sign of the hand" and marked hands, the military sign, etc.; also cauterization, scarification, tattooing, etc., in various forms, to mark slaves and property, as a mark of soldiers, as a religious token. It is curious to note how recently branding has disappeared from the penal codes of Christendom. Tattooing, apparently, was common in pre-Hellenic Greece, but not highly favored in classic times. Branding cattle was widely prevalent in antiquity. Slaves and recruits were often "marked." Perdrizet is of opinion that the military mark was probably of religious origin, being a special variety of the religious *stigma*. Its ultimate derivation would be from Syria.
14. *Modern cult of the dead.* In the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 302-303), L. Deubner cites some interesting facts concerning the requirement in the wills of several persons between 1880 and 1910, in Russia, Germany, etc., that the surviving relatives or donees of the deceased shall hold a festival, or dinner, on the anniversary of his birth or death, etc. One such individual suggested



that, when young people happened to be present at his death-festival, cheer should prevail, and dancing indulged in.

15. *Modern curse and malediction.* In the same Journal (pp. 318-319), R. Wünsch gives texts of two quite recent anathemas. The first, dating from 1910, is the conjuration of a French woman to have "Great St. Exterminus" torment the soul and mind of another woman living in Paris. The second, belonging to the year 1911, is the work of a female "seer" in Königsberg (Prussia), who practiced all sorts of "magic" with certain books of the Old Testament.
16. *Mysticism, etc.* In an article on "Mystik und Metaphysik," in *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 92-112) Sergius Hessen touches, among other things, upon the relation of mysticism and religion. For him, "in spite of its nearness to the religious field, mysticism, as pure experience, need not coincide with religion." Religion "does not, like mystical experience, like outside culture, but forms a part of it; it crystallizes itself in concrete things, such as church, prayer, dogma." However close religion may stand to the mystical sphere proper, it is not "the last thing." The mystic ocean surrounding the island of objectivity is endless.
17. *"Nama-cult of the Sudan.* In a brief article on "Le culte du Nama au Soudan," published in the *Bull. et. Mém. de la Soc. d'Anthrop. de Paris* (6.S., vol. 1, 1910, pp. 361-362), Fr. de Zeltner treats of a form of native "religion," known as the Nama-cult, the chief feature of which is certain colored wooden fetishes (or *namas*), which are kept in a hut under care of the *dibi* or head of the cult. Sanctuaries of this "religion" are to be found in the village of Niaumala, district of Kita. A number of the *namas*, confiscated by the authorities in a village of the district of Bamako, are now in the Musée du Trocadéro, Paris.
18. *Philosophy of religion and psychology of religion.* The question of the lines of division between the philosophy and the psychology of religion is discussed by Dr. Th. Hoepfner, in an article, "Beiträge zur Scheidung zwischen Religionsphilosophie und Religionspsychologie," published in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (vol. 5, 1911, pp. 37-56), originally an address before a Masonic lodge in Eisenach. In the study of religion, both philosophical-logical criticism and the psychological method are necessary in order, on the one hand, that the basis of our views may be tested and the great eternal and human ideas comprehended, and on the other, that the significance of mental content and mental processes may not be overlooked or misinterpreted.
19. *Placenta in folk-lore, etc.* In the *Archivio per l'Antropologia* (vol. 40, 1910, pp. 316-352), Professor G. Bellucci has an article on "La placenta nelle tradizioni italiane et nell'etnografia," in which he has gathered together a mass of data concerning the placenta in Italian folk-lore, with indications of corresponding ideas and practices elsewhere in the world, among uncivilized peoples, etc. The investiga-



tions of the author were suggested by the discovery of the remains of a human placenta in a spring in the commune of Magione (Umbria) in 1907. It was found that the women of Magione believed that placentas must be thrown into springs or running water, it being thought that the *descent* of milk in the breasts of the woman with child and the securing and preservation of a large quantity of milk, stood in relation to the slow maceration of the placenta, such as could be verified if it were thrown into and kept in the water. The belief also prevailed that if the placenta were suddenly dried the mammary glands would also dry up and suckling become impossible.

20. "*Primitive monotheism.*" In the *Revue de Philosophie* for September-October, 1911, J. Linard discusses (pp. 390-416), under the title "*Le monothéisme primitif d'après Andrew Lang et Wilhelm Schmidt,*" the views as to the nature of religion and the idea of God prevalent among uncivilized peoples according to Andrew Lang and Father Schmidt (editor of *Anthropos*) in their recent writings. Lang draws his evidence for the existence of a sort of "primitive monotheism," from all parts of the globe (Fuegians to natives of New Guinea), Father Schmidt considers particularly the Pigmies and the Australasians. The rôle of animism, according to Lang, was to clarify the conception of deity. Exuberant mythology has sometimes "buried" the idea of a creator, a supreme being, etc. Lang sees in sacrifices an attempt to please or appease spirits,—this also weakened the "idea of God;" Schmidt rather a token of gratitude to the author of all. Father Schmidt's articles in *Anthropos* have been reprinted as a monograph, with the title *L'Origine del'idée de Dieu, Etude historico-critique et positive* (Vienne, 1910, 316 p.).
21. "*Religion*" and "*Superstition.*" In the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 14, 1911, pp. 406-422), W. F. Otto has an article, "*Religio et Superstitio,*" wherein he discussed with some detail the meaning and use of these terms by the Romans, etc. According to the author, *religio* "is originally and primarily a feeling, more exactly the feeling of holy awe, anxiety, doubt, or fear, aroused in the human mind in face of something unusual, inexplicable, etc." Later, with the appearance of priests and stated religious offices, the word assumed a secondary meaning, viz., the attitude of the citizen toward the supernatural,—"represented without fear or doubt in the form of the recognized national deities and so rightly venerated." This view of the matter was expressed by W. W. Fowler in an essay on "The Latin history of the Word 'Religio,'" in the second volume of the *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions* (Oxford, 1908),—Hr. Otto's article was ready for publication before the appearance of Fowler's discussion. He agrees with Marett, who, in his *The Threshold of Religion* (London, 1909), says (p. 13), "of all English words, *Awe* is, I think, the one that expresses the fundamental Religious Feeling most nearly." *Religio* has in it something negative and something positive. The word *superstitio*, according to Otto, meant originally "excitement," then

excitement of fear," etc.; it belongs with *extasis*, but with a certain difference. In the later development of a state-cult, *superstitio* came to denote something reprehensible, a superfluity of *religio*. The etymology of *religio*, Otto thinks, is from a verb *relegere*, "to be careful," the opposite of *neglegere*. From the basal meaning of *relegere* the signification of rite and cult can be made clear. In his Königsberg dissertation, published in 1910, *De verborum "religio" atque "religiosus" usu apud Romanos quaestiones selecta*, which is criticized at some length by Otto, M. Kobbert opposes the view that *religio* primarily signified a feeling, and that from that meaning all others must be derived.

22. *Roman ex-votos*. It is not generally known that the Archeological Museum of Madrid contains a rich collection of terra-cotta *ex-votos* (not yet published), found about 1868 by the Marquis of Salamanca at Calvi, near Rome. Their number is so great that they may have come from a shop. There are several hundred figures of animals (pigs, cattle), heads of human beings, masks, feet, hands, breasts, genital organs, etc., besides many figurines of the Tanagra type. A brief account of some of these (particularly those representing deformed and diseased limbs, organs, etc.), is given by Dr. F. Regnault, in his article on "Collection d'ex-voto Romains du Musée Archéologique de Madrid," in the *Bulletins et Mémoires de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris* (Sér. 6, vol. 1, 1910, pp. 258-265). The *ex-votos* of feet show clearly that the Romans suffered from their sandals.
23. *Song recitative in myths*. The rôle of song in the non-ceremonial acts of American Indians, and, perhaps, of some other more or less primitive peoples, is emphasized by Dr. E. Sapir, in his article on "Song Recitative in Paiute Mythology," in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* (vol. 23, 1910, pp. 455-472). The subject is of great interest since, "not infrequently in America, particularly where song enters in, mythology is closely linked with ritual; but as Paiute myths have, as far as could be learned, no ritualistic aspect whatever, the term 'non-ceremonial' as applied to them seems justified" (p. 455). The Indians in question are the Kaibab Paiutes of southwestern Utah and northwestern Arizona. As Dr. Sapir points out, the obtaining of so many texts of Indian myths in English only has had certain disadvantages for while the myth thus obtained "may sometimes be more complete as a narrative than the same myth obtained in text," it will also "nearly always have much of the baldness and lack of color of a mere abstract." It can therefore be affirmed that "had most or all of the many American myths now already published been collected as fully dictated texts, there is small doubt that Indian mythologies would be more clearly seen to have their peculiarities of style and character as well as incident." There is undoubtedly a considerable effort made in American Indian myths "to make characters interesting as such," and this has probably been one of the factors in the development of the myth recitative, which may not be original with the Paiutes, but borrowed from or suggested by some-



thing similar among the Mohave, who possess long song-myths, since "there is reason for believing that the Mohave or other Yuman tribes have exercised a considerable influence on the musical stock in trade of the Paiute." In Paiute the song recitative "is not peculiar to any particular myth, but always to a particular character, there being as many distinct styles of recitative as there are singing characters." The narrative portions of the Paiute myth are always recited in a speaking voice, but the conversational passages, "are either spoken or sung, according to the mythical character who is supposed to be speaking." The Porcupine, Chipmunk, Skunk and Badger talk rather than sing. Among the singing characters are Wolf, Mountain-bluejay, Gray-Hawk, Sparrow-Hawk, Eagle, Lizard, Rattlesnake, Red-Ant, Badger-Chief and Iron-Clothes (a mythical personage). The coyote rarely uses song (e. g., on the death of his brother Wolf). A number of interesting points in connection with the wordings, pronunciation, etc., of the texts of these songs are noted by the author, while, "from the musical point of view, perhaps the most remarkable fact to be noted in regard to these recitatives is the variety of rhythms employed." In eleven examples obtained by Dr. Sapir "no less than five meters can be illustrated" (p. 470).

24. *Sun myths.* In the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* (vol. 23, 1910, pp. 473-478), Mr. A. C. Parker, himself of Indian descent, has a brief article on "Iroquois Sun Myths," in which he gives the English text only of a legend of "Three Brothers who followed the Sun under the Sky's Rim." According to Mr. Parker, although it is probable that this legend contains modern features the portion relating to the sky and the sun is, in the belief of the Indian narrator, very old. In Iroquois mythology as here represented, there are three somewhat conflicting ideas of the sun: 1, as the messenger of the creator and the patron of war; 2, as the face of the first mother; 3, as the father of mankind of earthly origin. Some of the data suggest that "Iroquois mythology in its present state has been derived from several sources." One of these factors is doubtless the adoption of conquered and associated tribes, both of Iroquoian and of Algonkian lineage. Among the Onondaga, of the Grand River Reservation (Ontario), the leader of the sun-ceremony carries a wooden effigy of the sun. The survival of certain sun-ceremonials among the Canadian Iroquois is ascribed by the author to the fact that these Indians were longer under the influence of the old religion, receiving later the "revelations" of Handsome Lake, the Seneca "prophet," who, about 1800, by his teachings, tabooed most of the Iroquois folk-beliefs "and almost entirely revolutionized the religious system of the Iroquois of New York and Ontario."